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New information technology (IT) ventures are at the forefront of developing IT innovations. 
In spite of their importance in the advancement of IT and the unique risks of survival that 
distinguishes them from established firms, the organizational literature on IT has mostly 
overlooked new IT ventures. Specifically, Big Data industry is a context where new IT ventures 
actively change the landscape of IT innovations. However, less is known about the factors 
influencing the economic success of Big Data ventures (BDVs), as well as the established firms 
that invest in them. To shed light on these factors, three essays are designed and executed.  
The first essay investigates the value proposition of a BDV‘s product/service as an important 
constituent of its business model and seeks to understand how it affects the capital raised by 
BDVs in their early stages of development. Then, the second essay is concerned with the role 
that the network embeddedness of a BDV plays in its success. Building on the notion of socially-
constructed innovations, this essay examines the suitable network structures that help BDVs 
succeed. Finally, the third essay focuses on a BDV‘s strategy in management of its 
communication with the potential investors on social media platforms. In this essay, we extend 
the previous literature that had highlighted the importance of the verbal content of 
communication on social media platforms for a new venture‘s success and in turn focus on the 
non-verbal aspects of communication in social media. Building on the notion of symbolic actions 
to theorize about non-verbal communication, we focus on the sequence of message narrators in 
social media and investigate the different tactics BDVs follow to raise capital. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
New IT ventures are at the forefront of developing information technology (IT) innovations, 
some of which have transformed the way the modern society, as well as the modern economy, 
function. For example, in the growing economy of Big Data, our preliminary examination of the 
Big Data initiatives0F
1
, pursued by established firms, shows a significant presence of investments 
in new Big Data ventures (BDVs). uBiomeis one of these BDVs that has developed a platform 
that utilizes the Big Data science to investigate human microbiomes and present the outcome of 
its discoveries to healthcare and pharmaceutical companies. uBiome is among the first industry-
scale initiatives to understand human microbiomes through analyzing masses of data coming 
from thousands of patients around the globe. It revolutionizes the way that the interrelations 
among diseases, as well as the effectiveness of drugs, are understood.  
New ventures face higher risks of survival compared to the bigger and more established 
firms (MacMillan and Day 1987). Most notably, they face threats of newness and smallness 
(e.g., Leung et al. 2006). Because of their unknown nature, or lack of a clear business history, 
their access to financial capital is challenging (threat of newness). Also, because of their organic 
organization (Covin and Slevin 1990) and extremely small size (Lu and Beamish 2006), they 
often face a fierce competition from the competitors that usually benefit from economies of scale 
(MacMillan and Day 1987).  
In spite of their importance in advancement of ITand the unique risks of survival that 
distinguishes them from established firms, the organizational literature on IT has overlooked new 
IT ventures for the most part.We searched the Web of Science database to see if the keywords 
―new venture‖ or ―startup‖ have been mentioned in AIS‘ basket-of-eight journals; the search in 
                                                          
1Out of 842 Big Data investments by businesses from 2009 to 2014 found in press news 
(collected from Lexis/Nexis), 615 (73%) were investments in BDVs. 
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Web of Science returns only seven results (Janson et al. 1997; Leidner 1999; Siau 1999; Poon 
2000; Winter and Gill 2001; Custodio et al. 2006; Laffey 2007), none of which appearin the top-
three journals of the field (MIS Quarterly, Information Systems Research, and Journal of 
Management Information Systems). While one of the seven studies discusses the usefulness of e-
commerce togeneral startups (Poon 2000), the other six studies are examinations of new IT 
venture single cases, which have mostly focused on the new technology introduced by the 
venture, rather than investigating the venture‘s roadmap to success. Therefore, this dissertation 
intends to investigate factors that affect the economic success of new IT ventures, and BDVs 
specifically, as less understood organizational forms. 
At an abstract level, we treat the question about the economic success of new IT ventures as 
the overarching theoretical phenomenon of interest. We study this phenomenon in the Big Data 
context as an important emerging area in which new IT ventures have a salient presence. 
Specifically, we design and execute three essays that shed light on factors influencing the 
economic success ofBDVs, as well as the established firms that invest in them. In the design of 
the three essays, we expand our attention to the strategic aspects of success of new IT ventures 
and the context-specific insights pertaining to BDVs. Below we briefly introduce each essay. 
A Three-Essay Research Approach 
The first essay (Chapter 2) investigates the value proposition of a BDV‘s product/service as 
an important constituent of its business model and seeks to understand how it affects the capital 
raised by BDVs in their early stages of development. In this study, we identify different 
technological scopes prevalent in the Big Data context and discuss the value propositions that 
best fit each scope. Moreover, we examine the value that BDVs generate for their well-
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established investors. In doing so, we consider the environmental characteristics of the investing 
firm as a factor that moderates the effect of a BDV‘s value proposition. 
We assess a BDV‘s value proposition by investigating its verbal communication with the 
potential investors, reflected in its product/service description statements. Moreover, we 
complement our examination of a BDV‘s verbal communication by surveying the value 
propositions communicated to the potential investors indirectly, mostly through third-party blog 
posts, or news pieces about the BDV. This study uses a mixture of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches and utilizes data crawled from a focal BDV‘s web pagesand archival 
data.Specifically, a text-analytics approach is followed to make sense of value propositions 
offered by a BDV, and an event study approach is used in examining the economic payoff of 
investing in BDVs by established firms. 
The second essay (Chapter 3) is concerned with the role that the network embeddedness of a 
BDV plays in its success. The existing research on entrepreneurial success has emphasized the 
effect of network embeddedness, especially in providing access to the investors. Nonetheless, the 
role of embeddedness in development and refinement of innovation and its effect on a new 
venture‘s success is understudied. Networks play a pertinent role in the development of a new 
venture‘s innovation, especially if the product/service is developed in an industry where 
innovation is socially-constructed. While regulation, patenting trends, and other social norms 
may make developing an innovation possible within the boundaries of individual firms, we argue 
that IT innovations, specifically in the area of Big Data, can be constructed socially. Building on 
the notion of socially-constructed innovations, this essay examines the suitable network 
structures that help BDVs succeed. Specifically, those networks supplying intellectual capital to 
a BDV are studied along with those supplying access to financial capital. 
4 
 
Further, this essay conducts a comparison between the IT context, i.e., Big Data, and a non-
IT context, i.e., Medical Devices. The purpose of this comparison is to understand the potential 
unique outcomes of network embeddedness for new IT ventures compared to their peers in other 
industries.  
A secondary focus in this essay is to simultaneously investigate the different types of 
networks that new ventures are embedded inand investigate whether separating or aggregating 
the ties from the different networks can better explain the economic benefits that the ventures 
receive. 
This quantitative study combines data gathered from the first study with the founders‘ and 
investors‘ networks of affiliation to investigate the proposed research models. In conducting this 
essay, networks of co-founders, employees, and investors are mapped and then transformed to 
examine the inter-venture networks that supply a BDV with intellectual or financial capital. In 
studying the network effects, the network structures are measured longitudinally, across each 
round of fundraising for each BDV, and a panel of BDVs across rounds of fundraising are 
examined. Further, a matched-sample methodology is used to conduct the comparison between 
the models run in the Big Data and Medical Devices Industry, to ensure a fair comparison. 
The third essay (Chapter 4) focuses on a BDV‘s strategy in management of its 
communication with the potential investors on social media platforms. In this essay, we intend to 
extend the previous literature that had highlighted the importance of the verbal content of 
communication on social media platforms for a new venture‘s successand in turn focus on non-
verbal aspects of communication in social media. Building on the notion of symbolic actions to 
theorize about non-verbal communication, we focus on the sequence of message narrators in 
social media and investigate the different tactics BDVs follow to raise capital.  
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A second focus of this essay is on examining the extent to which non-verbal communication 
tactics in one platform instigate reaction (in form of Word-of-mouth, WoM) in another platform. 
Specifically, we discuss that the BDVs face an environment in which fundraising activities are 
not limited to the macro-investors(e.g., angels and venture capitalists) and extend to micro-
investors in form of crowdfunding. Accordingly, social media activities extend beyond attracting 
audiences in platforms which are designed for macro-investors and include communication with 
micro-investors in more publicly accessible platforms. Since a new venture‘s activities in one 
platform are visible to the audience in another, investigating cross-platform effects can inform 
entrepreneurs about ways in which they can coordinate their social media efforts.  
The third essay follows an inductive approach, where we utilize event-sequence analysis to 
identify beneficial non-verbal communication tactics followed by BDVs in macro- and micro-
investor platforms. We then assess the effect that these tactics have on the raised capital and 
examine the possible cross-platform effects in a longitudinal study. Similar to Essay 2, this 
essay‘s quantitative analysis is conducted on a panel of BDVs followed in multiple rounds of 
fundraising. Table 1 summarizes these three essays, in terms of their research question(s), 
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Table 1. Overview of the Dissertation Essays 
 Essay 1 Essay 2 Essay 3 
Research 
Question(s) 
1. How do a BDV‘s value 
propositions affect its success? 
2. How do the environmental 
characteristics of an investing 
firm interact with the BDV‘s 
value propositions to affect the 
success for investing firms? 
1. How does the embeddedness of a 
BDV in intellectual and financial 
capital networks affect its success? 
2. Are there any differences between 
the social construction of IT 
innovations and innovations 
developed in other industries? 
 
1. What are the prevalent 
non-verbal 
communication 
strategies that BDVs 
pursue? 
2. Are there any cross-
platform effects for non-
verbal communication 
strategies followed in 
macro- and micro-
investor social media 
platforms? 
Theoretical Focus Business Models Social Networks Non-Verbal Symbolic 
Communication 
Methodology Qualitative (content analysis)/ 
Quantitative (event study) 
Qualitative (content analysis)/ 




(longitudinal panel, event 
sequence analysis) 
Data  Crawled data from webpages 
 Archival 
 Crawled data from webpages 
 














Big Data and Organizational Impacts: A Study of Investment in Big Data Ventures 
 
Abstract 
Due to their versatility, Big Data ventures (BDVs) have become a prevalent choice of 
investment for conventional firms that perceive the risk of investment in Big Data technologies 
to be high. However, less is known about how BDVs produce rent for their investing partners. 
Utilizing a business model lens, this study proposes that the value emphasis and technological 
scope of a BDV‘s business model interact to influence the market performance of the investing 
firms. Further, we hypothesize that the environmental uncertainty of the investing firm is another 
interacting factor, influencing the effect that the value emphasis has on the performance of 
investing firms. Adopting an event-study approach, we test our hypotheses by forming a sample 
of 651 public announcements about firms that have invested in BDVs from 2010 to 2013 and 
found that a BDV‘s emphasizing tackling Big Data challenges (i.e., volume, velocity, variety, 
and veracity) increases abnormal returns for the investing firm, although such benefits are 
contingent on the technological scope of the BDV‘s innovation (i.e., Big Data security, analytics, 
or Big Data infrastructure) and the investing firm‘s environmental dynamism, complexity, and 
munificence.   
 
Key words:  Big Data venture, Big Data investment, business model, value emphasis, 





In the ―Big Data‖ era, where the volume, velocity, and veracity of data available to 
organizations exceeds the capacity of traditional data processing applications (Chen et al. 2012), 
organizations strive to use new generations of technology to process fast-flowing information 
and produce competitive intelligence. According to one report, 64 percent of US firms had 
already invested or planned to invest in ―Big Data technologies‖ in 2013 (Gartner 2014). Big 
Data technologies are directed at finding ways to effectively assimilate voluminous and fast-
flowing data into the day-to-day conduct of firms (Gartner 2014) and range from infrastructural 
investments in new data processing platforms to advanced business intelligence and analytics 
applications. In the Big Data era, groundbreaking technological advancements have changed the 
nature of information technology (IT) investments, making their costs higher than what most 
medium-sized firms can afford (Jacobs 2009). Moreover, risks associated with Big Data 
investments are considered to be higher than with conventional IT investments (Chen et al. 
2012). The high cost of Big Data investments (BDIs), coupled with their high risk, has resulted 
in a growing mode of IT investment that is no longer internally driven.   
In turn, start-ups pursuing Big Data ventures (BDVs) represent a prevalent organizational 
form due to their versatility and risk-taking nature in design and development of Big Data 
technologies. BDVs are considered to be an important way of involving larger firms in Big Data 
Initiatives (BDIs). In fact, larger firms try to pursue BDIs through the proxy of BDVs, by 
investing in their venture capital, or acquiring them. Gobble (2013, p. 65) describes the 
emergence of BDVs: 
―…A number of promising start-ups are offering new ways to collect, store and 
analyze data; in 2011 and 2012 Wall Street Journal profiled several of these 




Similarly, results of our preliminary study of publicly-announced BDIs in 2013 show that 73 
percent of organizations‘ BDIs can be categorized as external investment in Big Data ventures 
(BDVs).  
Unlike conventional IT investments, investment in BDVs adds value through external 
partnership with another firm, i.e., the start-up company owning the venture. Literature on the 
value of IT in organizations has mainly focused on how IT as an internal production factor (e.g., 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000), resource (e.g., Wade and Hulland 2004), or capability (e.g., Pavlou 
and El Sawy 2006) enables organizations to compete with rivals and produce economic gain. 
However, this literature informs us less about value addition through investments in IT ventures, 
generally, and BDVs, specifically. Because of their external focus, value-adding mechanisms in 
ventures are different from those mechanisms in conventional organizations (Zott and Amit 
2007) and thusrequire more research to unfold.  
Moreover, Big Data technologies change the data focus of organizations from within-
enterprise data (i.e., own suppliers, own firm, own customers) to outside-of-the-enterprise data 
(i.e., potential suppliers, potential customers) (Chen et al. 2012). Due to their role in triggering 
major changes in the architecture of data in firms, Big Data investments have become an 
important area of interest within information systems (IS), with academia responding through 
redefined research agendas (Kumar et al. 2013; Goes 2014). Recent IS literature has focused on 
BDIs as the means to gain competitive advantage (Agarwal and Dhar 2014) and called for 
research that transcends the professional speculations around BDIs (Chen et al. 2012) by 
investigating their value-creation mechanisms (Agarwal and Dhar 2014) and impacts on 




In spite of the prevalence and importance of Big Data for contemporary firms, and although 
there have been calls for research on the economic payoffs of investment in Big Data (e.g., Goes 
2014), this research is in infancy stages, and other than few exceptions (e.g., Tambe 2014), there 
has not been much research on the topic. Specifically, and to the best of our knowledge, there has 
been no empirical study that investigates investment in BDVsas a prevalent mode of investment 
in Big Data. In summary, investment in BDVs presents two fresh challenges to the field of 
information systems (IS): (a) it presents an external mode of investment in IT that differs from 
the traditional in-house investments studied in the previous literature; and (b) it involves 
investment in a type of technology that is distinctively different from the conventional IT and 
can change the way that value is created by IT. To overcome these challenges, we intend to 
address the following research question: “What strategic and environmental factors influence the 
value of investments in BDVs?” 
We adopt the lens of business models (BMs) to understand value-adding mechanisms of 
BDVs for firms that invest in them. A BM ―elucidates how an organization is linked to external 
stakeholders, and how it engages in economic exchanges with them to create value for all 
exchange partners‖ (Amit and Zott 2001, p. 511). Recent IS studies have called for better 
understanding of the value creation of IT through the lens of BM (e.g., Rai and Tang 2013, 
Bharadwaj et al. 2013). Specifically, we view a BDV‘s BM as the way by which it presents its 
innovation to the marketand draws a path to success for its investors. Since many BDVs are in 
the initial phases of innovation inception, their BM can be the most tangible interface that can 
predict their profitability for investing firms.1F
2
 
                                                          
2Because of the novel nature of Big Data technologies most active BDVs are at the product 




Further and building on the resource-based view (RBV) in the IT context, we suggest that 
the BDV‘s and the investing firm‘s industry influence the effect that a BDV‘s BM has on 
performance of the investing firm. In hypothesizing about the role of the BDV‘s BM, as well as 
the BDV‘s and the investing firm‘s environment, we suggest that a BDV‘s BM involves value 
emphases on the ways in which the BDV‘s innovation helps an investing firm overcome any of 
the Big Data challenges of volume, velocity, variety, or veracity of data. Then, we conceptualize 
a BDV‘s environment as the technological scope (i.e., Big Data infrastructure, Big Data security, 
Big Data analytics) at which the BDV‘s innovation operates. Finally, and following the previous 
research (Miller and Friesen 1980; Newkirk and Lederer, 2006; Yayla and Hu 2012), we 
conceptualize the investing firm‘s environment through three dimensions of dynamism, 
complexity, and munificence. We hypothesize and test that the Big Data emphasis, the scope of a 
BDV, and the investing firm‘s environmental uncertainty interact to generate value for the 
investing firm. Despite being guided by the literature on business models in entrepreneurial firms 
and RBV to identify potential factors explaining the value of BDVs for established firms, the 
study takes an explorative approach in unfolding the way in which the identified factors affect 
the value of BDVs. Specifically, this approach is plausible given the rather understudied nature 
of the Big Data industry, as well as the economic ways in which IT start-ups create value for 
their investors. 
Given the pronounced importance of Big Data investments for firms (e.g., Agarwal and 
Dhar 2014), we expect that an event study approach enables us to assess the profitability of 
investments in BDVs by measuring the impact that public announcements about investments in 
BDVs have on the investing firms‘ market value. Using a longitudinal study of 651 public 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
offering (IPO) stage. As a result, in absence of mature organizational structures, their business 




announcements of investment in BDVs from 2010-2013, we find that the value of different 
emphases on Big Data challenges is contingent onthe technological scope of the BDV‘s 
innovation and the investing firm‘s environment. Further, our results shed light on the emerging 
trends in Big Data markets and offeractionable implications for the managers of investing firms, 
as well as for Big Data entrepreneurs. 
Theoretical Development 
Business Models 
Business models of IS firms are viewed as mediums that explain how a technological 
innovation results in business success (e.g., Al-Debei and Avison 2010). They provide a 
narrative that explains how a technological product/service can gain traction in a marketand 
achieve and maintain its competitive position (Pateli and Giaglis 2004). In spite of their appeal to 
the organizational studies focusing on the success of IS-centric firms (Eriksson and Penker 2000, 
Pouloudi et al. 2003, Vassilopoulou et al. 2003, Hedman and Kalling 2003, Klueber 2000), 
limited consensus exists on the definition of business models. For example, Al-Debei and Avison 
(2010) note that: 
―To date, the BM concept is still considered an ill-defined buzzword. It is 
suggested that the BM concept is ‗murky‘ at best. Some other researchers argue 
that the concept is underdeveloped. In addition, the BM concept has sometimes 
been misperceived as a substitute of corporate strategy, business process, or 
business case.‖ 
The existing literature on business models has attempted to clarify the definition of business 
models by identifying its components (e.g., Dubosson-Torbay et al. 2002, Pateli and Giaglis 
2004, Al-Debei and Avison 2010). Among the most agreed-upon components, especially in the 
early stages of development in entrepreneurial firms (Dubosson-Torbay et al. 2002), is value 
emphasis (Amit and Zott 2001, Petrovic et al. 2001, Magretta 2002, Osterwalder et al. 2005). 




customers/users (Amit and Zott 2001). The extant empirical research on business models has 
often surveyed business models by describing value emphasis (e.g., Bonaccorsi et al. 2006; 
Susarla et al. 2009; Brynjolfsson et al. 2010; Demirkan et al. 2010; Casadesus-Masanell and 
Llanes 2011; Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes 2011; Deodahr et al. 2012; VandeMeer et al. 2012; 
Lin et al. 2012; Liu et al. 2014; Niculescu and Wu 2014).   
Business Models and Performance 
Performance of new ventures critically depends on their boundary-spanning arrangements 
(Hite and Hesterly 2001). Among these boundary-spanning arrangements are their business 
models where they promote themselves as attractive investments for potential investors. In fact, a 
business model is considered an important pillar of new ventures because they need a convincing 
logic and narrative in order to attract investorsand expand. Especially in early stages of their 
existence, when the venture‘s service/product is not presented to customers at a large scale 
(Hand 2007), a business model operates as one of the main measures for the market to evaluate 
overall benefits of investment in the venture (Zott and Amit 2007). Since business models 
explain how value is created for an external partner (e.g., an investing firm), assessing them can 
explain payoffs for investing firms.  
The existing literature on the effect of business models on firm performance suggests that 
business models can be a source of competitive advantage (Markides and Charitou 2004; 
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010). Particularly, Zott et al. (2011, p.1029) note that more 
novel and effective models can result in superior value-creation for stakeholders: 
―The novelty presented by new, effective models can result in superior value 
creation‖ 
As a result, by investing in BDVs with superior business models (that are new and effective), a 




A BDV’s Business Model and Investing Firm’s Market Performance 
Building on the general literature on business models and firm performance, we develop a 
logic that explains how the value of investments in BDVs can be inferred by assessing the 
BDV‘s business model. Business models present a narrative through broadcasting the value 
emphasis of a venture. Value emphasis signals the way in which value is to be created for 
stakeholders. However, the same value emphasis in one technological scope might not be as 
novel in another. The technological scope of business models defines the context in which value 
is created. In fact, the technological scope operates as an environment where the value emphasis 
of a BM should be interpreted. Thus, in order to assess the value of BDV for an investing firm, 
its value emphasis should be examined in the technological scope in which it is presented. If in a 
given technological scope, the value emphasis of a BDV is novel and effective, then competitive 
advantage, and thereby increased market returns, can be expected for the investing firm. 
In addition to the technological scope, the environmental uncertainty of the investing firm 
can also influence the effect of the focal BDV‘s value emphasis. Specifically, the resource-based 
view in IT suggests that organizational uncertainty is a contingency factor that influences the 
plausibility and attractiveness of resources and investments for organizations (Wade and Hulland 
2004). Wade and Hulland (2004) contend (p. 126) that: 
―The relationship between IS resources and firm performance is affected not only by 
internal elements …, but also by environmental factors. These factors reflect the 
uncertainty in an organization's operating environment. Drawing on the work of 
Aldrich (1979), Child (1972), and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Dess and Beard (1984) 
concluded that three dimensions of the environment contribute most to environmental 
uncertainty and are thus most likely to consistently influence firm performance over 
time: environmental dynamism, munificence, and complexity.‖ 
 Thus, the performance payoffs of investment in BDVs, as an emerging mode of investment 
in IS resources, can be affected by the three dimensions of environmental uncertainty, namely, 




emphasis on the payoffs for the investing firm depends on the environment of the BDV, i.e., its 
technological scope, and the environment of the investing firm. In the below section, we discuss 
the value emphasis in BDVs, explain the prevalent technological scope in BD, and discuss the 
relevance of environmental uncertainty to BD investments. 
A BDV’s Value Emphasis 
The existing literature offers a variety of lenses to think of the value emphasis dimension of 
a business model in a BDV. For example, Amit and Zott (2001) suggest a typology that is 
consisted of four value emphases, i.e., innovativeness, efficiency, complementarity, and lock-in. 
Similarly, Zott and Amit (2007) focus on a combined pursuit of both efficiency and 
innovativeness as another value emphasis. Nonetheless, the existing frameworks to model value 
emphases of business models are too broad to fit the distinct nature of Big Data technologies and 
innovations. In this study, we build on the existing literature on Big Data technologies and frame 
value emphases of Big Data innovations around the specific purpose they are designed for.  
There is almost a unanimous agreement that Big Data technologies create value, through 
harnessing the volume, velocity, variety, veracity of data (Lee et al. 2014). The challenge of data 
volume refers to the vast amount of data that is generated and is accessible for making sense of 
(Chen et al. 2012). Not only is the massive size of data available to firms in Big Data era 
challenging, the speed at which it flows also represents a threat. This is what the challenge of 
velocity refers to (Jagadish et al. 2014). While these two challenges are the most discussed in the 
Big Data literature (Lee et al. 2014), other challenges are also present. Specifically, data 
available to contemporary firms can come in various formats (e.g., text, video, hypertext) and 
from different sources (e.g., social media, competitors‘ webpages, etc.). This refers to the 




to correctness and accuracy (Normandeau 2013) is another challenge that Big Data technologies 
must respond to. Building on these agreed-upon challenges and expectations from Big Data 
technologies to overcome them, we suggest that a Big Data innovation by a BDV can propose to 
create value for its investors by emphasizing any of the four areas of Big Data challenge. 
Therefore, emphasizing the ability to tackle each of the 4Vs challenges signals a BDV‘s 
proposed way of creating value for its stakeholders, and hence, its investors2F
3
. 
We define the volume emphasis of a BDV‘s innovation as the focus of the product on 
collecting, updating, screening, maintaining, or analyzing large data sets. Further, we define the 
velocity emphasis of a BDV‘s innovation as the focus of the product on timely collecting, 
updating, screening, maintaining, or analyzing fast-flowing data. Moreover, the variety emphasis 
of a BDV‘s innovation refers to the BDV‘s product focus on collecting, updating, screening, 
maintaining, or analyzing data from various sources and in different formats. Finally, we define 
the veracity emphasis of a BDV‘s innovation as the focus of the product on maintaining 
accuracy, correctness, and integrity of data available to a firm. We note that we do not define 
these areas of emphasis as mutually exclusive or collectively exhaustive. While a BDV can 
choose to emphasize neither or only one of the areas, another can emphasize more than one area. 
Since the purpose of Big Data technologies is widely believed to be addressing the 4Vs 
challenges of Big Data (e.g., Lee et al. 2014), the effectiveness of a BDV‘s business model for an 
investing firm can be determined by the way the BDV‘s innovation emphasizes resolving these 
challenges. The more a BDV signals that its innovation is capable of resolving the challenges of 
Big Data, the morethe likelihood of its ability to create competitive advantage for investing firms 
                                                          
3Even if the investing firm is not the end customer of the BDV‘s product/service, the investors 
can gather economic benefits, i.e., through selling the product/service to end customers, and 




is. Thus, variability in market returns of investment in BDVs can be explained by the extent of a 
BDV‘s business model emphasis on tackling the challenges of volume, velocity, variety, or 
veracity. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
H1a: The extent of a BDV‘s volume emphasis is positively associated with the 
market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of investing 
in the BDV.   
H1b: The extent of a BDV‘s velocity emphasis is positively associated with the 
market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of investing 
in the BDV.   
H1c: The extent of a BDV‘s variety emphasis is positively associated with the 
market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of investing 
in the BDV.   
H1d: The extent of a BDV‘s veracity emphasis is positively associated with the 
market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of investing 
in the BDV.   
A BDV’s Scope 
Although the four value emphases mentioned above can all be regarded as important areas 
of focus for Big Data innovations, the existing literature on Big Data suggests that there is no 
agreement on the superiority of either of the emphases. Some experts suggest that some 
emphases are superior to others (e.g., Normandeau (2013) believes that emphasis on veracity is 
superior to other emphases), but mostly they regard the four areas of emphasis as equally 
important for handling the Big Data challenges (e.g., Jagadish et al. 2014). We suggest that the 
effectiveness of a BDV‘s value emphases is determined by the technological scope that its 
innovation operates at.     
In the context of BDVs, we define the technological scope as the main Big Data area that the 
BDV‘s product/service is focused on. Big Data technologies cover diverse technological areas, 
most distinctively, Big Data security (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2012), analytics applications 
(LaValle et al. 2013), and Big Data infrastructure (e.g., computing) (Jacobs 2009, McAfee and 




technologies are also diverse in their architectural scope. While some Big Data technologies 
(e.g., cloud-based computing structures (Grossman and Siegel 2014)) are at the infrastructural 
level of IT architecture (see Weill and Vitale 2002 for a discussion of IT enterprise architecture), 
some technologies target the analytics application layer (e.g., data modeling applications 
(Grossman and Siegel 2014)). In addition to these more pronounced technological scopes, there 
is a third technological scope for Big Data innovations that is concerned with the security 
applications that protect large operations of the Big Data innovations belonging to the two other 
technological scopes. The following schema3F
4
 presents the architectural schema that ties these 
three scopes together: 
 
Figure 1- Architectural Relationship of Big Data Scopes 
Jagadish et al. (2014) suggest a similar hierarchy for the Big Data operations that starts with data 
acquisition, storage, and integration at the infrastructural layer and ends with modeling and 
interpretation at the analytics application layer. They also mention the overarching role of Big 
Data security technologies that protect the infrastructural and application layers from potential 
data losses or breaches.  
                                                          
4This schema is adapted from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation‘s (FDIC) enterprise 




Since different scopes of Big Data technologies differ in their architectural position, their 
effectiveness can depend on different value emphases. For example, at the analytics scope, 
handling (i.e., sense-making of) data in different formats might be more crucial than it is at the 
infrastructural level where the data in different formats merely needs to be stored and integrated. 
As a result, a high variety emphasis in an analytics innovation might be more valuable than a 
high variety emphasis in an infrastructural one. Thus, we expect that the market returns on 
different Big Data value emphases varies across different technological scopes. Thereby, we 
hypothesize that: 
H2a: The positive association between the extent of a BDV‘s volume emphasis 
and market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of 
investing in the BDV is moderated by the scope of BDV‘s innovation. 
H2b: The positive association between the extent of a BDV‘s velocity emphasis 
and market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of 
investing in the BDV is moderated by the scope of BDV‘s innovation. 
H2c: The positive association between the extent of a BDV‘s variety emphasis 
and market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of 
investing in the BDV is moderated by the scope of BDV‘s innovation. 
H2d: The positive association between the extent of a BDV‘s veracity emphasis 
and market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of 
investing in the BDV is moderated by the scope of BDV‘s innovation. 
Environmental Uncertainty of the Investing Firm 
In addition to the characteristics of a BDV, i.e., its value emphasis and technological scope, 
the characteristics of the investing firm can also influence the payoffs for the investing firm. 
What is a lucrative investment for one firm might not be as beneficial for the other (Venkatraman 
and Prescott 1990). While internal characteristics can be important, the effect of the external 
environment of a firm is more salient with relation to BD investments. This is because Big 
Datatechnologies change the data focus of organizations from within-enterprise data (i.e., own 
suppliers, own firm, own customers) to outside-of-the-enterprise data (i.e., potential suppliers, 




external environment of an organization. For example, the volume of data incoming for 
analytical purposes can directly depend on the number of competitors, the type of customers, 
number of products produced, etc. Further, velocity of incoming data can depend on the extent of 
dynamism in the environment. As an industry becomes more turbulent, the half-life of 
information decreases, requiring a firm increase the frequency of data-gathering. The resource-
based view in IT suggests that environmental uncertainty, i.e., the extent of challenge and 
unpredictability in environment (Aldrich 1979; Child 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Dess and 
Beard 1984), influences the payoffs IT investment create. Specifically, three dimensions of 
environmental uncertainty, dynamism, complexity, and munificence are highlighted. 
Environmental dynamism is viewed as ―the rate and unpredictability of environmental 
change‖ (Newkirk and Lederer 2006, p, 394). It represents the instability of the environment, 
which challenges managers to quickly and frequently adopt new strategies and tactics (Yayla and 
Hu 2012). Among the four BD value emphases, velocity is the most relevant to the dynamism 
aspect. As the extent of environmental dynamism increases, the half-life of external data for an 
organization decreases. In a vibrant environment, incoming data can lose its relevance faster, 
requiring an organization to increase the frequency at which it surveys, collects, and analyzes 
relevant data. As the frequency of collecting, storing, and analyzing incoming data increases, 
technologies with a value emphasis on velocity might be deemed more appropriable for firms in 
dynamic environments. Although we test for the interaction of all four value emphasis with the 
investing firm‘s environmental dynamism, we hypothesize, a priori, that: 
H3: The positive association between the extent of a BDV‘s velocity emphasis 
and market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of 





Environmental complexity refers to ―the heterogeneity and range of an industry and/or an 
organization‘s activities‖ (Wade and Hulland 2004, p. 127). Environmental complexity makes it 
difficult for managers to comprehend the drivers of performance (Newkirk and Lederer 2006). 
As the drivers of performance become more and more ambiguous for managers, the 
organizational need for accessing data starts to change. Ambiguity regarding success might be 
resolved through two paths. First, as the industry becomes more heterogeneous, the incoming 
data should match such heterogeneity. Therefore, BD investments that help access to a broader 
variety of data become more relevant and important. Aside from the emphasis on variety, 
emphasis on veracity can also help organizations facing a high degree of complexity. Due to the 
ambiguous nature of success and the need to access data from various sources, some of which 
might be of unknown nature, technologies with emphasis on data veracity can also be beneficial. 
As a firm increases its span of search for incoming data, authenticating information becomes 
more important. Although we test for the interaction of all four value emphases with the 
investing firm‘s environmental complexity, we hypothesize, a priori, that: 
H4a: The positive association between the extent of a BDV‘s variety emphasis 
and market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of 
investing in the BDV is moderated by the environmental complexity of the 
investing firm. 
H4b: The positive association between the extent of a BDV‘s veracity emphasis 
and market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of 
investing in the BDV is moderated by the environmental complexity of the 
investing firm. 
Environmental munificence refers to the extent to which the firm‘s environment supports 
sustained growth (Dess and Beard 1984; Wade and Hulland 2004). Mature or shrinking 
environments generally have a low level of munificence, whereas rapidly growing markets are 
usually associated with a high level of munificence. In environments marked by low 




the accomplishment of organizational goals (Toole 1994). By contrast, munificent environments 
are more forgiving in natureand support organizational performance and growth despite 
inappropriate firm strategies (Wade and Hulland 2004). All four Big Data value emphases can 
become more beneficial as the environment of a firm becomes more hostile (i.e., less 
munificent). More hostile environments require more scanning of the environment and therefore 
access to more incoming data (volume), in greater frequency (velocity) and variety, with a 
greater need for data authenticity (veracity) as use of unauthenticated data can be more 
punishing. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H5a: The positive association between the extent of a BDV‘s volume emphasis 
and market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of 
investing in the BDV is moderated by the environmental munificence of the 
investing firm. 
H5b: The positive association between the extent of a BDV‘s velocity emphasis 
and market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of 
investing in the BDV is moderated by the environmental munificence of the 
investing firm. 
H5c: The positive association between the extent of a BDV‘s variety emphasis 
and market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of 
investing in the BDV is moderated by the environmental munificence of the 
investing firm. 
H5d: The positive association between the extent of a BDV‘s veracity emphasis 
and market returns for the investing firm following the announcement of 
investing in the BDV is moderated by the environmental munificence of the 
investing firm. 
Methods 
This research utilizes an event study approach. We define an event as the public 
announcement of a firm to invest in a BDV. The sample was formed by searching for related 
events from January 1
st
, 2010 to December 31
st
, 2013. An online search was conducted through 
the services of Lexis-Nexis by searching for public announcements made at all news sources 
available at Lexis-Nexis, containing the terms: (1) Big Data, and (2) investment, invest, 




related news pieces. Upon further refinement of this set, 1393 news pieces were identified as the 
ones that a firm has invested in a BDV. These related news articles were then further refined by 
excluding announcements where: (1) there was a confounding announcement related to the firm 
(e.g., major earnings, change in top executives, mergers, etc.) in a window of five days before 
and after the BDV announcement, (2) there was more than one investment in a BDV in a 300-
day period prior to the announcement, (3) the firm was non-US, not-for-profit, or sub-division of 
a bigger firm, or (4) the firm was not publicly traded, or the study‘s organizational controls were 




Figure 2- Research Model 
Measures 
Value Emphasis 
In order to determine the volume, velocity, variety, and veracity emphases of a BDV‘s 
business model, we conducted a text analysis of the product description section of the BDV‘s 
webpage. We believe a BDV‘s value emphases can be unfolded in the product description 
section of the BDV‘s webpage because that section is the medium through which the product is 
                                                          




introduced and its potential superiorities to competing products is explained. The webpage 
associated with the BDV was crawled using the hyperlinks embedded in each announcement‘s 
news pieces
6
. In cases where the hyperlink to the BDV‘s webpage was not embedded in the 
announcement‘s news piece, a manual search was conducted to find the webpage. The text-
mining module of R (tm) was used to analyze the product description section of each BDV‘s 
website. In order to do so, first, a set of words associated with each of the four areas of emphasis 
was compiled using the existing literature on Big Data technologies. We searched Google 
Scholar for 2010-2103 articles that contained terms: (1) Big Data, and (2) volume, velocity, 
variety, or veracity. Over 1300 articles were identified, and the HTML version of these articles 
were combined to form a corpus.  
This corpus was text-mined to extract sentences that did not include any of the words 
volume, velocity, variety, or veracity, with the exception of sentences that were adjacent to the 
sentences containing these words. Then, the sentences containing the 4Vs and their adjacent 
sentences were analyzed to form a network of bigrams4F
7
 (i.e., combination of two words) that are 
closely associated with handling the 4Vs. For example, the bigrams ―accelerated computing‖, 
―fast response‖, and ―real time‖ had the highest frequency of occurring when the word ―velocity‖ 
was discussed in the corpus of articles. Also, the bigrams ―large size‖, ―massive data‖, and ―large 
calculations‖ were among the most used adjacent words to ―volume‖. Further, the bigrams 
―multimedia data‖, ―different formats‖, ―non-textual data‖, and ―unstructured data‖ were used 
adjacent to the word ―variety.‖ Finally, ―data authentication‖, ―data cleansing‖, and ―data 
verification‖ were adjacent to the word ―veracity‖.  The adjacent bigrams were then processed to 
                                                          
6Only descriptions with a time stamp prior to the announcement were used in the analysis. 
7We use bigrams instead of single words, because combination of two words more accurately 




eliminate the ones that are irrelevant to the concepts of 4Vs
8
. Then, a library of refined bigrams 
for each of the 4Vs were used to analyze the product description section of each BDV in the 
sample. For each of the four emphases, we calculated the frequency of its associated bigrams in 
the product description corpus of text. Then, we obtained the ratio of associated bigrams to the 
total number of bigrams in the text as the measure of each of the 4 emphases. For example, if the 
product description of a BDV contains 2 bigrams associated with ―volume‖ and the text contains 
200 meaningful bigrams in total, then the value of the volume emphasis is 0.01 (=2/200).   
Technological Scope 
We used the product description section part of a BDV‘s webpage to determine the 
technological scope at which it operates. We searched the description for the words ―analytics‖ 
and ―intelligence‖ to categorize the BDV‘s innovation in the scope of analytics. If the words 
―security‖ or ―cyber-security‖ were used in the description, the innovation was categorized in the 
security scope, and descriptions with the words ―infrastructure‖, ―cloud‖, ―computing‖, and 
―grid‖ were categorized in the infrastructure scope. Out of 651 BDVs in the sample, our analysis 
resulted in identification of 427 BDVs with a clear categorization (the searched words were used 
in the description and the BDV could not be categorized in two or more scopes). The rest of the 
224 BDV descriptions were manually read and categorized into the three scopes of Big Data 
technologies. To ensure the validity of manually categorized ventures, a sub-set of BDVs which 
                                                          
8We retained only bi-grams that appeared in at least 10% of the relevant articles. Appendix B 
presents the results of the main model where the bi-grams appearing in 5% and 20% of the 
relevant articles are considered. Although these bi-grams were used in academic articles 
adjacent to the 4Vs concepts, we asked a panel of four tenured Management Information 
Systems professors from a public school in mid-west US to evaluate (very good, good, fair, 
poor) the correspondence of each bi-gram to the concept it describes (i.e., volume, velocity, 
variety, or veracity). Rater agreed in their rating of 63 (85%) of the big-grams. Out of the 74 
bi-grams, eight did not pass Obermiller and Spangeberg‘s (1998) threshold of having at least 
three raters evaluating the bi-gram very good and no poor evaluation. Model B3 in Appendix 




had a presence in AngelList.com a crowd-funding service were selected (149 out of 224). 
AngelList reports the technological scope tag of the registered BDVs (i.e., if the BDV is active in 
the area of analytics, Big Data infrastructure, or Big Data security). We compared the reported 
tags of those 149 BDVs with our manual categorizations. It resulted in 138 matched cases, 
showing a reliability of 92.6%.  
Inclusion of technological scopes as a co-variate along with the value emphases poses a 
potential threat. That is, BDVs in certain scopes may emphasize certain aspects of Big Data 
challenges more than the others. If that is correct, a BDV‘s value emphases may be correlated 
with its technological scope, hence making the estimates of value emphases endogenous. To test 
for such potential threat, we compared the means of each value emphasis across the three scopes 
of Big Data in our sample. The analysis of variance (ANOVA)
9
 for difference of the value 
emphases across the three scopes fails to reject the null hypothesis about that assumes the scope 
of a BDV does not influence its emphasis on tackling the 4Vs of Big Data (Velocity: F-statistic= 
0.617, p-value = 0.540; Variety: F-statistic= 0.861, p-value = 0.423; Volume: F-statistic= 1.294, 
p-value = 0.275; Veracity: F-statistic= 2.599, p-value = 0.075). 
Environmental Uncertainty 
The three dimensions of environmental uncertainty are measured using prior measures and 
COMPUSTAT data. Following the prior literature (Keats and Hitt 1988; Xue et al. 2011), we 
measure environmental dynamism by quantifying the volatility of industry sales. For each firm, 
the natural log of total sales of four-digit SIC industry to which a firm belongs is regressed 
against an index variable of years, for a period of five years [t, t-4], and the antilog of the 
standard error of the regression coefficient is used to measure sales volatility as a proxy of a 
                                                          
9For each of the value emphases (e.g., emphasis on volume) we compared the mean score across 




firm‘s environmental dynamism. We measure environmental complexity using the reciprocal of 
industry concentration. This is consistent with the logic that firms situated in industries with 
fewer competitors (i.e., more concentration) is embedded in less complex environment where the 
competitors and their likely actions are well known. Specifically, following Xue et al. (2011), the 
log value of the reciprocal of the Herfindahl index of the market shares of the top four firms in 
that industry (i.e., the sum of the squares of the market shares of the four firms with the highest 
sales in that industry) is used to measure environmental complexity. Following prior literature 
(Keats and Hitt 1988; Xue et al. 2011), environmental munificence is measured based on 
growth in industry‘s sales. To do so, the natural log of total sales of four-digit SIC industry to 
which a firm belongs is regressed against an index variable of years, for a period of five years [t, 
t-4]. The antilog of the regression coefficient is then used to measure munificence. 
Market Return 
Following the existing literature on event studies (e.g., Chatterjee et al. 2001; Xu and Zhang 
2013), we use cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as a measure of market returns to investments 
in BDVs. CAR measures unexpected market returns in a window of time around an 
announcement when the news release of the investment is supposed to be followed by a market 
reaction. When CAR is positive, it reflects that the announcement has been met with a positive 
reaction in the market and thereby the market returns exceed the expectation. A zero CAR shows 
indifference in the market with regards to the announcement, and a negative CAR shows a 
negative reaction from the market. To calculate the normal returns, we first calculate the market 
model which is: 
Ri, t  = αi + βi * Rm, t + ϵi, t 
Where Ri, t is return on stock i in day t, and Rm, t is the return on market portfolio on day t. 




portfolio is calculated using equally-weighted CRSP index for the main analysis, and value-
weighted index is used in a robustness check. Following the previous literature (e.g., Sabherwal 
and Sabherwal 2007; Chatterjee et al. 2001), the market model was estimated using a 255-day 
window starting from 300 days before the announcement to 46 days before it. The normal return 
was calculated by αi + βi* Rm, tusing the coefficient estimates of the market model. Then 
abnormal return (AR) was calculated as: 
ARi, t= Ri, t  - (αi + βi* Rm, t) 
This abnormal return was then cumulated over a 3-day window (i.e. one day before the day of 
announcement, and one day after announcement [-1, +1]). Since it is possible that market reacts 
in a wider span of time to the announcement, we also calculate CAR in a 5-day (i.e., [-2, +2]) 
window for further robustness checks. 
Controls 
We controlled for the fixed effect of industry of the investing firm by including an industry 
dummy generated from 2-digit SIC code associated with the firm. Moreover, to account for the 
effect of possible time trends, we created a variable called time that accounts for the number of 
days between January 1
st
, 2010 and the date of the announcement. Further, we control for the 
firm size by using the natural log of total assets ($) of the investing firm, collected form 
COMPUSTAT. Finally, we account for the intensity of the investment made by creating a 
variable called investment value that uses the natural log of the value ($) of the investment 
made in each announcement. 
Further, during the data collection, we noticed that while some investments in BDVs are 
made in the form of a partnership where the investing firm contributes to the seed funding of a 
BDV, some investments are made to acquire the BDV. Since acquiring a BDV has distinct 




plausible to assume that CAR for acquiring firms can be different from the rest of the sample. 
Therefore, we created an ―Acquired‖ dummy (1 if the investing firm acquired the BDV; 0 
otherwise) to control for potential effects.  
Moreover, while some investing firms become the end-users of the BDV for their core 
activities, whereas some may utilize the BDV‘s product/services for operational purposes. For 
example, a banking corporation might invest in a BDV active in detecting credit-card breaches. 
In such an example, the product/service of the BDV aligns with the main activity of the investing 
firm. On the contrary, a retailing company might invest in a BDV that offers an analytical 
visualization service. In this example, the BDV‘s product/service is used for enhancing internal 
operations of the investing firm. Therefore, the relevance of a BDV‘s product/service to an 
investing firm may affect the way that the market evaluates such investments. Hence, we created 
a ―main‖ dummy (1 if the investing firm uses the BDV‘s product/service for its main activity; 0 
otherwise) to control this effect. Each BDV reports the industry of end-users through a secondary 
tag in its AngelList page. We compared the industry of a BDV‘s end-user to the industry of the 
investing firm. In case of a match, we assume that the BDV‘s product/service is used to perform 
a main activity in the investing firm.  
Finally, although we control for the time trends in our model, it can be argued that 
occurrence of a specific economic or technological event in a certain year, if not accounted for, 
can bias the coefficient estimates. To overcome this threat, we followed the suggestions of 
Greene (2011) and controlled for each year‘s fixed effect by including year dummies (2010 was 




Model and Estimation 
In order to test for our first set of hypotheses (H1) we first formed a direct effect model with 
CAR of announcement i as the dependent variable and the four value emphases, i.e., volume, 
velocity, variety, and veracity, along with the BDV‘s scope dummies, analytics and security (we 
use the Infrastructure scope as the reference group) as the independent variables, while 
controlling for the controls mentioned above: 
CARi = α0 + Controls + β1 * (Velocity) + β2 * (Variety) + β3 * (Volume) + β4 * 
(Veracity) + β5 * (Analytics) + β6 * (Security) + ϵi 
We estimate this model using an ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimation. However, since there 
are instances of a firm investing in more than one announcement, we estimate robust variance of 
coefficients by allowing the error terms of investments made by the same firm be correlated. 
Then, to test the second set of hypotheses (H2) we first follow an interaction approach and run 
the following estimation, while mean-centering the emphases variable (continuous variables) 
following the suggestions of (Cohen et al. 2013).  
 CARi = α0 + Controls+ β1 * (Velocity) + β2 * (Variety) + β3 * (Volume) + β4 * 
(Veracity) + β5 * (Analytics) + β6 * (Security) + β7 * (Velocity) * (Analytics) + β8 
* (Variety) * (Analytics)  + β9 * (Volume) * (Analytics)  + β10 * (Veracity) * 
(Analytics) + β11 * (Velocity) * (Security) + β12 * (Variety) * (Security)  + β13 * 
(Volume) * (Security)  + β14 * (Veracity) * (Security) + ϵi 
As an alternative approach, we also run a split-sample analysis where we compare the below 
model across the three scopes of analytics, security and infrastructure: 
CARi = α0 + Controls + β1 * (Velocity) + β2 * (Variety) + β3 * (Volume) + β4 * 
(Veracity) + ϵi 
In order to test for hypotheses 3-5, the following model will be tested
10
: 
                                                          
10The environmental variables, dynamism, complexity, and munificence are measured in the 
same year as the announcement. The measures of emphasizing 4Vs are collected from the 




CARi = α0+ Controls + β1 * (Velocity) + β2 * (Variety) + β3 * (Volume) + β4 * 
(Veracity) + β5 * (Analytics) + β6 * (Security) + β7 * (Velocity) * (Analytics) + β8 
* (Variety) * (Analytics)  + β9 * (Volume) * (Analytics)  + β10 * (Veracity) * 
(Analytics) + β11 * (Velocity) * (Security) + β12 * (Variety) * (Security)  + β13 * 
(Volume) * (Security)  + β14 * (Veracity) * (Security) + β15 * (Velocity) * 
(Dynamism) + β16 * (Variety) * (Dynamism)  + β17 * (Volume) * (Dynamism)  + 
β18 * (Veracity) * (Dynamism) + β19 * (Velocity) * (Complexity) + β20 * (Variety) 
* (Complexity)  + β21 * (Volume) * (Complexity)  + β22 * (Veracity) * 
(Complexity) + β23 * (Velocity) * (Munificence) + β24 * (Variety) * 
(Munificence)  + β25 * (Volume) * (Munificence)  + β26 * (Veracity) * 
(Munificence) + ϵi 
Results 
Table 1 provides a summary of descriptive statistics. Our sample shows that the average 
value of investment in BDVs is around 0.02% of the firm‘s annual sales. Also, on average, 
investing in a BDV results in a 0.31% cumulative abnormal return, while this number can be as 
low as -17.4% and as large as over 16.5%. The average size of an investing firm‘s total assets in 
our sample is slightly over $18 billion, with largest investing firm in the sample showing an asset 
endowment as large as $62.9 billion. Table 2 reports the results of our full-sample and sub-
sample analysis. Model 1 in Table 2 reports our direct effect model where we find that the 
investment value has a positive and significant effect on CAR (P<0.001). This means that the 
size of abnormal returns increase as firms increase the intensity of their investment in a BDV. 
This results suggest that in spite of described cautions about Big Data investments and their 
associated risks (e.g., Jacobs 2009; Lazer et al. 2014), the market reacts positively to a firm‘s 
decision for sizable investments in BDVs.  
Moreover, Model 1 suggests a positive and significant effect of firm size on CAR (P<0.01). 
This means that a larger firm‘s investment in BDVs is met with more positive reaction in the 
market. Also, the positive and significant sign of the Analytics scope (P<0.05) and Security 
scope (P<0.01) dummies suggest that investment in these two scopes is perceived more 




dummy suggests that the market reactions to investments in BDVs do not change over time, at 
least when the full sample is considered. Finally, the results point to positive and significant 
effects of a Volume (p<0.01), Velocity (p<0.01), Veracity (p<0.05), and Variety (p<0.05) 
emphasis in a BDV‘s business model. This suggests that the market positively reacts to focus of 
a BDV on either of the Big Data 4Vs and that, explication of such focus in product description of 
a BDV positively affects their perceived value in the market, supporting H1a-d.  
---Insert Tables 1 and 2 here--- 
Model 2 in Table 2 tests for the moderating effect of a BDV‘s technological scope on the 
impact of its value emphases. The positive and significant coefficient estimate for the interaction 
between the Analytics dummy and Variety (p<0.001) (supporting H2c) or Veracity (P<0.01) 
(supporting H2d) emphasis suggests that a focus on overcoming variety or veracity issues of Big 
Data is more beneficial for analytics innovations than it is for Big Data infrastructure. Moreover, 
the positive and significant estimate of the coefficient for the interaction between the Security 
and Veracity emphasis (p<0.001) (supporting H2d) suggests that a focus on tackling the veracity 
of Big Data is perceived more beneficial for Big Data innovations in the scope of security 
compared to infrastructure. Also, the non-significance of interaction coefficients between 
Analytics or Security, and the emphasis on Volume or Velocity suggests that an emphasis on the 
volume and velocity of Big Data is regarded as equally beneficial across the three scopes of Big 
Data innovations.  
In order to gain a better understanding about the market returns of emphasizing the 4Vs, and 
given the apparent heterogeneity across the three Big Data scopes, we continue our analysis by 
dividing the samples into three sub-samples. Model 3 reports the analysis of our data for 




sample analysis, both investment value and firm size positively and significantly affect CAR, 
while no apparent change in the market return over time is traceable. Also, an emphasis on 
volume, velocity, or veracity shows a positive and significant effect, however, an emphasis on 
variety does not increase CAR in the security scope. On the other hand, Model 4 that reports the 
results for the sub-sample of announcements in the infrastructure scope shows a negative and 
significant effect of the Time dummy (p<0.05) suggesting that from 2010 onwards the perceived 
value of Big Data infrastructure in the market has been decreasing. Also, Model 4 indicates that 
only an emphasis on volume or velocity positively and significantly affects CAR, whereas there 
is no support for the effect of emphasis on variety or veracity in the infrastructural scope of BDV 
innovations. Finally, Model 5 shows the estimation of the model for the subsample of 
announcements that are made on BDVs active in the analytics scope. Contrary to the 
infrastructural scope, the positive and significant effect of the Time dummy (p<0.05) suggests 
that over time, market returns to investment in analytics innovations have improved. Moreover, 
the results of analysis in this subsample suggests that an emphasis on any of the 4Vs in the 
analytics scope is associated with higher CAR. 
To shed more light on the observed market-return trends, we plotted the number of 
investments made in each scope (Figure 3a), as well as the average CAR (Figure 3a) from 2010 
to 2013. These plots further corroborate the trends revealed in Models 3-5. The plots show that 
the popularity and market returns on BDVs active in the security scope have remained steady 
across the four years of the study, whereas the popularity and market returns of BDVs active in 
infrastructure and analytics have followed contrasting patterns. While BDVs in analytics scope 




drop. These results further indicate the heterogeneity of patterns across the different 
technological scopes of Big Data innovations. 
  
Figure 3a- Number of Announcements per 
Scope 
Figure 3b- Average CAR per Scope 
Robustness Tests 
In order to make sure the results are robust to variations in measurement of constructs and 
selected control variables, we conducted a series of robustness checks. Table 3 reports the results 
of these first sets of analysis. First, we cumulated abnormal returns over a 5-day period (i.e., [-2, 
+2]) instead of a three day (i.e., [-1, +1]) period (Models 6-8). Then, instead of using an equally-
weighted index of CRSP in calculating the market returns, we used a value-weighted index. 
Models 9-11 report the results with CARs calculated based on the value-weighted index for 
estimating market returns. Further, Models 12-14 report the sub-sample analysis models for an 
alternative measure of emphasis on the 4Vs. In these models, instead of measuring the BDV‘s 
emphasis on the 4Vs through assessing the product descriptions posted on the BDV‘s website, 













































BDV‘s innovation was identified through a Lexis-Nexis search5F
11
 and then, the blog‘s description 
of the product was analyzed in the same manner to obtain the extent of the BDV‘s emphasis on 
any of the 4Vs. We did so, because there might be doubts regarding the accuracy of claims made 
by a BDV on its website. Evaluating the product‘s emphases through a third-party report can 
reduce the concern that self-presentation of the product might involve exaggerations that affect 
the accuracy of our measures. The results of models presented in Table 3 qualitatively converge 
with the results of Models 3-5, providing evidence for robustness of our findings to variations in 
measurement of key constructs. 
---Insert Table 3 here--- 
The Effect of Environmental Uncertainty 
We also tested for the moderating effect of environmental uncertainty, while keeping the 
interactions of technological scope and value emphasis in the model. Table 4 summarizes the 
results when the interaction of value emphasis and environmental uncertainty variables are 
included. Model 15 presents the results of a direct effect model, whereas Model 16 reports the 
results with the interaction terms included. Consistent with H3, a positive and significant 
interaction between Dynamism and emphasis on Velocity is observed (p < 0.001). Also, the 
findings suggest that interaction of other value emphases with Dynamism is insignificant. 
Moreover, consistent with H4a and H4b, both Variety (p < 0.001) and Veracity (p < 0.01) show 
significant and positive interaction with Complexity, while the interactions of Velocity and 
Volume with Complexity are insignificant. Finally, Velocity (p < 0.05), Variety (p < 0.01), 
Volume (p < 0.001), and Veracity (p < 0.05) emphases show a negative and significant 
                                                          
11In cases where more than one blog covered a report describing the BDV‘s product, we selected 
the blog post with more words, because of its higher potential for reflecting on the value 




interaction with Munificence, consistent with H5a-H5d. Models 17-19 report the results when: a 
5-day window, value-weighted measure of CAR, and alternative measures of 4Vs based on blog 
posts (instead of the product/service description written by the BDV) are considered in 
estimations. These models present results that qualitatively converge with findings in Model 16.  
---Insert Table 4 Here--- 
Payoffs for the BDV 
While the role of value of emphasis and technology scope in creating value for the investing 
firm is investigated, we complement our analysis by finding out if the two factors can benefit the 
BDV itself. Raised capital is viewed as an early financial success indicator for new ventures in 
early stages. We investigate if the value emphases of a BDV contribute to its success in raising 
capital. Also, we test if such an effect is moderated by the technological scope of the innovation. 
To do so, we focus on BDVs active in AngelList.com, and track their raised capital in each round 
of fundraising. This analysis focuses on 2,026 BDV-round observations, belonging to 529 unique 
BDVs. On average, each BDV had raised a total of $4.62 million, had 12.42 employees, and 
24.58% of them were ultimately acquired by a larger firm. For each round, the value emphasis 
on each of the Big Data 4Vs is calculated similar to the previous section, however, the corpus of 
text analyzed to determine each emphasis is limited to the content generated within each round. 
Raised capital and dates indicating the beginning and ending of each fundraising round is 
crawled from AngelList.com. For each BDV, the technological scope is evaluated similar to the 
previous section.  
Additionally, we control for the stage of development where the funding is raised. We do so 
because early and late stages of fundraising are different in terms of funding providers, as well 




seeding, stage A) we specify a variable, where the value of variable indicates number of 
fundraising rounds a new venture has completed in that stage prior to the current round. 
Therefore, for BDVs in their first round of fundraising, the value of seeding, stage A, stage B, 
and stage B variables is all set at 0. If a venture has had two rounds of fundraising at the seeding 
stage, and the current round is its second round at stage A, the value of seeding variable is set at 
2, the value of stage A variable is set at 1, and the value of stage B and stage C variables are set 
at 0. 
Also, we control for the number years since a BDV has been established because the time 
elapsed since establishment of a venture can have an effect on resources it can access, both 
financially and intellectually. We control for the location dummy, measured at the city level, and 
whether or not the venture identifies itself as a business-to-business or business-to-customer 
(identified by tags reported in AngelList.com). Moreover, number of employees 6F
12
 (including co-
founders) in the fundraising period of interest, and average of employees (including co-founders) 
value of education7F
13
 are controlled for. Table 5 presents the results for the effect of emphasis on 
BD 4Vs in the full sample (Model 20), as well as in the sub-samples representing each 
technological scope (Models 21-23). 
---Insert Table 5 here--- 
The results mainly converge with those pertaining to payoffs for the investing firm, 
suggesting that BDVs which are focused on infrastructural technologies see an increase in their 
raised capital when they emphasize the aspects of Volume and Velocity, whereas for BDVs 
                                                          
12
AngelList reports the date of employment and departure of employees. This data was used to 
calculate number of employees employed in each fundraising period. 
13
The LinkedIn account of each employee was accessed to obtain educational background of 
employees. The highest degree obtained by each individual was then coded (high school 
diploma=1, associate degree= 2, undergraduate degree= 3, master‘s degree= 4, doctorate= 5) 




active in the scope of security, emphasizing Veracity is also beneficial. Finally, BDVs active in 
the scope of analytics benefit from emphasizing all 4V aspects of Big Data. Together, the results 
suggest that BDVs benefit from the value emphasis of Big Data 4Vs in the same fashion that the 
investing firms do.  
Discussion 
 Motivated by the rather unknown factors that influence the economic success of investment 
in Big Data innovations, this study has focused on a prevalent mode of investment, i.e., 
investment in BDVs. While there has been a void in studying general investments in new IT 
ventures, the issue is more amplified in the context of Big Data given the understudied nature of 
Big Data technologies. Investment in BDVs as a way of organizational investment in Big Data 
has emerged as a phenomenon of interest for the IS field. Following an event-study approach, 
this paper has focused on the role of the BDV‘s business model as the driver of market returns 
for investing firms. Specifically, we focus on the value emphasis component of a BDV‘s 
business model. Given the purpose of Big Data innovations in solving the challenges of 4Vs (i.e., 
velocity, volume, variety, and veracity), we proposed a framework to make sense of a BDV‘s 
value emphasis by considering its focus on overcoming the 4Vs challenges.  In other words, we 
contend that BDVs propose creating value for their investors through addressing the 4V 
challenges of Big Data. Moreover, building on the existing literature on Big Data (e.g., Jagadish 
et al. 2014), we suggested that Big Data innovations can be heterogeneous in terms of the 
effectiveness or novelty of emphasis on 4Vs. As a result, we hypothesized that some areas of 
emphasis may not be met with increased market returns in certain scopes. 
We took a longitudinal approach to study investments in BDVs from 2010 to 2013. 




increases its emphasis on overcoming any of the 4V challenges, the market returns for its 
investors increase. Nonetheless, our results point to a heterogeneity in the value of these 4 areas 
of emphasis. Across the three technological scopes of Big Data, an emphasis on overcoming the 
issues of volume or velocity of data proves beneficial consistently. However, an emphasis on 
overcoming the issue of data veracity only becomes important for Big Data security or analytics 
innovations. Also, an emphasis on overcoming the issue of data variety meets abnormal market 
returns only in the scope of analytics. Although the existing literature on Big Data points to the 
4Vs in a flat manner, where the four issues are almost regarded equivalently, our findings point 
to a heterogeneity in the value of the four areas of emphasis. This heterogeneity matches our 
proposed hierarchy of Big Data technological scopes. That is, parallel to the architectural 
hierarchy of Big Data technologies, there exists a hierarchy of challenges.   
Figure 4 depicts the hierarchy of challenges along with the architectural hierarchy of Big 
Data technologies presented earlier. As it can be seen, at the infrastructural layer, emphasis on 
harnessing the volume and velocity of data is vital. Moving up the pyramid, veracity becomes 
important when fast-responding security algorithms also require detection of anomaly in data and 
verifying sources of the data (e.g., LaValle et al. 2013) to function well. Finally, at the analytics 
application layer, handling massive loads of data on the fly, along with the capability to leaving 
out unreliable data, is important, but also, utilizing and sense-making of data that comes in 
various formats becomes of paramount value. We note that our proposed hierarchy of emphasis 
does not suggest that overcoming the issues of veracity or variety of data are not needed at all at 
the infrastructural layer of architecture. For example, if Big Data structures are not capable of 




their promise. Rather, the hierarchy means that not all of the areas of emphasis are of the same 
importance or ability to create competitive advantage for investing firms.  
 
Figure 4- Architectural Hierarchy of Big Data Emphases and Scopes 
In addition to the moderating role of the technological scope, we recognized that the 
environmental uncertainty of the investing firm also influences the effect of value emphases. 
Specifically, we find that for firms active in the dynamic environment, investing in BDVs that 
emphasize the velocity aspect of Big Data becomes more beneficial, whereas for firms active in a 
complex environment, investing in BDVs that focus on variety and veracity is met with more 
payoffs. Finally, we found that firms that are active in more hostile environments obtain benefits 
from an emphasis on either of the 4V aspects of Big Data. 
The findings of this study should be seen in the light of its limitations. First and foremost, 
our study has focused on publicly-traded firms and thereby our insights are limited to only a 
subset of firms that engage in making investments in BDVs. Because of their relatively larger 
size, competition dynamics and performance implications can be different for publicly-traded 
firms compared to the smaller or privately-owned organizations. Moreover, market-based 
measures of performance, such as CAR, are limited in considering insiders‘ insight and foresight 




the investments in our sample (2010-2013) and the fact that the investments are made in 
innovations that are at the early stages of development, productivity measures of firm 
performance cannot be much informing either. We suggest that future research can examine the 
productivity of these investments once enough time has elapsed to observe and measure 
performance effects of these investments more directly. Also, due to the secondary nature of our 
data, our measures of value emphases are limited to insights that can be gathered from product 
descriptions announced by the BDV. Product descriptions written by BDVs may be biased. 
Although we have made efforts to triangulate our findings by assessing these emphases from 
third-party reports, a BDV‘s emphases on addressing 4Vs of Big Data could be measured with 
more objective alternatives. Finally, our data is limited to identify the mechanisms through 
which product/services of a BDV are utilized by investing firm. While some firms may utilize a 
BDV‘s product/service to enhance their core competencies, others might utilize it for more 
peripheral purposes such as maintenance and security. Our findings should be interpreted while 
considering the heterogeneous uses of BDV products which this study could not account for.  
     In spite of its limitations, this study has theoretical contributions to the field of IS. First, 
this study extends the current literature on the business value of IT investments by offering a lens 
to assess the value of investments made on new ventures. Specifically, this study extends the use 
of a business model lens to studying the value of investment in IT ventures. Moreover, unlike the 
prevalent unilateral focus on the value emphasis portion of a business model (e.g., Brynjolfsson 
et al. 2010; Lin et al. 2012), this study highlights the importance of considering the technological 
scope of an innovation in explaining the value-adding mechanisms of business models. Second, 
this study provides a more nuanced view of the 4V challenges of Big Data and incorporates them 




making competitive advantage for a firm. This study shows that emphasizing these four areas of 
challenge can make firms competitive, although the effects of these emphases is contingent upon 
the nature (i.e., scope) of the innovation. Thereby, the findings of this study suggest that the 
competitive value of overcoming each of the 4Vs depends on the technological scope in which 
an organization needs to invest. Third, by showing a general positive CAR as a result of 
investment in BDVs, this study sheds light on the discussions regarding the risky nature of Big 
Data investments (e.g., Jacobs 2009; Lazer et al. 2014). This study provides evidence that in 
spite of the existing risks, firms benefit by engaging in Big Data innovations, especially when 
these investments are made in the form of funding new ventures. 
In addition to its theoretical contributions, this study provides some practical implications. 
The findings of this study inform the organizational decision-makers by providing them with a 
framework to assess the likely value of investing in BDVs. Table 6 presents our contingency 
framework for investors where depending on the scope of their investment, they can evaluate the 
promise of a BDV by assessing its emphasis on overcoming the relevant issues of volume, 
velocity, variety, or veracity. Specifically, our results suggest that investing mangers can assess 
the value emphases of BDVs either by reviewing the product description offered by the BDV 
itself, or by reviewing reports about the BDV in blogsphere. Moreover, our findings suggest that 
larger firms, as well as those that make bigger investments in BDVs, can expect more market 
payoffs from their investments.  
Finally, our results suggest that investing firms must evaluate the value emphases of a BDV 
with regards to the industrial uncertainty they face. Our findings indicate that firms in hostile 
environments can gain more benefits from an increased emphasis on either of the 4V aspects of 




gains by investing in BDVs that emphasize overcoming the issues of handling high velocity of 
data, whereas, those in complex environments must direct their investments into BDVs that 
emphasize the aspects of variety and veracity. Also, our findings suggest that investors can 
increase their returns by acquiring BDVs instead of providing a limited investment without 
further integration of the BDV into their organization. Finally, our findings can inform Big Data 
entrepreneurs and founders of new BDVs, by suggesting that their market attractiveness can 
increase if they explicate their emphases in overcoming the 4V challenges of Big Data. Our 
results show that product descriptions of a Big Data innovation, operates as a medium to 
communicate the product‘s value-generating emphasis. Therefore, we encourage BDV founders 
to better explicate the value of their innovation by highlighting the role it plays in controlling the 





Afuah, A., and C. L. Tucci. 2000. Internet Business Models and Strategies: Text and Cases, 
McGraw-Hill Higher Education.  
Agarwal, R., and V. Dhar. 2014, "Editorial—Big Data, Data Science, and Analytics: The 
Opportunity and Challenge for IS Research," Information Systems Research (25:3), pp. 443-
448.  
Aldrich, H. E. 1979. Organizations and Environments, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
Al-Debei, M. M., and D. Avison. 2010, "Developing a Unified Framework of the Business 
Model Concept," European Journal of Information Systems (19:3), pp. 359-376.  
Amit, R., and C. Zott. 2001, "Value Creation in e‐business," Strategic Management Journal 
(22:6‐7), pp. 493-520.  
Bharadwaj, A., O. A. El Sawy, P. A. Pavlou, and N. Venkatraman. 2013, "Digital Business 
Strategy: Toward a Next Generation of Insights," MIS Quarterly (37:2), pp. 471-482.  
Bonaccorsi, A., S. Giannangeli, and C. Rossi. 2006, "Entry Strategies Under Competing 
Standards: Hybrid Business Models in the Open Source Software Industry," Management 
Science (52:7), pp. 1085-1098.  
Brynjolfsson, E., and L. M. Hitt. 2000, "Beyond Computation: Information Technology, 
Organizational Transformation and Business Performance," The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives (14:4), pp. 23-48.  
Brynjolfsson, E., P. Hofmann, and J. Jordan. 2010, "Cloud Computing and Electricity: Beyond 
the Utility Model," Communications of the ACM (53:5), pp. 32-34.  
Casadesus-Masanell, R., and G. Llanes. 2011, "Mixed Source," Management Science (57:7), pp. 
1212-1230.  
Casadesus-Masanell, R., and J. E. Ricart. 2010, "From Strategy to Business Models and Onto 
Tactics," Long Range Planning (43:2), pp. 195-215. 
Chatterjee, D., V. J. Richardson, and R. W. Zmud. 2001, "Examining the Shareholder Wealth 
Effects of Announcements of Newly Created CIO Positions," MIS Quarterly (25:1), pp. 43-
70. 
Chen, H., R. H. L. Chiang, and V. C. Storey. 2012, "Business Intelligence and Analytics: From 
Big Data to Big Impact," MIS Quarterly (36:4), pp. 1165-1188. 
Child, J. 1972, "Organizational Structure, Environment and Performance: The Role of Strategic 




Cohen, J., P. Cohen, S. G. West, and L. S. Aiken. 2013. Applied Multiple regression/correlation 
Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, Routledge. 
Demirkan, H., and D. Delen. 2013, "Leveraging the Capabilities of Service-Oriented Decision 
Support Systems: Putting Analytics and Big Data in Cloud," Decision Support Systems 
(55:1), pp. 412-421.  
Deodhar, S. J., K. Saxena, R. K. Gupta, and M. Ruohonen. 2012, "Strategies for Software-Based 
Hybrid Business Models," The Journal of Strategic Information Systems (21:4), pp. 274-
294.   
Dess, G., and Beard, D. 1984, "Dimensions of Organizational Task Environments," 
Administrative Science Quarterly (29), pp. 52-73. 
Dubosson‐Torbay, M., A. Osterwalder, and Y. Pigneur. 2002, "E‐business Model Design, 
Classification, and Measurements," Thunderbird International Business Review (44:1), pp. 
5-23.  
Eriksson, H., and M. Penker. 2000, "Business Modeling with UML," Business Patterns at Work, 
John Wiley & Sons, New York, USA. 
Gartner. 2014, http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2848718. 
Gobble, M. M. 2013, "Big Data: The Next Big Thing in Innovation," Research-Technology 
Management (56:1), pp. 64.  
Goes, P. B. 2014, "Editor's Comments: Big Data and IS Research," MIS Quarterly (38:3), pp. iii-
viii.  
Greene, William H. 2011. Econometric Analysis, 7th edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-
Hall. 
Grossman, R. L., and K. P. Siegel. 2014, "Organizational Models for Big Data and Analytics," 
Journal of Organization Design (3:1), pp. 20-25. 
Hamel, G. 2002. Leading the Revolution: How to Thrive in Turbulent Times by Making 
Innovation a Way of Life, Harvard Business School Press Boston. 
Hand, J. R. 2007, "Determinants of the Round-to-Round Returns to Pre-IPO Venture Capital 
Investments in US Biotechnology Companies," Journal of Business Venturing (22:1), pp. 1-
28.   
Hedman, J., and T. Kalling.  2003, "The business model concept: theoretical underpinnings and 
empirical illustrations," European Journal of Information Systems (12:1), pp. 49-59. 
Hite, J. M., and W. S. Hesterly. 2001, "The Evolution of Firm Networks: From Emergence to 




Jacobs, A. 2009, "The Pathologies of Big Data," Communications of the ACM (52:8), pp. 36-44. 
Jagadish, H., J. Gehrke, A. Labrinidis, Y. Papakonstantinou, J. M. Patel, R. Ramakrishnan, and 
C. Shahabi. 2014, "Big Data and its Technical Challenges," Communications of the ACM 
(57:7), pp. 86-94. 
Keats, B. W., and Hitt, M. A. 1988, ―A Causal Model of Linkages among Environmental 
Dimensions, Macro Organizational Characteristics, and Performance,‖ Academy of 
Management Journal (31:3), pp. 570-598. 
Klueber, R. 2000, "Business Model Design and Implementation for services," In Proceedings of 
Americas Conference on Information Systems, Long Beach, CA, 2000.   
Kumar, A., F. Niu, and C. Ré. 2013, "Hazy: Making it Easier to Build and Maintain Big-Data 
Analytics," Communications of the ACM (56:3), pp. 40-49.  
LaValle, S., E. Lesser, R. Shockley, M. S. Hopkins, and N. Kruschwitz. 2013, "Big Data, 
Analytics and the Path from Insights to Value," MIT Sloan Management Review (52), pp. 
20-32.  
Lazer, D., R. Kennedy, G. King, and A. Vespignani. 2014, "The Parable of Google Flu: Traps in 
Big Data Analysis," Science (343:14 March). 
Lee, Y., S. Madnick, R. Wang, F. Wang, and H. Zhang. 2014, "A Cubic Framework for the 
Chief Data Officer: Succeeding in a World of Big Data," MIS Quarterly Executive (13:1), 
pp. 1-13. 
Lin, M., X. Ke, and A. B. Whinston. 2012, "Vertical Differentiation and a Comparison of Online 
Advertising Models," Journal of Management Information Systems (29:1), pp. 195-236. 
Liu, C. Z., Y. A. Au, and H. S. Choi. 2014, "Effects of Freemium Strategy in the Mobile App 
Market: An Empirical Study of Google Play," Journal of Management Information Systems 
(31:3), pp. 326-354.  
McAfee, A., and E. Brynjolfsson. 2012, "Big Data: The Management Revolution," Harvard 
Business Review (90:10), Oct, pp. 60-6, 68, 128.  
Magretta, J. 2002, "Why Business Models Matter," Harvard Business School Publishing 
Corporation.  
Markides, C., and C. D. Charitou. 2004, "Competing with Dual Business Models: A 
Contingency Approach," The Academy of Management Executive (18:3), pp. 22-36. 
Miller, D., and Friesen, P. 1980, ―Archetypes of Organizational Transition,‖ Administrative 




Newkirk, H. E., and A. L. Lederer. 2006, "The Effectiveness of Strategic Information Systems 
Planning Under Environmental Uncertainty," Information & Management (43:4), pp. 481-
501. 
Niculescu, M. F., and D. Wu. 2014, "Economics of Free Under Perpetual Licensing: 
Implications for the Software Industry," Information Systems Research (25:1), pp. 173-199.  
Normandeau, K. 2013, "Beyond Volume, Variety and Velocity is the Issue of Big Data 
Veracity," Inside Big Data. 
Obermiller, C., and E. R. Spangenberg. 1998, "Development of a Scale to Measure Consumer 
Skepticism toward Advertising," Journal of Consumer Psychology (7:2), pp. 159-186. 
OIG. 2005, "Implementation of E-Government Principles," https://www.fdicig.gov/reports05/05-
018-508.shtml. 
Osterwalder, A., Y. Pigneur, and C. L. Tucci. 2005, "Clarifying Business Models: Origins, 
Present, and Future of the Concept," Communications of the Association for Information 
Systems (16:1), pp. 1.  
Pateli, A. G., and G. M. Giaglis. 2004, "A Research Framework for Analysing eBusiness 
Models," European Journal of Information Systems (13:4), pp. 302-314.  
Pavlou, P. A., and O. A. El Sawy. 2006, "From IT Leveraging Competence to Competitive 
Advantage in Turbulent Environments: The Case of New Product Development," 
Information Systems Research (17:3), pp. 198-227.  
Petrovic, O., C. Kittl, and R. D. Teksten. 2001, "Developing Business Models for Ebusiness," 
Available at SSRN 1658505.  
Pfeffer, J., and Salancik, G. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective, Harper and Row, New York. 
Pouloudi, A., K. Vassilopoulou, and X. Ziouvelou. 2003, "A societal perspective on E-Business 
adoption," Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society (1:3), pp. 149-165. 
Rai, A., and X. Tang. 2013, "Research Commentary-Information Technology-Enabled Business 
Models: A Conceptual Framework and a Coevolution Perspective for Future Research," 
Information Systems Research (25:1), pp. 1-14.  
Sabherwal, R., and S. Sabherwal. 2007, "How do Knowledge Management Announcements 
Affect Firm Value? A Study of Firms Pursuing Different Business Strategies," Engineering 
Management, IEEE Transactions on (54:3), pp. 409-422. 
Susarla, A., A. Barua, and A. B. Whinston. 2009, "A Transaction Cost Perspective of the" 
Software as a Service" Business Model," Journal of Management Information Systems 




Tambe, P. 2014, "Big Data Investment, Skills, and Firm Value," Management Science (60:6), pp. 
1452-1469. 
VanderMeer, D., K. Dutta, and A. Datta. 2012, "A Cost-Based Database Request Distribution 
Technique for Online E-Commerce Applications," MIS Quarterly (36:2), pp. 479-507.  
 Vassilopoulou K., X. Ziouvelou, A. Pateli, and N. Pouloudi. 2003 "Examining e-Business 
models: Applying a Holistic Approach in the Mobile Environment," In Proceedings of 11th 
European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) - Naples, June 16-21, 2003.  
Venkatraman, N., and J. E. Prescott. 1990, "Environment‐strategy Coalignment: An Empirical 
Test of its Performance Implications," Strategic Management Journal (11:1), pp. 1-23. 
Wade, M., and J. Hulland. 2004, "Review: The Resource-Based View and Information Systems 
Research: Review, Extension, and Suggestions for Future Research," MIS Quarterly (28:1), 
pp. 107-142.  
Weill, P., and M. Vitale. 2002, "What IT Infrastructure Capabilities are Needed to Implement e-
Business Models," MIS Quarterly Executive (1:1), pp. 17-34. 
Xu, S. X., and X. M. Zhang. 2013, "Impact of Wikipedia on Market Information Environment: 
Evidence on Management Disclosure and Investor Reaction," MIS Quarterly (37:4), pp. 
1043-1068. 
Xue, L., G. Ray, and B. Gu. 2011, "Environmental Uncertainty and IT Infrastructure 
Governance: A Curvilinear Relationship," Information Systems Research (22:2), pp. 389-
399. 
Yayla, A. A., and Hu, Q. 2012, ―The Impact of IT-Business Strategic Alignment on Firm 
Performance in a Developing Country Setting: Exploring Moderating Roles of 
Environmental Uncertainty and Strategic Orientation,‖ European Journal of Information 
Systems (21:4), pp. 373-387. 
Zott, C., and R. Amit. 2007, "Business Model Design and the Performance of Entrepreneurial 
Firms," Organization Science (18:2), pp. 181-199.  
Zott, C., R. Amit, and L. Massa. 2011, "The Business Model: Recent Developments and Future 







Tables of Chapter 2 
Table 1- Descriptive Statistics 
  
 
Avg. Min Max S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 CAR 0.31% -17.42% 16.53% 5.82%            
2 Velocity (% in text) 0.21% 0.04% 0.38% 0.04% 0.21**          
3 Variety (% in text) 0.19% 0.03% 0.31% 0.05% 0.18* 0.09        
4 Volume (% in text) 0.26% 0.05% 0.42% 0.08% 0.23** 0.09* 0.08
# 
     




   
6 Dynamism 1.26 0.32 0.05 2.08 -0.08 0.07
# 
0.02 0.05 0.06   
7 Complexity 0.31 0.22 0.03 0.74 -0.04 0.03 0.10* 0.04 0.02 0.10*  
















Table 2- CAR [-1, +1] - Equally Weighted 
 
Full Sample Analysis Sub-Sample Analysis 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Security Infrastructure Analytics 
Investment Value 
(normalized by org 
sales) 0.326*** 0.318*** 0.306*** 0.322*** 0.332*** 
Firm Size (total 
assets) 0.082** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.063** 0.059** 
Time 0.012 0.011 0.009 -0.011* 0.014* 
Velocity 0.036** 0.039** 0.036** 0.028** 0.018* 
Variety 0.014* 0.018* 0.004 -0.003 0.054*** 
Volume 0.042** 0.051** 0.026** 0.049*** 0.024** 
Veracity 0.027* 0.022* 0.054*** 0.008 0.042** 
Analytics 0.018* 0.016*       
Security 0.031** 0.028**       
Analytics*Velocity   0.009       
Analytics*Variety   0.078***       
Analytics*Volume   -0.008       
Analytics*Veracity   0.064**       
Security*Velocity   0.011       
Security*Variety   0.002       
Security*Volume   -0.007       
Security*Veracity   0.081***       
N 651 651 231 184 236 
Adjusted R
2
 (%) 12.4 13.6 11.3 11.7 12.8 
∆ R
2
 (%)   1.2***       
Industry, year, acquired, and main dummies are included but the dummy coefficients are not 
reported for brevity; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001; Robust standard errors are 
estimated by clustering errors around firm dummies. There is at least a 300-day distance 







Table 3- Robustness Analyses: Alternative Measures for Core Constructs 
 
CAR [-2, +2]- Equally Weighted CAR [-1, +1]- Value Weighted Alt. Measures of 4Vs Emphasis 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
 
Security Infra. Analytics Security Infra. Analytics Security Infra. Analytics 
Investment Value 
(normalized by org 
sales) 0.321*** 0.313*** 0.304*** 0.284*** 0.292*** 0.318*** 0.305*** 0.344*** 0.279*** 
Firm Size (total 
assets) 0.062*** 0.051** 0.073** 0.077*** 0.082*** 0.062* 0.064*** 0.076** 0.075** 
Time 0.004 -0.013* 0.010* -0.003 -0.011* 0.015* -0.0043 -0.019* 0.013* 
Velocity 0.029** 0.023** 0.023* 0.030* 0.032* 0.017* 0.022* 0.021* 0.025* 
Variety -0.007 0.005 0.062*** 0.012 0.009 0.039* -0.006 -0.008 0.016* 
Volume 0.033** 0.066** 0.017* 0.042** 0.072*** 0.041** 0.051** 0.064** 0.029* 
Veracity 0.062*** 0.013 0.031* 0.068*** -0.004 0.052*** 0.074** 0.008 0.043** 
N 231 184 236 231 184 236 214 168 199 
Adjusted R
2
 (%) 12.1 11.4 11.2 10.1 10.6 11.7 11.2 13.7 9.6 
Industry, year, acquired, and main dummies are included but the dummy coefficients are not reported for brevity; * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p< 0.001; Robust standard errors are estimated by clustering errors around firm dummies. There is at least a 300-day 



















Table 4- Full Models 
 Direct Interaction [-2, +2] Value-
Weighted 
Alt. Measures of 
4Vs 
 DV= CAR  Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 
Velocity 0.093** 0.082** 0.068** 0.073** 0.059* 
Variety 0.082** 0.064** 0.086* 0.092*** 0.041* 
Volume 0.078** 0.053** 0.088** 0.067* 0.091** 
Veracity 0.096** 0.032** 0.077* 0.082** 0.093* 
Analytics 0.031* 0.026* 0.028* 0.031** 0.056* 
Security 0.044* 0.037** 0.071 0.080* 0.029 
Dynamism 0.133*** 0.112*** 0.159*** 0.121** 0.134*** 
Complexity 0.102* 0.093** 0.084** 0.058* 0.091*** 
Munificence -0.070* -0.067* -0.021 -0.029
# 
0.042** 
Analytics*Velocity 0.005 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.008 
Analytics*Variety 0.048** 0.053* 0.039* 0.044** 0.052* 
Analytics*Volume 0.011 0.009 0.003 0.000 0.002 
Analytics*Veracity 0.073* 0.089*** 0.071* 0.066** 0.069* 
Security*Velocity 0.003 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.010 
Security*Variety 0.008 0.010 0.005 0.002 0.002 
Security*Volume 0.001 0.002 -0.006 0.003 0.006 
Security*Veracity 0.088** 0.094* 0.102*** 0.038
#
 0.057* 
Dynamism * Velocity   0.173*** 0.184*** 0.122*** 0.083** 
Dynamism * Variety   0.018 0.010 0.009 0.004 
Dynamism * Volume   0.009 0.011 0.012 0.005 
Dynamism * Veracity   0.011 0.004 0.004 -0.006 
Complexity * Velocity   0.013 0.012 0.007 0.003 
Complexity * Variety   0.125*** 0.092*** 0.111*** 0.098*** 
Complexity * Volume   0.018 0.012 0.014 0.009 
Complexity * Veracity   0.093** 0.172*** 0.048* 0.069** 
Munificence * Velocity   -0.065* -0.070* -0.057** -0.061* 
Munificence * Variety   -0.082** -0.088** -0.091* -0.073** 
Munificence * Volume   -0.116*** -0.131*** -0.109** -0.094** 
Munificence * Veracity   -0.049* -0.081* -0.042* -0.033* 
N 651 651 651 651 651 
Adjusted R
2





2.7***    
Industry, year, acquired, and main dummies are included but the dummy coefficients are not 
reported for brevity; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001; Robust standard errors are 
estimated by clustering errors around firm dummies. There is at least a 300-day distance 




Table 5- Payoffs for the BDV 
 Full Sample Security Analytics Computing 
 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 
DV= Raised Capital 
Velocity 0.115*** 0.152*** 0.119*** 0.128*** 
Variety 0.183** 0.032 0.203*** 0.027 
Volume 0.064** 0.078** 0.033* 0.068* 
Veracity 0.218*** 0.321*** 0.256*** 0.012 
Analytics 0.022*       
Security 0.038*       
Number of employees 0.052* 0.063** 0.049* 0.081* 
Education of co-
founders 
0.093** 0.231** 0.117** 0.198*** 
Years established -0.011 -0.009 -0.012 -0.01 
Funding round count 0.116*** 0.125*** 0.142*** 0.133*** 
Acquired 0.204*** 0.354*** 0.242*** 0.198*** 
B2B 0.005 0.007 -0.004 0.003 
N 2026 714 868 444 
Adjusted R
2
 (%) 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.18 
Coefficients of dummies representing the secondary scope of the BDV, location, funding series 
(i.e., no stage, seed, A, B, C), and BDV’s year of establishment are not reported for brevity;  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  




Table 6- Importance of Big Data Emphasis in Different Scopes 
 Velocity Variety Volume Veracity 
Security     
Infrastructure     






Appendix A. Examples of Announcements about Investments in BDVs 
Reported by Techcrunch, June 10, 2013: 
Walmart, via its Silicon Valley innovation lab @WalmartLabs, has made another acquisition 
today, continuing its shopping spree. The company is announcing that predictive intelligence 
startup Inkiru will be joining Walmart Labs to accelerate the retail giant‘s analytics capabilities. 
Financial terms of the deal were not disclosed. 
Inkiru‘s platform is an active learning system that combines predictive intelligence, data 
analytics and a decision engine to influence and determine customer interactions. Benefits to 
using Inkiru include being able to reduce fraud, improve customer segmentation and targeting, 
and more. 
In a post announcing the acquisition, Walmart Labs writes that Inkiru‘s predictive analytics 
platform will add data analysis capabilities, including site personalization, search, fraud 
prevention and marketing. From the post: ―Walmart‘s data scientists will now be able to work 
with big data directly and create impact faster than ever before.‖ 
Walmart Labs is known for being acquisitive when it comes to snapping up early-stage 
startups to test new ideas in e-commerce. Some of these startups eventually get folded into the 
company‘s e-commerce site and other online operations.  
It looks like we can expect Walmart.com to improve personalization, which isn‘t too 
surprising. Data analytics and personalization are certainly two areas where retailers are doubling 











Reported by marketwatch.com, June 27, 2013: 
Raytheon Company has acquired a privately held company, Visual Analytics Incorporated, 
further extending Raytheon's capabilities to meet the data analytics, data visualization and 
information sharing needs of its customers. Terms of the transaction were not disclosed.  
As one of the largest processors of data for the intelligence community, Raytheon has 
extensive experience handling large data sets and providing actionable information to its 
customers. The acquisition of Visual Analytics will add advanced analytic products and 
knowledge management solutions with intuitive user interfaces to Raytheon's offerings to its 
customers. It will also broaden the company's customer base in federal, state and local law 
enforcement.  
"The addition of Visual Analytics will further strengthen Raytheon's capabilities in the area 
of data analytics," said Lynn Dugle, president of Raytheon's Intelligence, Information and 
Services (IIS) business. "This will allow us to bring new, innovative visualization offerings to 
our customers as they address the continuous challenge of increasing analyst efficiency and 




Appendix B. Additional Analysis with Different Sets of Bi-grams pertaining to Emphasis on 
4Vs 
 Frequency of 4V 
Keywords -5% 
Frequency of 4V 
Keywords -20% 
4Vs calculated with 
problematic bi-grams dropped 
 DV= CAR Model B1 Model B2 Model B3 
Velocity 0.068* 0.029* 0.088* 





Veracity 0.049* 0.070** 0.021* 
Analytics 0.013 0.021 0.004 
Security 0.020 0.004 0.008 
Dynamism 0.072* 0.099** 0.072* 







Analytics*Velocity -0.002 0.002 0.001 
Analytics*Variety 0.082*** 0.023* 0.091*** 




Security*Velocity 0.007 0.000 0.011 
Security*Variety 0.000 -0.004 -0.016 






Dynamism * Velocity 0.201** 0.117*** 0.092* 
Dynamism * Variety 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Dynamism * Volume 0.005 0.017 -0.009 
Dynamism * Veracity -0.001 -0.004 0.010 
Complexity * Velocity -0.010 0.000 0.018 
Complexity * Variety 0.052* 0.105* 0.088** 
Complexity * Volume 0.002 0.003 0.005 
Complexity * Veracity 0.051* 0.023* 0.112*** 
Munificence * Velocity -0.063* -0.028
# 
-0.033* 
Munificence * Variety -0.111*** -0.061* -0.018
# 




Munificence * Veracity -0.033
# 
-0.081** -0.073** 
N 651 651 651 
Adjusted R
2
 (%) 15.8 14.6 14.2 
Industry, year, acquired, and main dummies are included but the dummy coefficients are not 
reported for brevity; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001; Robust standard errors are 
estimated by clustering errors around firm dummies. There is at least a 300-day distance 





Socially-Constructed Innovations in New IT Ventures 
 
Abstract 
The network view is a prevalent theoretical lens to describe the success of new ventures. 
Nonetheless, the relevant literature faces a number of shortcomings. First, while embeddedness 
in networks providing access to financial capital resources has been studied, the structure of 
networks facilitating access to intellectual capital is less understood. Therefore, this paper‘s first 
goal is to understand the role that intellectual capital networks play, along with the financial 
capital networks, to make new ventures successful. Second, most studies investigating the role of 
network embeddedness in new ventures have mainly focused on either one type of network tie or 
have aggregated different types of network ties to understand the role of network position. 
However, different types of network ties may shape network structures that are distinct, and 
therefore, their aggregation may mask important information about their value to a new venture. 
Thus, the paper‘s second goal is to study different types of network ties, in both financial capital 
and intellectual capital networks, and understand how these different networks interact to make 
new ventures successful. Focusing on Big Data Ventures (BDVs), as ventures active in an 
industry where innovation is socially-constructed, we investigate the structure of personal and 
investment networks, as networks facilitating access to financial capital, and educational and 
professional networks, as networks facilitating access to intellectual capital. We also differentiate 
between ventures that pursue radical versus incremental innovations and hypothesize about the 
difference in network positions ideal for each type of innovation. 
 Results of our study on 2,009 BDVs observed between 2011 and 2014 show that: a) 
educational and professional networks have distinct structures, and thus, treating them as 




for super-imposing them; c) achieving a desirable mix of structural holes and density for venture 
pursuing radical innovations is possible when those structural traits occur in different networks 
(i.e., high network density in education network, and high level of structural holes in the 
professional network or vice versa); and d) eigenvector centrality in the superimposed financial 
capital network is positively associated with higher levels of raised capital for new ventures. 
Moreover, our post-hoc matched sample analysis reveals that unlike in the Big Data industry, 
ventures in the Medical Devices industry do not exhibit the same benefits from embeddedness in 
the inter-venture intellectual capital networks. We discuss how this empirical evidence hints at 
the distinct socially-constructed nature of IT innovations.  
 
Keywords:embeddedness, big data venture, financial capital network, intellectual capital 































The network view is a prevalent theoretical lens to describe the success of new ventures 
(Brüderl and Preisendörfer 1996, Baum et al. 2000, Florin et al. 2003, Maurer and Eber 2006; 
Evers and O‘Gorman 2011; Zanre and DeCarolis 2016). This lens assumes a positive relation 
between the networking activities of a founder and its venture‘s success. The rationale behind 
this expectation is the theory of socially embedded ties, according to which socially embedded 
ties allow entrepreneurs to: a) obtain resources cheaper than they could be obtained through 
markets; and b) secure resources that would not be available in markets at all (e.g. reputation, 
customer contacts; Witt 2004). The extant research on the role of networks in the success of new 
ventures has mostly focused on the strength and weakness of founders‘ personal ties (e.g., 
Brüderl and Preisendörfer 1996, Jenssen and Greve 2002, Florin et al. 2003) and their effect on 
financial performance of new ventures (e.g., Baum et al. 2000, Lechner et al. 2006).  
Nonetheless, the current literature8F
14
 faces a number of shortcomings. First, focusing on the 
late-stage performance of new ventures, prior studies overlook the effect of network structure on 
the initial phases of forming new ventures. Focusing on the late stages of venture development, 
the existing literature has emphasized financial capital networks, i.e., networks where ties among 
the members are established through direct social interaction, as means to access resources, 
mainly financial and reputational, required to enter a market and survive (e.g., Elfring and 
Hulsink 2003). However, the early phases of venture development are also important because 
they involve creation and refinement of the venture‘s innovation (Florin et al. 2003). This is in 
contrast with late stages of venture‘s development, where appropriating market share, 
competing, and survival are the main tasks. In the early stages, in addition to depending on their 
                                                          
14
 See Appendix A for a brief summary of notable literature about the network view and success 




social networks to obtain financial and reputational resources to kick-start their business, BDVs 
depend on their intellectualnetworks (i.e., networks where ties among the members are 
established through knowledge-related associations) to develop their innovation. Specifically, 
new ventures develop products/services on a spectrum of innovativeness (incremental to radical). 
Previous literature suggests that network structures required for success of each type of 
innovation are distinct (Elfring and Hulsink 2003). Therefore, the first objective of this study is 
to extend the existing literature by considering the role that intellectual networks play, in 
addition to the role of social networks, in the success of new ventures generally and BDVs 
specifically. Also, we intend to study this role relevant to the type of a new venture‘s innovation 
(radical vs. incremental). Figure 1 depicts how this study departs from the existing literature‘s 
focus on the late stages of venture development and thereby includes access to intellectual 
networks in the discussion about network factors affecting the success of new ventures. 
Figure 1. Comparison of the Developmental Focus of this Essay and the Previous 
Literature 
Second, the current literature has mainly focused on either one type of founders‘ network 
(e.g., Baum et al. 2000, Jenssen and Greve 2002, Jenssen and Koeing 2002, Maurer and Eber 
2006) or has aggregated different types of founders‘ networks (e.g., Florin et al. 2003) to study 




embedded in different types of networks (Lechner et al. 2006). Friendship ties, educational ties, 
and professional ties are among different types of network ties that a venture founder can have 
with relevant individuals in his/her environment. Lechner and colleagues (2006) suggest and 
empirically show that the same position in different types of networks results in different 
outcomes and encourages researchers to consider separately studying networks of distinct nature. 
Building on Lechner et al.‘s work, the second objective of this paper is to study different network 
types in which a BDV is embedded and understand the effect of these networks‘ structure on the 
success of the BDV.   
To investigate the role of intellectual capital networks, we consider a BDV‘s educational 
and professional ties with other BDVs. The general literature on entrepreneurial innovations 
(e.g., Robinson and Sexton 1994; Van Praag et al. 2013), as well as the literature on development 
of IT innovations (e.g., Couger 1973; Kautz et al. 2007), suggests that innovators access 
technical knowledge through two main sources: formal education and professional experience. 
While formal education provides innovators with basic technical knowledge, professional 
experience provides access to tacit technical knowledge or organizational proprietary knowledge 
that is not presented in formal curricula taught in colleges and universities. Individuals with 
similar educational and professional background share a common language (e.g., Preston and 
Karahanna 2009) that facilitates transfer of cutting-edge, and often complex, knowledge that is 
usually required in the development of technological innovations (e.g., Kuemmerle 2003). While 
some BDVs pursue the development of a radical innovation, others might pursue the 
development of a more incremental one. First, we discuss how intellectual networks affect a 




discuss the role that intellectual networks play in the development of a venture‘s initial idea, 
radical or incremental, and raising the capital needed to expand the business. 
To investigate the role of financial capital networks, we consider a BDV‘s personal and 
investment ties with other BDVs, as well as with investors such as angels and venture capitalists. 
We define personal networks as networks with ties constructed based on non-financial social 
interactions that can include emotional and public encouragement for the BDV. Previous 
literature has documented positive financial gains from similar ties, including kinship, friendship, 
and family ties (e.g., Brüderl and Preisendörfer 1996); therefore, we consider personal ties a 
major channel for accessing reputational and financial resources. Also, we consider investment 
networks which are networks with ties to previous investors. Ties to previous investors, 
including angels or venture capitalists, can allow a BDV to access unexploited financial 
resources. Both personal and investment networks can provide a BDV with reputational and 
financial resources it needs to raise capital.  
Building on structural theories of innovation and the theory of social embeddedness, this 
paper proposes to focus on structural holes and density in intellectual networks of a BDV, while 
considering eigenvector centrality9F
15
 in its social networks as the key determinant of success, i.e., 
raised capital. The developed hypotheses are tested using objective data from AngelList.com, 
focusing on 2,009 BDVs active from 2011 to 2014. The results show that: a) educational and 
professional networks have distinct structures, and thereby treating them as separate networks is 
more informative; b) the structure of personal and investment networks call for super-imposing 
them, considering personal and investment ties simultaneously; and c) achieving a desirable mix 
                                                          
15
Eigenvector centrality is a special measure of centrality that considers the importance ties, in 





of structural holes and density for radical innovations is possible when those structural traits 
occur in different networks (i.e., high network density in education network, and high level of 
structural holes in the professional network or vice versa).     
Innovation and New Ventures 
Innovation is at the heart of entrepreneurial firms at the early stages of development (Zott 
and Amit 2007). Absent traditional firm resources, such as liquidity, reputation, and extensive 
human capital, innovation is the main source of value-creation for these ventures (Zott and Amit 
2007). To develop, grow, and stabilize, new ventures need to attract capital from venture 
capitalists and angels, mainly through a persuasive innovation that shows the potential for 
success (Timmons and Bygrave 1986). New ventures follow different strategies in developing 
innovations. Some focus on radical novelty, where product/service is a clear often a risky 
departure from the existing technology (Ettlie et al. 1984). Others pursue incremental 
innovations where the focus is on improvements, modifications, or re-configuration of the 
existing technology (Ettlie et al. 1984). While both types of innovation are shown to influence 
performance of new ventures positively (Rosenbusch et al. 2011), different structures are 
required to support and nourish them (Ettlie et al. 1984; Elfring and Hulsink 2003). Below, 
utilizing a networks lens, we explain the structural features that support radical and incremental 
innovations. 
Theoretical Development 
A new venture‘s ability to raise capital depends on two conditions. First, new ventures 
should have access to channels that enable them present their work to capitalists and attract them 
(e.g., Ferray 2003).  Second, the innovation offered by the venture should be deemed lucrative 




role in convincing a capitalist to invest (e.g., McMillan et al. 1985; Kollman and Kuckertz 2010). 
From a networks perspective, satisfying the two conditions requires access to different types of 
networks and different structural positions. Specifically, we label networks allowing access to 
capitalists‘financial capital networks, and label networks that enable creation, refinement, and 
development of an innovation intellectual capital networks. Below, we discuss the network 
theories relevant to each condition. 
Theories of Social Embeddedness and Access to Financial Capital 
Theories of embeddedness suggest that entrepreneurs become more successful as they 
become more embedded in social ties with others because social ties facilitate accessing 
resources and information in a fast and economically-efficient fashion (Uzzi 1997). Socially 
embedded ties allow entrepreneurs know, approach, and persuade individuals and firms that seek 
investment opportunities. Reach and access are not the only feature of socially-embedded ties. 
Rather, social ties create a degree of network reputation (Uzzi 1997; Uzzi 1999) that is essential 
for the flow of capital to new ventures. Ties to influential entities enhance a venture‘s worth in 
the eyes of others, leading to an enhanced reputation. The existing research suggests that new 
ventures are viewed as uncertain investments (Kollman and Kuckertz 2010). The reputation 
stemming from a strong network position facilitates trust (Gluckler and Armbruster 2003), a key 
element in financial decisions especially when an investment carries high levels of uncertainty 
(Bhide and Stevenson 1992). Therefore, socially-embedded ties enable accessing investors under 
a level of trust that is pertinent for suppressing the threat of newness investors face when 
considering an investment in a new venture.  
From a structural perspective, size and centrality are discussed as structural attributes that 




Specifically, the size of a founder‘s ego network has been primarily discussed and empirically 
investigated (e.g., Aldrich and Reese 1993; Hansen 1995). Centrality is conceptually similar to 
network size. While network size determines the extent to which resources are available, 
centrality ―explicitly includes the ability to access (or control) resources through indirect as well 
as direct links‖ (Hoang and Antonic 2003, p. 171). The existing research has characterized a new 
venture‘s access to financial resources through considering the network centrality of its 
founder(s) (e.g., Brajkovich 1994; Johannisson et al. 1994; Powell et al. 1996). 
In spite of research supporting the role that central positions play in accessing resources, 
plain degree measures of centrality fail to reflect the reputation and therefore the trust that 
network ties carry. As it was noted earlier, access to trusted ties is needed for the flow of capital 
to new ventures. Therefore, new ventures with the same number of social ties may be different in 
terms of their access to trusting resources, depending on the reputation of those they are 
connected to. The current literature on social network structures suggests that to account for the 
reputation carried by social ties, the centrality of edges needs to be considered. This is based on 
the theory that ties to more influential actors bear more reputation (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). 
Consistent with this theory, the concept of eigenvector centralityis introduced (Bonacich 1972) 
and utilized in cases where reputation, in addition to the access to resources, is considered (e.g., 
Mehra et al. 2006). Similarly, we build on the notion of eigenvector centrality to argue about the 
network structures that facilitate a BDV‘s access to trusting investors. 
New ventures become embedded in financial ties by establishing two types of connections. 
The first type is connections with other ventures and investors through personal ties. These 
personal ties can exist due to social interactions such as friendship among founders and 




investment ties, i.e., ties with previous investors,can facilitate financial embeddedness. The two 
types of ties are different in terms of content. In the former, social interactions are the basis for 
connection, whereas in the latter, financial transactions play a key role. We suggest that 
eigenvector centrality in financial capital networks (consisted of personal and investment ties) 
increases access to trusting investors.  
Personal ties with more central investors increase the reach and reputation for a new venture. 
On the one hand, more ties with capitalists increase the level of access to them. On the other 
hand, personal ties with popular and influential investors signal dependability of a venture and 
thereby attract other investors. In addition to ties with potential investors, personal ties to other 
(central) ventures can also increase access to more resources. Through ties to other ventures, a 
venture can extend its access to those ventures‘ investors. Moreover, personal ties to highly 
central ventures signal dependability and trustworthiness. Influential ventures are likely to be 
successful in raising capital and showing potential. For newly emerged ventures or those at the 
early stages of development, with the threat of newness glooming (Chen et al. 2009), ties to 
successful and influential ventures can also boost reputation. This can be explained by social 
homophily, a well-documented phenomenon that suggests personal ties often emerge between 
social actors with similar traits and qualities (McPherson et al. 2001). For potential investors, an 
influential venture‘s tie to a new venture can signal that the founders of the new venture, 
although less known, share the same talent and experience as the in-tie influential venture.  
In addition to personal ties, investment ties can also enhance a new venture‘s reach and 
reputation. First, investors from the past rounds of investment are very likely to invest in the next 
rounds due to the sunk costs of their initial investment (Hallen and Eisenhardt 2012). Moreover, 




to research the venture in the previous round(s) of investment. The ongoing monitoring of a 
business venture and observing its survival to another round of capital raising can reduce 
perceived risks for an investor. Second, the empirical evidence suggests that new investors rely 
on referrals by previous investors (Hallen and Eisenhardt 2012). Specifically, the more central 
and influential investors have higher levels of network reach and hence are more likely to be able 
to introduce a new venture to their ties. Moreover, a previous investment by an influential 
investor signals the new venture‘s dependability to the potential investors. Highly central 
investors, i.e., those with a large number of investments, have more financial capabilities. 
Research suggests that well-endowed capitalists invest in better ventures (Hsu 2004; Sørensen 
2007; Knill 2009). Therefore, new investors perceive a venture with ties to central investors as a 
business with more potentials and/or less risks. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
H1: Higher eigenvector centrality in the financial capital network, consisting of 
personal and investment ties, is associated with higher capital raised by a BDV 
in round t.    
Big Data Innovations and Intellectual Capital Networks 
The existing literature suggests that ―when the knowledge base of an industry is both 
complex and expanding and the sources of expertise are widely dispersed, the locus of 
innovation will be found in networks of learning, rather than in individual firm‖ (Powell et al. 
1996, p. 116). Big Data fits the description of such an industry. First, the existing literature 
describes Big Data innovations as complex and relying on multiple disciplines of science (e.g., 
Chen et al. 2012; Dhar 2013). Further, Big Data is described as a growing and expanding area 
(Goes 2014). Therefore, development, refinement, and advancement of Big Data innovations are 
socially-constructed in intellectual networks, rather than being confined to individual firms. In 
addition to the general literature on management of innovations (e.g., Gilbert et al. 2008), the 




innovations happens in a social discourse in the IT context (Wang and Ramiller 2009). 
Therefore, a BDV‘s success in the development of a lucrative innovation highly depends on its 
structural position in the intellectual network around it. In the section below, we introduce 
structural theories of innovation and discuss structural positions that help a BDV with 
incremental and radical innovations grow.  
Two closely related but distinct streams of social networks research have theorized about the 
intellectual capital embedded in networks and discussed the ways through which innovation 
development is enabled. First, the literature on structural holes (Burt 2004) suggests that the 
presence of structural holes facilitates access to a diverse set of resources, increasing the 
possibility to innovate. When two separate clusters possess non-redundant information, there is 
said to be a structural hole between them (Burt 2009). The theories of structural holes build on 
the notion that in the context of networks, intellectual capital exists where people have an 
advantage because of their location in a network. Contacts in a network provide information, 
opportunities, and perspectives that can be beneficial to the central player in the network. These 
theories emphasize that most social structures tend to be characterized by dense clusters of strong 
connections (Burt 2004) and that information within these clusters tends to be rather 
homogeneous and redundant. However, it is contended that non-redundant information is usually 
obtained through contacts in different clusters, a case that happens when structural holes exist. 
Thus, networks rich in structural holes have a form of intellectual capital by offering information 
benefits. The player in a network that bridges structural holes is able to access information from 
diverse sources and clusters (Burt 2009). For new ventures, the presence of structural holes 
enables accessing to more diverse information and increases the likelihood of innovation 




Second, the theory of weak ties (Granovetter 1973) has been utilized to shed more light on 
the phenomenon by explaining the effects of network structure on development of innovations. 
Tenets of this theory suggest that that different network positions, i.e., rich in cohesion or 
structural holes, enable differing tie strengths such that individuals embedded in networks rich 
with structural holes, due to their access to non-redundant resources and the broader reach of 
their network, establish weaker ties that are more proper to acquire diverse knowledge (Hansen 
1999). On the contrary, more cohesive networks, characterized by the existence of more ties 
among the network actor, enable stronger ties that enable transfer of rich knowledge, often 
enabling more drastic innovations (Hansen 1999).  
Although the general role of strong and weak ties, as well as structural holes and network 
cohesion, are realized in the existing literature, there is disagreement regarding the role that each 
type of network characteristics plays the success of entrepreneurial firms (Johannisson 2000; 
Hite and Hesterly 2001; Rowley et al. 2000). Specifically, the role of network characteristics in 
the early stages of a venture‘s development has been less clear (Bloodgood et al. 1995; Steier 
and Greenwood 2000). The existing literature suggests conflicting findings. For example, in 
some instances ―both strong and weak ties are argued to be positively related to performance‖ 
(Rowley et al., 2000, p. 369) and in other cases, strong ties, enabled by highly dense networks, 
are deemed detrimental to development of ideas (Gargiulo andBenassi, 1999). Burt (2000) 
argues that the two types of ties, strong and weak, play different and distinct role in enabling 
innovation. On one hand, dense networks and the resulting strong ties are regarded as means to 
facilitate exchange of rich information, and complex and tacit knowledge (Krackhardt 1992; 
Starr and MacMillan 1993; Rowley et al. 2000). On the other hand, structural holes and their 




(Granovetter 1973, 1982; Burt 1992). Works by Uzzi (1996, 1997), Hite and Hesterly (2001), 
and Rowley et al. (2000) indicate that a mix of structural holes and dense ties can explain the 
network benefits for new ventures. 
A contingency approach is often utilized to understand the mix in which structural holes and 
network density operate create success for entrepreneurial firms. For instance, the stage of 
development in which a venture is has been noted as a contingency factor such that in early 
stages there is a greater need for higher cohesion, whereas in the later stages of development, 
structural holes are more beneficial (Birley 1985; Bloodgood et al. 1995; Hite and Hesterly 
2001). A second contingency factor in explaining the mix of structural holes and network 
cohesion is the industrial context. Specifically, structural holes are shown to be more 
instrumental in dynamic environments, whereas in stable environments, network density 
becomes more beneficial (Rowley et al. 2000). A third contingency has been the type of 
innovation, radical or incremental. While Elfring and Hulsink (2003) point to more agreed-upon 
role by structural holes as the provider of information diversity for new ventures, they offer a 
lens to understand the role that network density and strong ties play. Specifically, Elfring and 
Hulsink (2003, p. 414) describe the role of network density and strong ties as following: 
―Another strong tie advantage is related to the ability to exchange tacit knowledge. This 
mechanism may be particularly important to start-ups realizing more radical innovations. They 
are confronted with a new combination of resources from various backgrounds. The deployment 
of these complementary assets requires the exchange of tacit knowledge.‖  
Overall, the theoretical arguments point to importance of structural holes for advancement of 
incremental innovations. Incremental innovations happen through the combination of existing 




diverse set of knowledge and thereby facilitate the development of incremental innovations. In 
addition to the theoretical arguments supporting the role of structural holes in development of 
incremental innovations, empirical findings suggest that for ventures pursuing incremental 
innovations, those with weaker ties are more likely to discover opportunities than those with 
strong ties (Elfring and Hulsink 2003). 
On the other hand, it is contended that for ventures pursuing radical innovations, those 
having a mix of strong and weak ties are more likely to discover opportunities than those that do 
not have such a mix (Elfring and Hulsink 2003). That happens because for advancement of 
radical innovations, a combination of diverse knowledge and exchange of complex tacit 
knowledge is required.While access to more than enough diversity in a network traps innovators 
in myopic states where breaking the status-quo is hard (Obstfeld 2005), presence of strong ties 
along with weak ties is more important for ventures pursuing radical innovations as strong ties 
enable exchange of complex tacit knowledge, which is key for radical innovations (Elfring and 
Hulsink 2003). A novel and breakthrough idea is not a combination of different ideas or a re-
configuration of the existing ones. A diverse knowledge about existing innovations allows 
entrepreneurs to understand the current status of an innovative field and define, or adopt, a niche 
area. After this phase, a deep understanding of the often tacit and complex technological 
knowledge is required to develop and refine an idea that is novel (Elfring and Hulsink 2003). 
Creation of breakthrough innovations requires a great extent of tacit knowledge exchange as 
evidenced by Smith et al. (2005), and the existing literature (Reagans and McEvily 2003) suggest 
that strong ties enabled by higher levels of network cohesion enable the exchange of such tacit 
and complex knowledge. Table 1 summarizes the potentials of network structures with high 




extant literature regarding the type of network structures enabling incremental and radical 
innovations. 
---Insert Tables 1 and 2 here--- 
Building on the above-mentioned literature, hypothesizing about the direct effect of 
structural holes and network density in the intellectual capital networks, i.e., educational and 
professional networks, is rather straight-forward. For both radical and incremental innovations, 
access to structural holes in either network is beneficial as it increases access to diverse 
knowledge and ideas. On the other hand, the literature mentions the importance of network 
density for radical innovations but not of incremental ones. Network density facilitates transfer 
of complex knowledge that is key to advancement of radical innovations. Therefore, based on the 
prior literature, we expect network density in both educational and professional networks has a 
positive effect on the capital raised by BDVs pursuing radical innovations. Moreover, we expect 
an insignificant effect in the case of BDVs pursuing incremental innovations. Because these 
relationships have been theorized in the previous literature, we avoid hypothesizing about them 
in this essay. Instead, our focus is on the interactions of structural positions in educational and 
professional networks. 
We believe the focus on the mentioned interactions advances the prior literature theorizing 
about network structures enabling innovation development. For example, while achieving low 
levels of network cohesion and high levels of structural holes is possible in a single network (in 
case of incremental innovations), a simultaneous access to the structural holes and network 
cohesion for BDVs with radical innovations is unlikely. As the network density increases, 
redundant ties among individuals start to emerge. Therefore, reaching high levels of structural 




networks of entrepreneurs can extend beyond a singular structure. Specifically, an entrepreneur‘s 
intellectual network can be shaped around ties that are based on formal education and 
professional experience. If the two networks are structurally distinct, one network can supply 
entrepreneurs with high levels of structural holes, and the other can supply strong ties through 
high level of network density. Below, we explain how different combinations of structural 
positions in the two networks affect the capital raised by BDVs pursuing a radical or incremental 
innovation.       
For radical innovations, access to diverse knowledge and ability to communicate complex 
information are required for success. A possible way to access both is when in one network (e.g., 
educational), structural holes are present, and the other (e.g., professional) is a network with high 
density. Specifically, we suggest that high network density in the other network complements the 
diverse access to the community knowledge. Therefore, as the network density increases in one 
network, the BDV is able to make better use of its diverse access to knowledge through high 
structural holes in the other. High network density in one network allows breakthrough ideas to 
emerge through exchange of complex knowledge, building on the diverse knowledge obtained 
through structural holes of another network. Therefore: 
H2: For radical innovations, network density in one network (i.e., professional or 
educational) increases the effect that structural holes in the other network have 
on the BDV‘s raised capital in round t. 
For incremental innovation, increasing density in one network does not help increase the 
value of structural holes in another. Especially in the context of Big Data, where the speed of 
generating incremental innovations by rival is high (Dhar 2013), high network density and its 
associated redundancy do not help a timely response to market. Incremental innovations require 
quick moves to the market (Tushman and Nadler 1986), and high network density is not 




H3: For incremental innovations, network density in one network (i.e., 
professional or educational) does not change the effect that structural holes in 
the other network have on the BDV‘s raised capital in round t. 
High network density in both educational and professional networks can be detrimental for 
both radical and incremental innovations. As the network density increases in one network, it 
erodes value from the high density in the other. This happens because increasing network density 
in the second network happens at the expense of reduced structural holes; therefore, the BDV 
becomes deprived of information diversity needed for quality innovations. Structural holes and 
access to diverse knowledge are key to the development of innovation. Specifically, in the case 
of Big Data innovations, with their dispersed nature of knowledge (e.g., Dhar 2013), lack of 
structural holes reduces the quality of innovation, making them less attractive for investors. 
Hence, we suggest that: 
H4: For both radical and incremental innovations, network density in one network 
(i.e., professional or educational) reduces the effect that network density in the 
other network has on the BDV‘s raised capital in round t. 
High structural holes in both educational and professional networks can be detrimental for 
radical innovations, but not for incremental innovations. For radical innovations, as the structural 
holes in one network increase, the value of the other network‘s structural holes decreases. This 
happens because the structural holes in the second network emerge at the expense of reducing 
network cohesion. In such cases, although the BDV has access to a wide set of ideas and 
knowledge, it lacks the knowledge depth to come up with breakthrough ideas. Hence, we 
suggest: 
H5: For radical innovations, structural holes in one network (i.e., professional or 
educational) reduces the effect that structural holes in the other network have 
on the BDV‘s raised capital in round t. 
Unlike the case of radical innovations, for BDVs pursuing incremental innovations, diverse 
knowledge in both educational and professional networks is complementary. The quality of 




inputs to the BDV‘s idea generation room. The content of professional knowledge about IT 
innovations can be different from the knowledge obtained from formal education. Thereby, 
BDVs with access to a broad knowledge in both educational and professional networks perform 
better compared to those with access in only one. Moreover, the diverse ideas obtained from one 
network can have higher value when combined with distinct ideas of another network. This 
increases the quality of idea combination, as the components of the idea combination are likely 
to be diverse, resulting in combinative innovations that are distinguished from those developed 
by rivals. Hence, we suggest that: 
H6: For incremental innovations, structural holes in one network increase the 
effect that structural holes in the other network have on the BDV‘s raised 
capital in round t. 
Figure 2 presents an overview of our research model: 
 
Figure 2. Research Model Overview 
Methods 
This research focuses on BDVs active on AngelList.com, a venture-funding website that 
offers a platform to new ventures so they can connect to other ventures and gain access to a pool 
of potential investors. A total of 2,009 BDVs were followed from January 1
st
, 2011 until 
December 29
th




average BDV in our sample has raised $4.73 million, has 3.56 co-founders, and has 12.84 
employees. The website assigns a profile page to each BDV where information such as names 
and links to personal pages of founders, employees, investors, and followers of the BDV are 
identified. Additionally, information regarding different rounds of capital-raising, amount of the 
capital raised, and contributing investors in each round is provided. Finally, the profile page 
includes a section where the BDV‘s innovation is described and introduced. Using a Python-
based web-crawler, the mentioned information about each BDV is crawled and used as the main 
source of information. This information is then supplied by accessing the LinkedIn profile of 
founders, employees, and co-founders, where information about the professional and academic 
background, as well as the friend list of each individual, is obtained.  
Obtaining Network Information 
In order to define the network of ventures in our study, four different types of ties where 
identified to be examined. The nodes in the mapped networks are the BDVs, angels, and venture 
capitalists. The ego networks of each BDV consisted of ties with other BDVs, angels, and 
venture capitalists are analyzed to extract structural features mentioned in the hypothesis 
development section. 
Financial Capital Network 
Networks Based on Personal Ties 
A tie exists between a BDV and another BDV, angel, or venture capitalist if in the periods 
leading to the current round of fundraising, a non-financial social transaction (e.g., friendship, 
followership) has happened between the two actors. The strength of ties is defined by summing 
the number of social interactions between each of two nodes. Specifically, following a BDV on 




company, or an angel is treated as a social interaction between the BDV and the other BDV, 
venture capitalist, or angel. Similarly, appearing in the friend list of a BDV‘s founder or 
employee by a founder or employee of another BDV, an employee of a venture capital company, 
or an angel is treated as another type of a social interaction between the BDV and the other 
BDV, the venture capitalist, or the angel. Then, the raw values of tie strength in the network are 
range-standardized to vary between 0 and 1.   
Networks Based on Investment 
A tie exists between a BDV and an angel or venture capitalist if in the periods leading to the 
current round of fundraising an investment, transaction has happened between the two actors. 
The strength of tie is the cumulated value of transactions between the two parties. Then, the raw 
values of tie strength in the network are range-standardized to vary between 0 and 1.   
Intellectual Capital Network 
Educational Network 
To establish an educational tie between two BDVs, first, educational ties between all 
founders and employees of the sample‘s BDVs are determined. An educational tie between two 
individuals exists if they have graduated in the same major. The strength of the tie increases by 
one for sharing alma mater, as well as having overlap in the educational period.  The strength of 
ties between two BDVs is determined by summing the weight of ties that exist between 
individuals at the two ventures. Then, the raw values of tie strength in the network are range-
standardized to vary between 0 and 1.   
Professional Network 
To establish professional ties between two BDVs, first, professional ties between all 




individuals exists if they have previously worked in the same place. The strength of the tie 
increases by one if the two individuals have overlapping tenures.  The strength of ties between 
two BDVs is determined by summing the weight of ties that exist between individuals at the two 
ventures. Then, the raw values of tie strength in the network are range-standardized to vary 
between 0 and 1.   
Measures 
For the four networks mentioned above, structural characteristics were measured as follows. 
Eigenvector centrality is measured utilizing Bonacich‘s measure 10F
16
 (1972). We multiply the 
value of eigenvector centrality by 100 for better interpretation. On average, personal networks 
show an eigenvector centrality of 9.63, whereas the average eigenvector centrality in investment 
networks is 13.28
17
. For measuring structural holes and density measures, 1-step neighborhood 
ego networks of each BDV are considered. The weighted-network measures of network density 
and constraint suggested by Burt (2008) are utilized as measures of network density and 
structural holes, respectively. For measuring structural holes, we use an inverse measure of 
constraint. The constraint measure is calculated as follows: 
Ci=  𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑗 , i ≠ j  
Cij = (Pij + 𝑃𝑖𝑞   𝑞 𝑃𝑞𝑗 )
2
, i ≠ q ≠ j 
Pij = Zij /  𝑍𝑖𝑞𝑞  
Where Ci is the constraint index for ith BDV and Zij is the weight of the tie between the ith 
and jth BDV. Then, Pij measures the direct access to the jth BDV by the ith one. We follow 
                                                          
16The elements of the adjacency matrix are the edge weights in the whole network. 
17We ran our models with simple degree centrality measures, instead of the eigenvector centrality 
measure. Although the same trends are observable with those alternative measures, Wald‘s 
chi squared of those estimations are persistently lower than the ones estimated with the 
eigenvector centrality measures. Therefore, we keep eigenvector centrality as the measure of 




Burt‘s suggestion for multiplying the index by 100 for better interpretation. Also, ego network 
density is calculated by: Zij / N(N-1), where N is the size of the ego network. We also multiply 
the density ratio by 100. On average, ego networks of education in our sample show a constraint 
level of 27.83 and a density of 35.61. Ego networks of professional experience in our sample 
show a constraint level of 19.22 and a density of 24.43.  
In order to determine the innovation type (radical vs. incremental), we conducted a text 
analysis of the product description section of the BDV‘s profile in the AngelList website, 
supplemented with blog and news reports about the BDV‘s innovation, obtained from Lexis-
Nexis. We believe a BDV‘s innovation type can be unfolded in the product description section of 
the BDV‘s webpage because that section is the medium through which the product is introduced 
and its potential superiorities to competing products are explained. Further, news pieces and blog 
posts provide outsiders‘ view of the BDV‘s innovation. The text-mining module of R (tm) was 
used to analyze the product description section of each BDV‘s profile, as well as related news 
pieces and blog posts. In order to do so, first, a set of words associated with radical and 
incremental innovations was compiled using the existing literature on organizational innovations. 
We searched Google Scholar for articles that contained terms incremental innovation and radical 
innovation. Over 12,100 articles were identified, and the HTML versions of these articles where 
combined to form a corpus. This corpus was text-mined to extract sentences that did not include 
any of the radical innovation or incremental innovation with the exception of sentences that were 
adjacent to the sentences containing these words. Then, the sentences containing the mentioned 
terms and their adjacent sentences were analyzed to form a network of words that are closely 




For example, the words ―original,‖ ―breakthrough,‖ ―pioneering,‖ and ―groundbreaking‖ had 
the highest frequency of occurring when the word ―radical innovation‖ was discussed in the 
corpus of articles. Also, the words ―revise,‖ ―extend,‖ ―amend,‖ ―combine,‖ ―re-configure,‖ and 
―modify‖ were adjacent to the word ―incremental innovation.‖ The adjacent words were then 
processed to eliminate the ones that are irrelevant to the concepts of incremental and radical 
innovations. Then, a library of refined word for each type of innovation was used to analyze the 
product description section of each BDV in the sample. The frequencies of words associated 
with radical and incremental innovations in the product description corpus of each BDV are 
calculated. The ratio of associated words to the total number of words in the text is calculated to 
measure emphasis on a radical vs incremental approach. The two ratios are then compared with a 
z-test to determine the category of innovation; the significantly larger ratio determines the 
category of radical or incremental innovation. Observations with insignificant z-test are dropped 
from further analysis. The following is a piece of a news coverage of Levyx, a Big Data startup 
that was evaluated as radical in our sample: 
―Start up Levyx believes that its Helium and LevyxSpark platform, which is integrated into 
Apache Spark open source computing framework, is a groundbreaking change in big data 
computing. Levyx CEO Reza Sadri told Legaltech News that company‘s proprietary technology 
can process tens of millions of queries per second on a single computing node and with latency 
in microseconds… 
…  Levyx differs from other big data processors in the market in its utilizations of solid state 
drives (SSD) and flash memory, which stores and erases data through electrical circuits as 
opposed to through mechanical parts like disk read-and-write heads in traditional hard drives, 
and is therefore able to process data much quicker. The use of this technology, as well running it 
on commodity servers, Sadri said, allows Levyx to achieve in-memory computing performance 
at a fraction of the cost.‖ 
 
Alternatively, the following is a piece of news coverage of BloomReach which is evaluated 
as a BDV that pursues development of an incremental innovation: 
―Big data is hot, but infrastructure-level platforms such as Hadoop, which focus on storage 




extend Hadoop and will let companies analyze, visualize and act on all that data without hiring a 
team of Stanford Ph.Ds, or that will let developers write big-data apps without having to reinvent 
the wheel.; BloomReach is one of those applications. 
BloomReach is taking a very targeted, very hands-free approach to big data for its 
customers. It‘s offering a SaaS-based product that job listings say is for ―helping leading online 
businesses uncover the highest quality, most relevant content sought by their consumers, when 
and where they want it.‖ Founded by a team with roots at Google, Cisco, Facebook and Yahoo, 
among other companies, BloomReach has, according to one estimate, about 160 customers — all 
of them among the top 10,000 websites, and most of them in the retail space. Among its core 
technologies and methods are Hadoop, Lucene, Monte Carlo simulations and large-scale image 
processing.‖ 
The information about the raised capital in each round was collected from AngelList.com‘s 
profile of the BDVs. From the conception to business planning, product development, 
commercialization, operationalization, expansion, and eventually public offering, new ventures 
raise funds from different resources (e.g., Cumming 2007). Depending on the stage of the 
venture‘s development, the fundraising round is labeled as seeding (i.e., no stage, often at the 
conception and research stage), Stage A, Stage B, Stage C, etc. It is possible that a BDV raises 
external funding at multiple rounds in the same stage of development. Therefore, a new venture 
might have two or three rounds of seeding. In our operationalization of a fundraising period, we 
focus on each round of fundraising and use the raised capital in that round as the dependent 
variable. Then, we control for the stage at which the capital is raised.     
Controls 
As mentioned above, we control for the stage of development where the funding is raised. 
We do so because early and late stages of fundraising are different in terms of the funding 
providers,11F
18
 as well as the amount of the capital needed.12F
19
 To best capture the effect of the 
fundraising stage, for each stage of development (e.g., seeding, stage A, etc.), we specify a 
                                                          
18
For example, angels contribute more in the early stages of the development, whereas venture 
capitalists do so in the later stages close to the initial public offering (IPO). 
19
Usually, the financial capital needed in the early stages of development are smaller than the 




variable, the value of which indicates the number of fundraising rounds a new venture has 
completed in that stage, prior to the current round. Therefore, for BDVs with their first round of 
fundraising, the value of seeding, stage A, stage B, and stage B variables is all set at 0. If a 
venture has had two rounds of fundraising at the seeding stage, and the current round is its 
second round at stage A, the value of seeding variable is set at 2, the value of stage A variable is 
set at 1, and the value of stage B and stage C variables are set at 0. 
In addition to measuring the inter-venture networks, an intra-venture’s intellectual 
networks (networks among employees and founders) were also analyzed. This is because the 
existing research has primarily focused on intra-organizational networks as motors of innovation 
(e.g., Hansen 1999); therefore, we measure the network density and network constraint for all 
BDVs‘ internal networks.   
Also, we control for the number of years since a BDV has been established because the 
time elapsed since establishment can have an effect on accessible financial and intellectual 
resources. We control for the location dummy, measured at the city level, whether or not the 
venture identifies itself as a business-to-business (B2B) or business-to-customer (identified by 
B2B tags reported in AngelList.com), and the technological scope dummies which represent the 
area of focus in the Big Data context (identified by tags reported in AngelList.com; can be 
analytics, security, or infrastructural). Moreover, the number of employees13F
20
 (including co-
founders) in the fundraising period of interest, and average of employees‘ (including co-
founders) value of education14F
21
 are controlled for. 
                                                          
20
AngelList reports the date of employment and departure of employees. This data was used to 
calculate number of employees employed in each fundraising period. 
21
The LinkedIn account of each employee was accessed to obtain educational background of 





We constructed a panel where each BDV is observed in each round of fundraising (i.e., the 
BDVs are paneled over rounds of fundraising). This resulted in 6,810 venture-round 
observations.15F
22
 We split the sample to BDVs pursuing radical and incremental innovations, and 
models are run within each sub-sample. For all of the models, and due to the panel structure of 
the data, the models are processed using a generalized least squares (GLS) estimation with panel-
specific corrections for first-order auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity.  
In order to test the hypothesis, we followed a step-wise approach. First, we tested the 
structural effects of the financial capital networks (without inclusion of the intellectual networks‘ 
variables; (1.1 and 1.2)). Next, we tested the structural effects of intellectual capital networks 
(without inclusion of financial capital networks‘ variables; (2)). Finally, we tested a full model 
(3) by simultaneously considering the structural variables pertaining to both financial and 
intellectual capital networks.  
 
RaisedCapitalit = α0 + β1 * (Investment eigen. cent.)it + β2 * (Personal eigen. cent.)it 
                           + β3 * (Investment eigen. cent. * Personal eigen. cent.)it + Controls + ϵit (1.1) 
 
 
RaisedCapitalit = α0 + β1 * (Superimposed eigen. cent.)it + Controls + ϵit  (1.2) 
RaisedCapital16F
23
it = α0 + β1 * (SH-Edu)it + β2 * (D-Edu)it + β3 * (SH-Prof)it + β4 * (D-Prof)it 
                            + β5 * (SH-Edu * D-Prof)it + β6 * (D-Edu * SH-Prof)it + β7 * (D-Prof * D-
Edu)it 
                            + β8 * (SH-Edu * SH-Prof)it + β9 * (D-Edu * SH-Edu)it 
                              + β10 * (D-Prof * SH-Prof)it + Controls + ϵit  (2) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
diploma=1, associate degree= 2, undergraduate degree= 3, master‘s degree= 4, doctorate= 5) 
and averaged for each BDV. 
22
Appendix B presents the correlations among key variables. 
23
SH denotes structural holes; D denotes density; Edu denotes educational networks; Prof 




RaisedCapitalit = α0 + β1 * (SH-Edu)it + β2 * (D-Edu)it + β3 * (SH-Prof)it + β4 * (D-Prof)it 
                                  + β5 * (SH-Edu * D-Prof)it + β6 * (D-Edu * SH-Prof)it + β7 * (D-Prof * D-
Edu)it 
                           + β8 * (SH-Edu * SH-Prof)it + β9 * (D-Edu * SH-Edu)it 
                                     + β10 * (D-Prof * SH-Prof)it + β10 * (Superimposed eigen. cent.)it 
                                     + Controls + ϵit  (3) 
 
Table 3 represents the results of the first step, the model investigating the effect of 
eigenvector centrality in personal and investment networks. We start with a model that treats the 
two networks as structurally separate and only includes the direct effect of eigenvector centrality 
in each network (Model 1). Results from this model show no significant effect from either of the 
centrality measures in the two networks. However, when the cross-effect of eigenvector 
centrality in personal and investment networks is considered, a positive and significant 
coefficient is observed (Model 2), indicating that holding a central position among influential 
investors helps only when a central position in the personal networks is held. In order to examine 
the structural difference between the personal and investment networks, we calculate the Kendall 
rank correlation between eigenvector centrality in investment and personal networks (following 
Battiston et al. 2014). The results (Table 4) show a significantly high correlation between the two 
measures (0.73) indicating that the two networks are structurally convergent, thereby justifying 
superimposing the two networks. Hence, the two networks were superimposed, with the 
redundant ties between the two networks being assigned with the sum of the weights of ties in 
the two networks when considered separately. Also, if a tie existed in one network and not in the 
other, the tie was included in the superimposed network with its weight set at the original weight 
it had in the separated network. Then, we measured the eigenvector centrality in the newly 
constructed superimposed network. The results (Model 3 in Table 3) show that in BDVs 




networks is positively and significantly associated with the raised capital. Taken together, the 
results provide support for H1.   
---Insert Tables 3 and 4 here--- 
In the second step, we tested for the effect of structural holes and network density in both 
educational and professional networks. Similar to our approach investigating the financial capital 
networks, we started our analysis by treating the two networks structurally separate. The results 
of direct effect models (4 and 6 in Table 5) suggest that while the presence of structural holes in 
both networks positively and significantly affects the raised capital in BDVs pursing radical and 
incremental innovations, density does not show a significant effect in either of the networks. 
Also, the coefficient estimates of structural holes and density from intra-venture networks 
suggest a similar pattern where structural holes in both educational and professional networks 
show positive and significant association with the raised capital, whereas the coefficient estimate 
of network density in both educational and professional networks shows insignificant 
associations.  However, our examination of the cross-effects between the networks suggests a 
clear trend (Models 5 and 7). For radical innovations, the interactions between educational 
network‘s density and professional network‘s structural holes, as well as the interaction between 
educational network‘s structural holes and professional network‘s density, are positive and 
significant, suggesting that the effect of high structural holes in one network increases with the 
increase in the density of the other network, supporting H2. For BDVs pursuing incremental 
innovations, the increase in one network‘s density does not increase the value of structural holes 
in the other (supporting H3).     
Also, for BDVs in the two sub-samples, the coefficient of interaction between network 




network density in one network erodes value from the network density in the other, supporting 
H4. Moreover, for BDVs pursuing incremental innovations, the interaction of structural holes in 
educational and professional networks show a negative and significant association with the 
capital raised, indicating that increasing structural holes in one network erodes value from the 
structural holes present in the other, supporting H5. Finally, for BDVs pursuing incremental 
innovations, the coefficient of interaction between structural holes in educational and 
professional networks is positive and significant, indicating that structural holes in one network 
increase the value of structural holes in the other, supporting H6.  
While we had hypothesized about the structural cross-effects of the two networks, we also 
control for interaction of network density and structural holes in the same network. Although the 
two structural measure are strongly and significantly correlated (-0.15), we controlled for these 
interactions to remove any effect that the co-occurrence of structural holes and network density 
in the same network might have. The results suggest that for incremental innovation, increasing 
network density in a network erodes value from the effect of its structural holes, while for radical 
innovation, the coefficients of interaction between density and structural holes in the same 
network is insignificant.    
Similar to the case of financial capital networks, we compared the structural similarity of 
educational and professional networks. The results of the Kendall rank correlation tests (also 
reported in Table 3) indicate that the structural features of the two networks are diverging. The 
correlation between the structural holes of the two networks is 0.11 while the correlation 
between the densities of the two networks is 0.18. This justifies structural separation of 
educational and professional networks.  




In the last step of our primary analysis, we include the eigenvector centrality in the 
superimposed financial capital network, along with the structural holes and density measures of 
professional and educational networks. Estimating these full models (Models 8 and 9 in Table 6) 
shows patterns of results that are similar to when the effects of structural positions in financial 
and intellectual capital networks are examined separately. 
---Insert Table 6 here--- 
In conducting the main analysis, we established the inter-venture links by considering ties of 
founders as well as employees of the BDVs in the sample. However, it might be contended that 
founder ties are more influential in accessing both intellectual and financial capital. Founders are 
deemed as the main drivers of development and refinement of innovation (Amitt and Zott 2001) 
and also involve directly in fundraising activities (e.g., Birley 1986; Wetzel 1987; Harrison and 
Mason 1992; Webb et al. 2013; Thai and Turkina 2014). In order to focus on the power of 
founders‘ network, we conduct our main analysis by only considering the intellectual and 
financial capital networks that are defined based on founders‘ ties only. Models 10 and 11 in 
Table 7 represent these results. The findings from this table suggest that the main hypotheses 
hold robust when networks based on founders‘ ties are considered. 
---Insert Table 7 here--- 
Sub-Sample Analysis: Technological Scope 
In the context of BDVs, we define the technological scope as the main Big Data area that the 
BDV‘s product/service is focused on. Big data technologies cover diverse technological areas, 
most distinctively, big data security (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2012), analytics applications 
(LaValle et al. 2013), and big data infrastructure (e.g., computing) (Jacobs 2009, McAfee and 




technologies are also diverse in their architectural scope. While some big data technologies (e.g., 
cloud-based computing structures (Grossman and Siegel 2014)) are at the infrastructural level of 
IT architecture (see Weill and Vitale 2002 for a discussion of IT enterprise architecture) some 
technologies target analytics application layer (e.g., data modeling applications (Grossman and 
Siegel 2014)). In addition to these more pronounced technological scopes, a third scope in Big 
Data is concerned with the security applications that protect large operations of the Big Data 
innovations belonging to the two other technological scopes.  
We suspect that the three scopes of BD require different levels of knowledge diversity and 
complexity in knowledge exchange and hence will be enabled by distinct network structures. 
Therefore, our general arguments regarding the mix of structural holes and network density 
might not be homogeneously applicable in all contexts. These scopes can be different in terms of 
the way the required knowledge for their development is dispersed in the network. Absent 
previous literature regarding these differences, we adopt an inductive approach and conduct our 
analyses in sub-samples corresponding to the three technological scopes. Table 8 (Models 12-17) 
represents the result of this sub-sample analysis. 
---Insert Table 8 here--- 
Findings suggest that the results regarding the effect of financial capital networks‘ 
eigenvector centrality is consistent across the three scopes. However, the result shows 
differences when the effects of structural holes and network densities of intellectual capital 
networks are considered. For BDVs active in the security scope, the structure of intellectual 
capital network shows a pattern similar to what was observed in the full model analysis. 
However, while in the full sample analysis a trend was observed that structural holes in one 




pursuing radical innovations, the subsample results show that for the BDVs in the analytics 
scope, only structural holes in the educational network and network density in the professional 
network positively and significantly interact. However, for BDVs in the infrastructural scope, 
only structural holes in the professional networks and network density in educational networks 
show the same complementary interaction. These results can be interpreted by considering that 
analytics innovations are built on a broader span of knowledge, from statistics to distributed 
computing, and thus diversity in the educational background is key to their development. In such 
a case, professional networks can bring the network cohesion required to transfer complex ideas 
needed for the development of radical innovations. On the contrary, Big Data infrastructural 
innovations involve a complex exchange of knowledge, mostly developed in the computer 
science, therefore, BDVs can benefit from high cohesion in the educational networks and obtain 
diverse ideas from their professional ties. Due to infrastructural innovations‘ dependence on the 
exchange of complex knowledge, increasing network density in one network does not erode 
value from the network density in another. Moreover, structural holes in one network do not 
show a significant complementarity with structural holes in another intellectual capital network.  
Comparison with non-IT Context 
Our hypothesizing about the effect of inter-venture networks heavily relies on the socially-
constructed nature of IT innovations that is evidenced by the previous research. We believe the 
multi-disciplinary nature of IT innovations, combined with the dispersed access to the cutting-
edge IT knowledge, contributes to the patterns observed in terms of the effect of intellectual 
capital networks. In order to further investigate this unique nature of IT innovation, we conduct 
our model in a different industry, i.e., Medical Device, which shows a comparable level of 




constructed a matched sample following suggestions of Chae et al. 2014. In doing so, for each 
venture-round observation in the Big Data sample, a venture-round observation in the Medical 
Device context was selected that was in the 0.30% range of employee size and level of employee 
education, and share the same year of establishment with the venture from the Big Data Sample. 
Due to the restrictions for building the matched sample, the sample in the Medical Devices 
context had fewer observations (5,182).17F
24
 
We start our matched sample analysis by assuming that similar to the Big Data context, 
personal and investment networks have similar structure, whereas educational and professional 
networks are structurally distinct. Therefore, we replicated our full models (Models 8 and 9) for 
the Medical Devices sample (Models 18 and 19 in Table 9). While in both Big Data and Medical 
Devices sample eigenvector centrality in the financial capital market is positively and 
significantly associated with raised capital, the results for the effect of intellectual capital 
networks‘ structure on capital raised are not converging. 
---Insert Table 9 here--- 
A possible explanation for such a difference between the two industries is the difference in 
the structural similarity of educational and professional networks. To investigate this possible 
explanation, we first calculate the Kandall correlation coefficient for structural features of 
networks in the Medical Devices industry. The results (Table 10) show that although personal 
and investment networks are structurally similar (similar to the Big Data context), there is also a 
high correlation between the structural features of educational and professional networks. 
Specifically, the correlation coefficient between structural holes in educational and professional 
networks is 0.46, and the correlation coefficient between network densities in the two networks 
                                                          
24




in 0.38.  This indicates that the structural separation of educational and professional networks in 
the Medical Devices context might be misleading. To address this issue, we superimpose the 
educational and professional networks in the Medical Devices context and calculate the network 
density, structural holes, and interaction between the two based on a single network of 
intellectual capital.  
---Insert Table 10 here--- 
The results of this modified model are also presented in Table 9 (Models 20 and 21). The 
findings show insignificant coefficients for structural holes, density, and the interaction of the 
two for inter-venture networks. However, the results indicate that while intra-venture structural 
holes in ventures pursuing both radical and incremental innovations are positively and 
significantly associated with the raised capital, the intra-venture network density has a positive 
and significant association with the raised capital only for radical innovations. Taken together, 
these results indicate two distinctions between the intellectual capital networks in Big Data and 
Medical Devices industries. First, educational and professional networks in the Big Data industry 
are structurally distinct, whereas the two networks show similar characteristics in the Medical 
Devices context. Second, while in the Big Data context inter-venture intellectual networks 
contribute to the capital raised, therefore providing evidence for their socially-constructed nature, 
in the Medical Devices context, only intra-venture intellectual capital networks contribute to the 
raised capital. 
Network Effects on Inception of Innovation 
Thus far, we have viewed intellectual networks as mediums through which BDVs access 
knowledge resources required to refine and further develop their initial idea. It is also possible 




inception. In order to test for such an effect, we investigate the effect of intellectual networks‘ 
structure on whether a BDV pursues a radical or incremental innovation. Specifically, we 
consider the educational and professional ties of the founders of a BDV one year before 
establishment. Since we need access to data about existing BDVs one year prior to establishment 
of a focal one, this analysis is done on BDVs established after January 1
st
 2012. Table 11 
presents two models (Models 22 and 23) with direct and interaction effects of inter-venture 
educational and professional networks‘ structure. 
---Insert Table 11 here--- 
The results suggest that network density or structural holes alone do not affect the type of 
innovation a BDV pursues. However, the coefficients of the interaction between network density 
in one network and structural holes in other are positive and significant. Therefore, as the 
network density in one intellectual capital network increases, it increases the positive effect that 
structural holes have on a BDV‘s pursuit of radical innovations. Moreover, the results show as 
the structural holes in one network increase, it increases the likelihood that structural holes in 
another leads to a BDV‘s pursuit of incremental innovations. Figure 3 presents the emerging 





Figure 3. Emerging Research Model 
Discussion 
Focusing on BDVs, this study investigates the effect that intellectual and financial capital 
networks have on a new venture‘s success, in terms of the raised capital in a fundraising period. 
Specifically, educational and professional networks are identified as structurally distinct 
networks that facilitate the flow of knowledge resources to BDVs for improvement and 
development of their innovation. The results suggest that for radical innovations, one of the 
educational or professional networks can supply the BDV with structural holes, enabling access 
to diverse ideas, and the other can provide the network density needed to exchange complex 
knowledge required for development of novel ideas. Moreover, our findings suggest that for 
incremental innovations, diverse ideas obtained from educational networks can complement 
those obtained from professional ties. Specifically, these effects are persistent for ties made by 
founders only, or when extended ties among venture employees are also considered. Moreover, 




or incremental, at the inception stage. Also, we found that depending on the technological scope, 
the structural features of intellectual networks required for success change. 
In addition to the effects of intellectual capital networks, our results suggest that personal 
ties with other BDVs‘ founders and employees, personal ties made with angels and capitalists, 
and ties based on previous investments are pertinent for raising capital. Specifically, we found 
that eigenvector centrality in the financial capital network positively, significantly, and 
consistently predicts the BDV‘s success.  
Finally, our findings provide evidence that unlike the case of the Big Data context, inter-
venture intellectual networks do not contribute to fundraising success in a comparable non-IT 
context, i.e., Medical Devices. The results suggest that while innovations are socially constructed 
in the context of IT generally, and Big Data specifically, this is not always the case, as evidence 
by lack of support for effects of inter-venture intellectual capital networks in the context of 
Medical Devices. Further, the results indicate that unlike the case in the IT context, educational 
and professional networks are not structurally distinct in a non-IT context such as Medical 
Devices. 
Contributions 
Primarily, this study contributes to the literature on IT innovations (e.g., Nambisan et al. 
1999; Fichman 2001, Han et al. 2012) which has mostly examined them in the context of 
established firms (Han et al. 2012). However, with innovations generated by new ventures 
becoming increasingly important in the IT field, this study extends the literature by focusing on 
innovations generated in new ventures and providing a network framework that explains the 
success of the innovation. Specifically, this study shows that IT innovations are socially-




Moreover, this study documents that such social embeddedness of innovation is not prevalent in 
other non-IT contexts. 
Second, while the general literature on new ventures‘ success has mainly focused on the 
networks that help obtaining financial and reputational resources, this study extends this network 
view by empirically providing evidence that external intellectual ties with other new ventures 
also contribute to the success of a focal new venture, especially for those ventures that are still at 
the early stages of development. Specifically, in the IT context, our results provide evidence for 
how innovations can be socially developed and refined through intellectual ties among new 
ventures in the same industry. Also, the study suggests that while intellectual networks operate as 
a driving factor for pursuit of certain types innovations in the conception stages, they operate as a 
factor that interacts with that type of innovation (radical or incremental) to predict financial 
success.  
Third, this study extends the network research in new ventures that has mainly focused on 
aggregated networks (Lechner et al. 2006), by introducing separate networks and distinguishing 
the structural interplay between them. More importantly, we show an empirical approach that 
depends on the structural similarities to aggregate or disaggregate distinct network ties. An 
implication of disaggregating inter-venture networks is resolving the equivocal suggestions made 
by previous research. For example, while anecdotal evidence (e.g., Elfring and Hulsink 2003) 
suggest that a mix of structural holes and network cohesion is required for success of radical 
innovations, co-presence of the two structural features in a singular network is unlikely to 
happen. However, considering ties with different contents as distinct, we showed that a new 






From a practical perspective, this study has a number of implications. First, the results of the 
study inform entrepreneurs and incubator managers about networking strategies contingent with 
the type of innovation a new venture pursues. Specifically, our findings suggest that intellectual 
ties should be appropriated by considering the radicalness of the innovation a new venture 
pursues. Figures 4a and 4b present a blue print for networking structures appropriate for each 
type of innovation. Another implication of this study is for incubator firms. Incubator firms 
mainly focus on providing new ventures with networking opportunities that connect 
entrepreneurs with angels and venture capitalists. However, findings of our study suggest that 
personal ties with employees that founders of other BDVs can also contribute to fundraising 
success.  
Also, our findings suggest that networking efforts for obtaining financial and reputational 
resources can be extended by developing proper intellectual links, by considering the educational 
and professional background of new recruitments. Specifically, our findings suggest that 
ventures pursuing incremental innovations need to diversify both of their educational and 
professional backgrounds. Moreover, ventures pursuing radical innovations should consider 
building a dense network of one type, e.g., educational, and supplement this dense network with 
a diverse network of another type, e.g., professional. These findings also provide investors with 
additional information to evaluate success of new ventures. Since access to financial capital is 
key to new ventures‘ success, and since intellectual capital networks play a key role in a new 
venture at development stages, investors can evaluate the promise of the venture by considering 
its embeddedness in intellectual networks, while taking into account the radicalness of 









Figure 4b. Networking Structure Appropriate for BDVs Pursuing Incremental Innovations 
Limitations 
In spite of its contributions, the findings of the study should be interpreted considering its 
limitations. First, we use the BDVs listed on AngelList.com and ties evidenced in the website 
and LinkedIn to construct financial capital and intellectual capital networks. While it is possible 
that some ties are omitted due to the incomplete information in the website or due to lack of 




well-known limitation of network studies. However, we are encouraged by the number of BDVs 
studied that is considerably higher than the sample size in similar studies. Also, in studying 
intellectual capital networks, we focused on educational and professional networks of 
association. We were limited in our access to other types of intellectual associations such as 
journal memberships or attendance to field-related conferences. We suggest that future research 
investigates other types of intellectual association and evaluate the role they have in raising 
financial resources. Moreover, in identifying the radicalness of innovations, we rely on a 
venture‘s description of a product as well as news report and blog posts about it. Self-
descriptions and news coverage might be biased towards claiming a product/service radical. 
However, we strongly believe that our approach might contain less bias compared to the 
alternative approaches used, such as self-reported measures. Moreover, while the interaction 
between different network structures provides evidence of symmetrical complementarity 
between structural holes and network density for BDVs pursuing radical innovations, the 
theoretical arguments point to the possibility of a sequential complementarity. While studying 
this sequential complementarity is out of this study‘ scope, we encourage future studies to further 
investigate it.  
Finally, in our matched sample comparison with non-IT contexts, we had only investigated one 
other context, i.e., Medical Devices, mainly due to the limitations in accessing another industry 
present in AngelList.com with similar valuation range and enough observations to make 
meaningful comparisons. We believe that further research is required to further examine the 
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Tables of Chapter 3 
Table 1- Summary of the potentials of networks structures with high levels of structural 
holes and network cohesion. 
 Potential for reach to diverse 
knowledge 
Potential for enabling 
exchange of complex 
knowledge 
Structural holes H L 
Network cohesion L H 
 
Table 2- Type of innovation and the fostering network structure 
 Incremental innovations Radical innovations 
Structural holes H H 
Network cohesion L H 
 
Table 3- The Effect of Financial Capital Networks 
 
Networks treated separately Superimposed networks 
 
Incremental Radical Incremental Radical 
DV =Raised Capital Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Investment eigen. cent. 0.012 0.009 0.004 0.003     
Personal eigen. cent. 0.022 0.018 0.019 0.018     
Investment eigen. cent.* Personal 
eigen. cent.   0.083*   0.072*     
Superimposed eigen. cent.         0.182*** 0.178*** 
Wald's Chi 1073.86 1112.52 1008.92 1161.14 2252.22 2371.34 
N 2712 2712 4098 4098 2712 4098 
Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, number of years the BDV is established, and 
dummies representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or B2C), location, funding series (i.e., no stage, seed, 
A, B, C), and BDV’s year of establishment are not reported for brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  
GLS estimation with corrections for panel specific AR1 and Heteroskedasticity is used. 
 
Table 4- Kendall Correlation of Different Networks’ Structural Features 
  Correlation 
 SH-Edu  - SH-Prof  0.11
# 
Justifies separation 
D-Edu  - D-Edu 0.18* Justifies separation 
SH-Edu  - SH-Prof (IVN) 0.21* Justifies separation 
D-Edu  - D-Edu (IVN) 0.14
 
Justifies separation 
Investment eigen. cent. - Personal eigen. cent. 0.73** Justifies superimposing 
SH denotes structural holes; D denotes density; Edu denotes educational networks; Prof denotes 
professional network. IVN denotes intra venture network. 




Table 5- The Effect of Intellectual Capital Networks 
 
Incremental Radical 
DV= capital raised Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
SH-Edu  0.114*** 0.082** 0.0131*** 0.182*** 
D-Edu  -0.021 0.005 0.012 0.019 
SH-Prof  0.153*** 0.093** 0.096** 0.149*** 
D-Prof -0.019 0.008 0.009 0.012 
SH-Edu * D-Prof    0.011   0.173*** 
D-Prof * D-Edu   -0.076**   -0.082** 
SH-Edu * SH-Prof   0.132***   -0.078* 
D-Edu * SH-Prof   0.016   0.125*** 
D-Edu * SH-Edu   -0.038*   0.014 
D-Prof * SH-Prof   -0.026#   0.008 
IVN D- Prof 0.008 0.005 0.022* 0.052* 
IVN D- Edu 0.014 0.017 0.031* 0.063* 
IVN SH- Prof 0.098** 0.073* 0.097* 0.096** 
IVN SH- Edu 0.086* 0.082* 0.110** 0.084* 
Wald's Chi 3026.34 5783.67 3244.38 6111.32 
N 2712 2712 4098 4098 
SH denotes structural holes; D denotes density; Edu denotes educational networks; Prof denotes 
professional network. IVN denotes intra venture network. 
Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, number of years the 
BDV is established, and dummies representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or 
B2C), location, funding series (i.e., no stage, seed, A, B, C), and BDV’s year of establishment are 
not reported for brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  















Table 6- The Effect of Both Financial Capital and Intellectual Capital Networks 
 
Incremental Radical 
DV= capital raised Model 8 Model 9 
SH-Edu  0.098** 0.080* 
D-Edu  0.008 0.015 
SH-Prof  0.120*** 0.089** 
D-Prof 0.017 0.012 
SH-Edu * D-Prof  -0.010 0.168*** 
D-Prof * D-Edu -0.114** -0.053* 
SH-Edu * SH-Prof 0.129*** -0.074* 
D-Edu * SH-Prof 0.012 0.059** 
D-Edu * SH-Edu -0.037** 0.008 
D-Prof * SH-Prof -0.019* 0.011 
IVN D- Prof 0.008 0.033* 
IVN D- Edu 0.009 0.035* 
IVN SH- Prof 0.056* 0.073* 
IVN SH- Edu 0.068* 0.082** 
Superimposed eigen. cent. 0.201*** 0.188*** 
Wald's Chi 7812.39 8623.91 
N 2712 4098 
SH denotes structural holes; D denotes density; Edu denotes educational networks; Prof denotes 
professional network. IVN denotes intra venture network. 
Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, number of years the 
BDV is established, and dummies representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or 
B2C), location, funding series (i.e., no stage, seed, A, B, C), and BDV’s year of establishment are 
not reported for brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  














Table 7- Full Model When Only Founders’ Ties Are Considered 
 
Incremental Radical 
DV= capital raised Model 10 Model 11 
SH-Edu  0.083* 0.053* 
D-Edu  0.011 0.009 
SH-Prof  0.117*** 0.144*** 
D-Prof 0.020 0.018 
SH-Edu * D-Prof  0.013 0.128*** 
D-Prof * D-Edu -0.162*** -0.099** 
SH-Edu * SH-Prof 0.133*** -0.051* 
D-Edu * SH-Prof 0.008 0.071* 
D-Edu * SH-Edu -0.020# 0.008 
D-Prof * SH-Prof -0.018* 0.003 
IVN D- Prof 0.010 -0.003 
IVN D- Edu 0.002 0.009 
IVN SH- Prof 0.005 0.012 
IVN SH- Edu 0.007 0.005 
Superimposed eigen. cent. 0.202*** 0.192*** 
Wald's Chi 6794.31 7032.46 
N 2712 4098 
SH denotes structural holes; D denotes density; Edu denotes educational networks; Prof denotes 
professional network. IVN denotes intra venture network. 
Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, number of years the 
BDV is established, and dummies representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or 
B2C), location, funding series (i.e., no stage, seed, A, B, C), and BDV’s year of establishment are 
not reported for brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  














Table 8- Sub-sample Analysis: Technological Scope 
 
Analytics Security Infrastructure 
 
Incremental Radical Incremental Radical Incremental Radical 
DV= capital 
raised Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 
SH-Edu  0.081** 0.072* 0.082** 0.061* 0.071* 0.096** 
D-Edu  0.005 0.006 0.012 0.007 0.005 0.014 
SH-Prof  0.098** 0.067* 0.092** 0.042* 0.089** 0.092* 
D-Prof 0.010 0.013 0.008 0.010 0.019 0.007 
SH-Edu * D-
Prof  -0.017 0.191*** -0.011 0.111** -0.011 0.019 
D-Prof * D-
Edu -0.211*** -0.103** -0.080* -0.051* -0.017 -0.011 
SH-Edu * SH-
Prof 0.173*** -0.078** 0.062** -0.074* 0.016 -0.059* 
D-Edu * SH-
Prof 0.005 0.017 0.003 0.063* 0.016 0.084** 
D-Edu * SH-
Edu -0.021* 0.001 -0.018* 0.010 -0.021 0.001 
D-Prof * SH-
Prof -0.014# -0.002 -0.012# 0.010 -0.011 -0.012 
IVN D- Prof 0.003 0.041* 0.005 0.027* 0.003 0.044** 
IVN D- Edu -0.004 0.056** 0.009 0.019# 0.009 0.022* 
IVN SH- Prof 0.028* 0.081* 0.071* 0.082** 0.042* 0.108** 
IVN SH- Edu 0.072** 0.090* 0.052* 0.091* 0.033** 0.094** 
Superimposed 
eigen. cent. 0.194*** 0.170*** 0.173*** 0.231*** 0.221*** 0.211*** 
Wald's Chi 6232.12 7002.56 6714.81 6537.79 7444.31 7518.29 
N 982 1349 699 1030 1031 1719 
SH denotes structural holes; D denotes density; Edu denotes educational networks; Prof denotes 
professional network. IVN denotes intra venture network. 
Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, number of years the 
BDV is established, and dummies representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or 
B2C), location, funding series (i.e., no stage, seed, A, B, C), and BDV’s year of establishment are 
not reported for brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  








Table 9- Matched Sample Comparison with Medical Devices Industry 
 
Big Data Medical Devices 
 
Incremental Radical Incremental Radical Incremental Radical 
DV= capital 
raised Model 8 Model 9 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
SH-Edu  0.098** 0.080* 0.012 0.010     
D-Edu  0.008 0.015 0.009 0.007     
SH-Prof  0.120*** 0.089** 0.002 0.007     
D-Prof 0.017 0.012 0.005 0.014     
SH-Edu * D-Prof  -0.010 0.168*** 0.011 0.016     
D-Prof * D-Edu -0.114** -0.053* 0.005 0.008     
SH-Edu * SH-
Prof 0.129*** -0.074* 0.005 0.005     
D-Edu * SH-Prof 0.012 0.059** 0.003 0.009     
D-Edu * SH-Edu -0.037** 0.008 -0.007 0.011     
D-Prof * SH-
Prof -0.019* 0.011 -0.004 0.010     
IVN D- Prof 0.008 0.033* 0.003 0.004     
IVN D- Edu 0.009 0.035* 0.005 0.000     
IVN SH- Prof 0.056* 0.073* -0.006 0.003     
IVN SH- Edu 0.068* 0.082** -0.008 0.011     
Superimposed 
SH         0.012 0.009 
Superimposed D         0.007 -0.007 
Superimposed 
SH * D         0.000 0.003 
Superimposed 
IVN SH         0.086** 0.092* 
Superimposed 
IVN D         0.019 0.039** 
Superimposed 
eigen. cent. 0.201*** 0.188*** 0.294*** 0.376*** 0.271*** 0.301*** 
Wald's Chi 7812.39 8623.91 4324.81 4526.72 5679.34 6103.38 
N 2712 4098 1954 3228 1954 3228 
SH denotes structural holes; D denotes density; Edu denotes educational networks; Prof denotes 
professional network. IVN denotes intra venture network. 
Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, number of years the 
BDV is established, and dummies representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or 
B2C), location, funding series (i.e., no stage, seed, A, B, C), and BDV’s year of establishment are 
not reported for brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  





Table 10- Comparison of Kendall Rank Correlation Results 
 
Medical Devices Big Data Benchmark 
SH-Edu  - SH-Prof  0.46*** 0.11
#
 
D-Edu  - D-Edu 0.38** 0.18* 
SH-Edu  - SH-Prof (IVN) 0.54** 0.21* 
D-Edu  - D-Edu (IVN) 0.28* 0.14 
Investment eigen. cent. - Personal eigen. cent. 0.75*** 0.73** 
SH denotes structural holes; D denotes density; Edu denotes educational networks; Prof denotes 
professional network. IVN denotes intra venture network. 
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001. 
Table 11- The Network Effect at the Inception Phase 
DV= Radical Innovation Model 22 Odds 
Ratio 
Model 23 Odds 
Ratio 
SH-Edu  0.016 1.016 0.018 1.018 
D-Edu  0.008 1.008 0.010 1.010 
SH-Prof  0.015 1.015 0.007 1.007 
D-Prof 0.004 1.004 0.007 1.007 
SH-Edu * D-Prof      0.139*** 1.149 
D-Prof * D-Edu     0.002 1.002 
SH-Edu * SH-Prof     -0.120*** 0.887 
D-Edu * SH-Prof     0.151*** 1.163 
D-Edu * SH-Edu     0.013 1.013 
D-Prof * SH-Prof     0.015 1.015 
IVN D- Prof 0.028* 1.028 0.034* 1.035 
IVN D- Edu 0.021* 1.021 0.029** 1.029 
IVN SH- Prof 0.008 0.005 0.011 0.010 
IVN SH- Edu 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.008 




 SH denotes structural holes; D denotes density; Edu denotes educational networks; Prof denotes 
professional network. IVN denotes intra venture network. 
Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, and dummies 
representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or B2C), location, and BDV’s year 
of establishment are not reported for brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  





Appendix A. Summary of the Research on New Ventures and Social Networks 
Study Type of founders’ network Dependent variable Method 





growth, and sales 
growth 
Survey 
Ostgaard and Birley 
1996 
Personal networks Sales Survey 
Baum et al. 2000 Diversity and size of 
alliance network 
Revenue Survey 
Jenssen and Greve 
2002 
Personal networks Revenue Survey 
Jenssen and Koeing 
2002 
Personal networks Information, finance Survey 
Ferrary 2003 VC's centrality, gift 
exchange network 
N/A Theoretical 
Florin et al. 2003 Composite equally weighted 
measure of business 
network, personal network, 
and underwriters. 
Capital raised Archival 
Elfring and Hulsink 
2003 
Strong and weak ties 
aggregated 
Early performance Case study 
Witt 2004 N/a Performance Literature 
review 




Sales, time to break 
even 
Survey 
Maurer and Eber 
2006 
Social capital Performance Case study 









Pirolo and  Presutti 
2010 












Appendix B. Correlation Matrix 
  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 
1 SH-Edu  -27.83 5.71      
2 D-Edu  35.61 12.67 -0.16**     
3 SH-Prof  -19.22 6.33 0.17** -0.08*    
4 D-Prof 24.43 13.08 -0.07* 0.10* -0.19**   
5 Superimposed 
eigen. cent. 
10.28 3.39 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02  
6 Raised Capital 4.73 1.64 0.21*** 0.11# 0.15** 0.05 0.32*** 







It is a Matter of Who Narrates the Lines 
 
Abstract 
New ventures are at the forefront of developing IT innovations. Increasingly, new ventures 
turn to micro- and macro-funding social media platforms to promote their products/services and 
raise the necessary capital for their development. Some initial efforts have recently been made to 
understand how new ventures promote their products/services in funding platforms, but further 
insights are needed in terms of at least two important aspects.  
First, while the attention has been on the content of verbal communication with potential 
investors, signals sent through non-verbal communications have not been considered. To address 
this gap, we investigate the sequence of narrators, i.e., personal (e.g., founders or employees), 
organizational (e.g., the official account of the venture in a funding platform), or external (e.g., 
news links, blog posts), who deliver promotional messages in the funding platform, as a non-
verbal aspect of communication with investors. Second, social media provides a context for new 
ventures to promote their products/services in both macro-funding (i.e., with angels and venture 
capitalists as the potential audience) and micro-funding platforms (i.e., with the public micro-
investors as the potential audience). While the two types of platforms require distinct ways of 
communication to promote the product/service, activities on one platform are observable to the 
main audience of the other. Therefore, studying cross-platform effects of non-verbal signals of 
communication can further inform new ventures about strategies to access financial capital. We 





Focusing on the new ventures active in one specific industry -Big Data-  i.e., Big Data 
ventures (BDVs), we follow the sequence of narrators in a venture‘s communication in one 
micro-investor platform, i.e., Twitter, and one macro-investor platform, i.e., AngelList. 
Collecting longitudinal data from 2011 to 2014, our empirical study investigates 1,213 BDVs 
over multiple stages of their fundraising. We examine: a) whether BDVs more successful in 
raising financial capital follow a converging sequence of narrators (i.e., the ideal sequence) in 
their social media communication; b) whether similarity to the ideal sequence (i.e., the quality of 
sequence) helps BDVs increase positive Word-of-Mouth (WoM) and access to financial capital; 
and c) whether following sequences that are appropriate for one platform leads to beneficial 
cross-platform spillovers. Our findings suggest that the ideal sequence of narrators varies 
depending on the type of innovation pursued by a BDV, i.e., incremental or radical, and that the 
similarity to the ideal sequence contributes to a BDV‘s positive WoM and financial success. 
Moreover, our findings provide empirical support for cross-platform effects. 
 
Keywords: Micro-funding, Macro-funding, Social media, Non-verbal communication signal, 






















Social media plays an important role in the success of contemporary entrepreneurial firms 
by providing a forum to access future stakeholders, customers, and potential investors (Fischer 
and Reuber 2014). Empirical evidence suggests that specifically for information technology (IT) 
ventures, the role of social media in promoting the business is more salient (Fischer and Reuber 
2014). Since most IT ventures promote their business on social media platforms, management of 
Word-of-Mouth (WoM), i.e., users‘, customers‘, or followers‘ opinions (Gu et al. 2012), in such 
platforms is an important factor in explaining success (Aggarwal et al. 2012). WoM reflects 
interaction with external partners for IT ventures, and hence, its proper management can play an 
integral role in a new venture‘s success. Specifically, new ventures utilize communicative tactics 
(Fischer and Reuber 2014) as a part of their impression management strategy (Zott and Huy 
2007) to maintain certainty, and thereby legitimacy, in the eyes of their audience. In doing so, 
modern ventures are not bound to a single communication channel, rather, they promote their 
product/service on multiple platforms. Specifically, while some of these platforms are intended 
to reach out to micro-investors in public, others are designed to attract macro-investors such as 
angels, venture capitalists, and larger firms (Belleflamme et al. 2014).  
In spite of social media‘s prevalence (Rueber and Fischer 2010), as well as its 
distinctiveness from other channels of communication for entrepreneurial firms (Fischer and 
Rueber 2014), we lack understanding of the relevant communicative tactics for new ventures 
(Fischer and Rueber 2014). Fischer and Reuber (2014) analyze the verbal content of 
communication in social media and provide insights into the different types of content and their 
effects on the venture‘s legitimacy. In this study, we use theories of symbolic action ( Zott and 




of a venture‘s narrative by different narrators; and (b) the selection of narrators can be a non-
verbal symbolic action (i.e., ―action in which the actor displays or tries to draw other people‘s 
attention to the meaning of an object or action that goes beyond the object‘s or action‘s intrinsic 
content or functional use‖ (Zott and Huy 2007, p. 70)) that affect the venture‘s legitimacy, and 
thereby access to financial resources, beyond the content of its verbal narrative. 
Approaching angels and venture capitalists is not the only way to access financial resources. 
Instead, with the prevalence of crowdfunding, new ventures also extend their promotion 
activities to platforms that are more focused on micro-investors. Studying multiple platforms is 
therefore important. However, the general literature on WoM (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006, 
Trusov et al. 2009, Burtch et al. 2013) and the literature on WoM for new ventures (Kim and 
Hann 2013, Mollick 2014, Thies and Wessel 2014, Lu et al. 2014, Macht and Weatherston 2014) 
have focused on single electronic platforms. Thus, less is known about how potentially different 
strategies in different platforms generate rents for new ventures, especially in the case of new IT 
ventures.  Therefore, promotion strategies in platforms that provide communication with micro- 
and macro-investors should be studied simultaneously, and cross-effects of actions between the 
two platforms need to be understood. 
We leverage signaling theories and theories of symbolic actions and theorize about non-
verbal symbolic communications a new venture carries in multiple social media platforms. 
Focusing on new ventures active in the Big Data industry, i.e., Big Data ventures (BDVs), we 
follow the sequence of narrators in a venture‘s communication, as a form of non-verbal symbolic 
communication, in one micro-investor platform, i.e., Twitter, and one macro-investor platform, 
i.e., AngelList. Collecting longitudinal data from 2011 to 2014, our empirical study investigates 




questions: 1) Do BDVs that are more successful in raising financial capital follow a converging 
sequence of narrators (i.e., the ideal sequence) in their social media communication (RQ1)? 2) 
Does similarity to the ideal sequences that are appropriate for the platform (i.e., the quality of 
sequence) enable BDVs to increase (a) positive WoM and (b) access to financial capital (RQ2)? 




Impression management is a series of actions conducted by an organization, through which 
it tries to positively influence its image (Bolino and Turnley 1999; Bozeman and Kacmar 1997; 
Goffman 2002). Organizational impression management strategies span a wide range, broadly 
classified into two categories. The first category includes strategies that focus on reversing 
negative outcomes. These strategies can include restoring legitimacy following a controversial 
event (Caillouet and Allen 1996; Elsbach 1994; Elsbach and Sutton 1992; Elsbach et al. 1998; 
Graffin et al. 2011) or poor performance (Davidson et al., 2004), or increasing the acceptance of 
controversial decisions (Arndt and Bigelow 2000; Elsbach et al. 1998; Graffin et al. 2011). The 
second category includes strategies that focus on creating positive outcomes such as attracting 
minority job applicants (e.g., Avery and McKay 2006) and creating cognitive legitimacy (e.g., 
Nagy et al. 2012).  
New ventures follow different strategies, verbal or non-verbal (e.g., Ellis et al. 2002), in 
order to attract much-needed financial resources (Parhankargas and Ehrlich 2014). Impression 
management is therefore important for new ventures (REFs). For new ventures at the early stages 




strategies (Parhankargas and Ehrlich 2014). Establishing legitimacy is important for new 
ventures because they face the challenges of the threats of newness and smallness (e.g., Chen et 
al. 2009). As relatively unknown and believed to be too-small-to-compete entities, legitimization 
help new ventures reduce investor uncertainty. 
Although new ventures, similar to established firms, can face threats of controversial 
decisions and their associated negative outcomes, the salience of such threats are often at a lower 
level. Because of their limited public base, new ventures are rarely subject to the social scrutiny 
that established firms face (e.g., Parhankargas and Ehrlich 2014). Rather, their uncertain and 
unknown nature, in addition to their lack of access to major assets and small size, are major 
obstacles they face to attract financial capital from investors. Because of the salience of the 
threats of newness and smallness, this study focuses on legitimacy strategies in new ventures as 
means to reduce uncertainty for investors. 
Legitimacy Strategies 
―Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions‖ (Suchman 1995, p. 547). Suchman (1995) offers a comprehensive 
classification of organizational legitimacies and discusses the context in which each type of 
legitimacy is meaningful. Below, we briefly discuss these classes and identify the type of 
legitimacy new ventures seek to established with potential investors. 
The first class of organizational legitimacies discussed by Suchman (1995) is pragmatic 
legitimacy. This type of legitimacy is called pragmatic because it is based on self-interest 
calculations in an organization‘s specific contract. A focal organization is deemed legitimate if it 




the context of a specific contract. This type of legitimacy is evaluative since it rests on the 
positive outcomes an organization provides, but is subjective, because the positive outcomes for 
the subjects of a specific contract are considered.  
A second class of legitimacy is referred to as normative legitimacy (Suchman 1995). This 
type of legitimacy is also evaluative, but the evaluation is not done by the immediate trade 
parties of an organization, or with relation to a certain contract. Rather, the evaluation is made by 
observers based on the organization‘s general conformity to socially accepted norms, values, and 
beliefs. Therefore, although this second type of legitimacy is also evaluative, it is more objective 
compared to the pragmatic legitimacy.  
A third class of legitimacy is cognitive legitimacy, also referred to as taken-for-granted 
legitimacy (Suchman 1995). This class of legitimacy is not evaluative; that is, an organization is 
perceived legitimate if its existence, whether with positive, negative, or neutral outcomes, is 
justified in a social system.  
The above three classes of organizational legitimacies have clear distinctions. While the first 
two are evaluative, the third one is not. Also, pragmatic and normative legitimacy differ in the 
agency of the evaluator. In the pragmatic legitimacy, the evaluator has some contractual ties with 
the organization. However, in the normative legitimacy, the evaluator is not tied to the 
organization with a specific contract18F
25
 (Suchman 1995). Based on these differences, we believe 
normative legitimacy is the most salient type of legitimacy relevant to new ventures because 
potential investors often evaluate a venture and do so while they are not necessarily focused on 
an existing contract. Investors choose ventures that are deemed to be successful in a broad 
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or limited to it. Rather, the evaluation is made in a broader sense and with regards to the 




market (e.g., MacMillan et al. 1986), and since the notion of market success is socially-
constructed through what is socially accepted as successful and prosperous for a firm (Zott and 
Huy 2007), establishing legitimacy by new ventures through social media is mainly normative. 
Normative legitimacy can be established through four broad strategies. First and foremost, 
consequential legitimacy is highlighted as a type of legitimacy that is gained when an 
organization is believed to produce desirable outcomes for its customers (Suchman 1995). For 
example, in the literature about new ventures, focus on legitimizing through quality is 
highlighted as a key activity (Fischer and Rueben 2014). High quality products and services are 
met with satisfied customers and therefore increased market success. As a result, emphasizing 
quality is a way to construct consequential legitimacy. Two other related strategies for 
establishing normative legitimacy are procedural legitimacy, where an organization signals 
superiority by following desirable organizational procedures, and structural legitimacy, where 
the superiority is signaled through adopting well-accepted organizational structures. Finally, 
personal legitimacy rests on the competence and passion (Chen et al. 2009) shown by leaders, 
founders, and innovators of a new venture (Suchman 1995). 
Pursuing Normative Legitimacy in Social Media: Symbolic Communication 
The existing literature suggests that organizations follow a set of symbolic actions, i.e., 
―action in which the actor displays or tries to draw other people‘s attention to the meaning of an 
object or action that goes beyond the object‘s or action‘s intrinsic content or functional use‖ 
(Zott and Huy 2007, p. 70), to establish normative legitimacy (Zott and Huy 2007). Specifically, 
symbolic communication with the public and/or potential investors is deemed an effective means 
for conducting these symbolic actions (e.g., Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Golant and Sillince 2007). 




of symbolic communication, to distinguish themselves and reduce the uncertainties that may 
exist with regards to their potential for success. For example, Martens et al. (2007) found that 
ventures emphasizing a pioneering nature and a track record of supporting it in their 
reports/proposals to investors are more successful with regards to their valuation premiums at 
initial public offering (IPO). Similarly, Zott and Huy (2007) highlight the role of emphasizing 
personal credibility, capability for professional organizing, quality of relationships with partners, 
and organizational achievements in a venture‘s narrative to the public, as pertinent to its access 
to external resources.  
For new ventures, social media is an emerging channel for symbolic communications (e.g., 
Fischer and Rueben 2014). Focusing on verbal cues in communication, Fischer and Reuber 
(2014) found that emphasizing quality, a relational orientation, distinctiveness, and positive 
affect in the content of venture‘s twitter posts is most likely to positively affect investors‘ 
perception of the venture‘s quality or distinctiveness.  
Although content is a major part of communication, the agency of narrator, i.e., who narrates 
the content, is also part of the signal that the audience receives. We suggest that choosing agency 
of the narrator can also be a symbolic action by a new venture. For example, both a founder and 
a non-affiliated blogger can provide a similar narrative, signaling quality of a venture‘s 
innovation. Specifically, social media, such as Twitter, allows a new venture to cast its narrative 
by either source. However, the meaning of a narrative being told by the venture‘s founder can be 
very different from one that is told by a non-affiliated blogger. A founder‘s signaling of quality 
might be perceived as bragging (e.g., Chan et al. 2009), whereas a non-affiliated affirmation of 
quality might not be seen as such. Supporting the importance of non-verbal cues, the extant 




Huy 2007), although such non-verbal cues in communication are under-studied. Taking part in 
certification contests (Rao 1994) or displaying artifacts in offices (Clarke 2011) are examples of 
non-verbal symbolic actions documented in the existing literature.   
Therefore, while the existing literature about the symbolic communication in social media 
(Fischer and Rueben 2014) has focused on the verbal aspects (by focusing on the content of 
narrative communicated), this paper focuses on non-verbal cues in the communication, by 
considering the agency of narrator19F
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 Below, we discuss the social media-enabled capability to 
select the narrator of a message and the normative legitimacy strategy that each narrator enacts.    
Narrators in Symbolic Communication 
In the offline world, Initial Public Offering (IPO) prospectuses are exemplar mediums 
through which innovators present their formal communications to investors (Martens et al. 
2007). These formal narratives are stories conveyed at a single point of time (Lounsbury and 
Glynn 2001) where any interested audience can access it (Fischer and Rueben 2014). Contrary to 
these formal communications are symbolic communications that are signals embedded in 
interpersonal interactions conveyed across time and accessible only to those who are present at 
the point of interaction (Fischer and Rueben 2014). In both formal and symbolic 
communications, there is a limited variability in the agency of narrator. IPO prospectuses are 
often written by founders, and interpersonal interactions with stakeholders are usually carried by 
a venture‘s employees, if not by the founders themselves.  
However, symbolic communications carried in social media show distinct attributes. Unlike 
offline symbolic communications, those enabled by social media have a broad audience reach. 
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More importantly, social media-enabled symbolic communications can be narrated by different 
agents. Social media allows transferring of a message by providing a web link to a blog or news 
report regarding the venture. It also allows the narrative to be broadcasted by organizational or 
personal (e.g., founders‘ or employees‘ account) aliases. For example, in Twitter, a new venture 
can post tweets promoting the venture‘s business through four narrators. First, a message can be 
posted by the personal Twitter account of founders or employees. An alternative to this approach 
is posting content through the official Twitter account of the venture. The third option is 
providing a link to a blog post or news article about the venture. Fourth, the venture can re-tweet 
the content that the public has created about the venture. Although social media platforms are 
different with regards to different narrators that can convey symbolic messages, they share the 
ability to allow different narrators to carry conversation with the same audience. 
At a broad level, social media enables narrative to be told by organizational, personal, and 
external agents. Below, we discuss the type of normative legitimacy that each of these agents 
affirm. Well-established firms often communicate through an organizational alias in social 
media. For example, news about different products of Sony are broadcasted by Sony‘s official 
Twitter account directly to its followers. Therefore, broadcasting with organizational alias is an 
institutionally accepted norm. When a new venture broadcasts a message by its official venture 
alias, a conformity to well-established norms is maintained. To outsiders, conformity to the 
broadcasting behavior of well-established firms signals presence of procedures and structures 
that match those of stable organizations. Therefore, we suggest that broadcasting with a venture 
alias affirms procedural and structural legitimacy.  
On the contrary, a part of new ventures‘ news is communicated by founders or employees 




behavior does not enhance procedural or structural legitimacy, it may affirm personal legitimacy. 
Specifically, Chen et al. (2009) suggest that showing passion by founders and employees is a 
strategy to improve personal legitimacy. Passion shows confidence in a new venture‘s innovation 
and thereby can signal the positive perceptions of founders and employees about what they do. 
When a founder or employee of a new venture personally broadcasts a message, it signals a level 
of enthusiasm, reflecting on personal passion. Thus, we suggest that broadcasting through a 
personal alias affirms personal legitimacy.  
Finally, broadcasting a message through external agents, e.g., news agencies and bloggers, 
can signal non-verbal consequential legitimacy. Specifically, external agents‘ talking about a 
new venture suggests how well-accepted the new venture is in the social system in which it 
operates. Therefore, aside from the content of the message, narration of news by others suggest 
that the venture has been influential enough to spark conversation in the outside world, hinting at 
its consequential legitimacy. Public approval is regarded as a mode of consequential legitimacy 
for firms (Pollock and Rindova 2003).  
In viewing non-verbal cues of symbolic communication, we take into account the processual 
nature of symbolic communications. Elaborating on the nature of symbolic communications, 
Fischer and Reuber (2014) note that such communications are not issued at a single point of time 
and rather ―consist of multiple messages conveyed over a span of time‖ and are ―a collage of 
individual signals, rather than a unified and integrated narrative‖ (p. 569). In spite of their 
theoretical acknowledgement of the processual nature of symbolic communication, Fischer and 
Rueben‘s empirical treatment of communication in social media is through a variance approach. 
Focusing on the non-verbal cues in symbolic communication, this study considers the sequence 




new venture‘s non-verbal symbolic communication as the sequence of narrators it chooses to 
deliver messages to its audience. A process view enables us to follow a BDV‘s communication 
through time, conceptualizing symbolic communication by including the time element. Given the 
lack of studies on non-verbal communication cues in social media, this study adopts an inductive 
approach to understand symbolic communications that suit new ventures. In doing so, we are 
guided by the signaling theory to explain how different symbolic communications can affect the 
new venture‘s success in accessing financial capital. Figure 1 summarizes the above discussion 
on legitimacy strategies for new ventures and the relevant non-verbal tactics in social media. 
 
Figure 1. A Theoretical View of Impression Management in New Ventures 
Signaling Theory 
Signaling theory is concerned with reducing information asymmetry between two parties 
(Connelly et al. 2011). Information asymmetry is defined as a situation when two parties 
involved in an economic transaction have access to two different sources of information related 




information disadvantage (i.e., faces uncertainty), peripheral information vis-à-vis the focal 
transaction is used as surrogate information (Boulding and Kirmani 2003). For example, a more 
recent study shows how CEOs signal the unobservable quality of their firms to potential 
investors via the observable quality of their financial statements (Zhang and Wiersema, 2009). 
For entrepreneurial firms at the early stages of developing their product/service, when the 
initial capital needed to establish the business is raised, potential investors face uncertainty. 
Since the final product/service is far from being experienced and evaluated by investors, they 
must rely on other informational cues to trust and invest (Elitzur and Gavious, 2003).  
We suggest that non-verbal symbolic actions are organizational signals that can be used by 
potential investors to reduce the uncertainty. Therefore, the extent of a new venture‘s success to 
persuade potential investors depends on the extent to which the new venture‘s symbolic action 
reduces the investors‘ uncertainty. New ventures are not homogeneous with regards to the type 
of uncertainty their investors face. Specifically depending on their innovative strategy, new 
ventures and their investors face different kinds of uncertainties and require different symbolic 
actions. 
Theoretical Development 
Radical vs. Incremental Innovations and Investor Uncertainties 
Innovation is at the heart of entrepreneurial firms at the early stages of development (Zott 
and Amit 2007). Absent traditional firm resources, such as liquidity, reputation, and extensive 
human capital, innovation is the main source of value for these ventures (Zott and Amit 2007). 
To develop, grow, and stabilize, new ventures need to attract capital from venture capitalists and 
angels, mainly through a persuasive innovation that shows the potential and promise of business 




their innovations. Some focus on radical novelty, where product/service is a clear and often risky 
departure from the existing technology (Ettlie et al. 1984). Others pursue incremental 
innovations where the focus is on improvements, modifications, or re-configuration of existing 
technology (Ettlie et al. 1984).  
Entrepreneurial firms face two major liabilities: liability of smallness and liability of 
newness (Rosenbusch et al. 2011). While the first concerns the limited size of new ventures and 
their ability to compete with established firms, liability of newness concerns the unknown nature 
of the firm‘s product/service and its reception by customers (Rosenbusch et al. 2011). These two 
major liabilities are the sources of concern for potential investors, and their limited access to 
information about the firm‘s ability to overcome the threats of these liabilities creates 
uncertainties. While the two liabilities to some extent exist in all new ventures, the salience of 
them can be different depending on the innovative strategy they pursue.  
We contend that for radical innovations, the liability of newness is more pronounced than 
the liability of smallness. Because of the breakthrough nature of innovation, and thus lack of 
benchmarks, evaluating the reception of a radical innovation in the market is hard for investors. 
However, due to their uniqueness, less competition is expected to come from established firms; 
thereby, the liability of smallness is reduced. On the contrary, liability of smallness is more 
pronounced for new ventures pursuing incremental innovations. Since an incremental innovation 
is an extension to an already-existing product/service, evaluating market reception is less 
cumbersome for potential investors. However, the presence of established firms, as competitors 
with the pre-modified version of the service/product, increases the likelihood of head-to-head 




uncertainties lie in whether or not the new venture has the required structure to compete with 
mature firms.      
Symbolic Actions: Radical vs. Incremental Innovations 
We suggest that different symbolic actions that establish organizational legitimacy are 
required to overcome uncertainties about smallness and newness. Specifically, we contend that 
establishing procedural and structural legitimacies suit uncertainties that arise due to the 
liabilities of smallness. The more a new venture is capable of showing its conformity to 
procedural and structural attributes of established firms, the more its investors are convinced that 
the venture has the maturity to compete with larger firms. On the contrary, establishing personal 
legitimacy can be more effective for reducing uncertainties due to newness. Absent a track-
record, investors rely on the competence of innovators to evaluate the promise of an innovation 
(Suchman 1995; Chen et al. 2009).  
Therefore, as a new venture establishes personal legitimacy, the uncertainties about newness 
subside. Finally, consequential legitimacy is suitable for uncertainties that arise due to both 
smallness and newness of new ventures. Specifically, external affirmation can signal market 
enthusiasm and therefore positive reception of a future product/service. Hence, it can address the 
liability of newness. On the other hand, external affirmation of quality can signal a favorable 
market attention, indicating a capability to attract market attention in the presence of 
competition. Therefore, for new ventures pursuing a radical innovation, higher focus on personal 
and consequential legitimacy signals are more effective, whereas for those pursuing incremental 
innovations, focus on structural, procedural, and consequential legitimacy signals can be more 





Figure 2. An Overview of Legitimacy Strategies and Tactics Suitable for New Ventures 
Pursuing Radical vs. Incremental Innovations 
Although the existing literature informs us about the different signals required for different 
innovative strategies, the sequence of these signals cannot be hypothesized a priori. Specifically, 
symbolic actions are carried out over time and thereby, hypothesizing about isolated signals is 
theoretically immature. Due to lack of existing literature with regards to the sequence in which 
symbolic action should be carried, we adopt an inductive approach and study the sequence of 
narrators in organizational communication at social media. Given the difference between 
innovative strategies with regards to the signals required to alleviate investor uncertainties, we 
propose that: 
P1: The ideal sequence of signals sent through selection of narrators differ for 
radical and incremental strategies of innovation. 
Also, since selection of narrators can help to establish legitimacy and such legitimacy 
reduces investor uncertainties, and given the proposed difference in ideal sequence of signals for 




P2: Ventures that follow a sequence of signals closer to the ideal sequence that 
suits their innovative strategy, i.e., ventures with higher sequence quality, 
become more successful in attracting investors. 
WoM as a Mediating Mechanism 
At the receiving end of communication messages sent by new ventures is the audience. In 
the social media context, in addition to the new venture itself, the audience can also express its 
sentiment and opinion (i.e., WoM) about the new venture. A successful symbolic communication 
by a new venture can be evidenced by a positive reception from the audience. Successful 
persuasion of audience can lead to increasing discussions about the venture (increase volume of 
WoM) and also can lead to expressing of positive sentiments about it (increase in valence of 
WoM). Therefore, symbolic communications, and specifically the sequence of narrators, can 
affect WoM. High volume of WoM and its positivity can then create a positive social disposition 
towards the venture and encourage investment. The existing literature in other contexts shows 
that volume (e.g., Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006) and positive sentiments about a business (e.g., 
Liu 2006) positively affect the financial gains. Therefore, we propose that: 
P3: Ventures that follow a sequence of signals more similar to the ideal sequence 
that suits their innovative strategy, i.e., ventures with higher sequence quality, 
become more successful in attracting investors by increasing the volume and 
positive valence of WoM in the social media.    
In the age of crowdfunding and importance of micro-investors, new ventures rarely rely only 
on social media that enables interactions with angels and venture capitalists (Agarwal 2011). 
Rather, in an effort to access micro-investors, more general social media platforms, such as 
Twitter (Fischer and Reuber 2014), are also used to pursue symbolic communication. Therefore, 
symbolic communications can be carried out in the multiple platforms. Since communications in 
one platform are visible for the audience at the other platform, it is logical to assume that 




other platform. We are unaware of studies that have examined the cross-effect of symbolic 
actions in different social media platforms. Therefore, we propose that: 
P4: The effect of narrator sequence quality in one platform on access to financial 
resources is also mediated through increase in the volume and positive valence 
of WoM in the other platform. 
Figure 3 presents an overview of our research model that guides us to study the effect of 
narrator sequence quality on the success of BDVs in a round of fundraising. 
 
Figure 3. Research Model 
Methods 
This essay utilizes a field study and mixes qualitative approaches used to identify different 
non-verbal symbolic actions in a venture‘s communications, with quantitative approaches used to 
study the role that quality of the symbolic actions plays in the venture‘s access to financial 
resources. This research focuses on BDVs active on AngelList.com, a venture-funding website 
that offers a platform to new ventures to connect to other ventures and gain access to investors. 




2013). Following the tradition of focusing on the high-tech industry in entrepreneurial studies 
(e.g., Baron and Hannan 2002; Colombo and Grilli 2010; Bertoni et al. 2011; Anderson and Xiao 
2016), we select Big Data as a niche high-tech context. A total of 1,213 BDVs were followed 
from January 1, 2011 until December 29, 2014, resulting in 4,113 venture-round observations. 
These ventures are self-identified as active in the Big Data context. An average BDV in our 
sample has raised $4.67 million and has 3.42 co-founders and 11.88 employees. The website 
assigns a profile page to each BDV where information such as names and links to personal pages 
of founders, employees, investors, and followers of the BDV are identified. Additionally, 
information regarding different rounds of capital-raising, amount raised, and contributing 
investors in each round is provided. Finally, the profile page includes a section where the BDV‘s 
innovation is described and introduced. Using a Python-based web-crawler, the mentioned 
information about each BDV is crawled and used as the main source of information. This 
information is then supplied by accessing the LinkedIn profile of founders, employees, and co-
founders, where information about professional background, academic background, and the 
friend list of each individual is obtained. 
Data 
The study focuses on Twitter as a social-media platform with high presence of micro-
investors and AngelList.com as a platform highly directed at macro-investors. We treat the 
tweets created by the venture‘s official Twitter account (including those with links to other 
sources, or re-tweets of others‘ mentioning of the venture) and those created by the founders or 
employees of the venture, mentioning the venture‘s official account, as the venture‘s 
communication in Twitter. To capture the communications in the AngelList, the content posted 




comments inserted by founders or employees of the venture are treated as the venture‘s 
communication in AngelList. The narrator of each piece of communication, its content, and the 
time at which the communication message is created are stored in a spreadsheet. In Twitter, the 
message of the communication can be narrated by: a) venture‘s official Twitter account (venture 
alias); b) venture‘s founder or employee (personal alias); c) external piece of news or blog post 
(news); or d) followers (through re-tweets; followers). In AngelList, the message of the 
communication can be narrated by: a) venture‘s official AngelList account (venture alias); b) 
venture‘s founder or employee (through personal comments on the activity page; personal alias); 
c) external piece of news or blog post (in the ―press‖ section of the activity page; news).  
In order to test the propositions, we focus on the periods between two fundraising events and 
panel the new ventures in our sample based on that time stamp. In each period, a sequence of 
narrators is identified for each venture in each platform. Each sequence represents the non-verbal 
symbolic action carried by a new venture in a given platform. For example, venture 
aliasnewspersonal aliasfollowers can be the narrator sequence of a venture in its Twitter 
in a given period of fundraising. 
Measures 
Quality of non-verbal symbolic communications 
In order to calculate the quality of non-verbal symbolic communication for each venture in 
each platform at each round of fundraising, we calculate the distance between the narrator 
sequence of the venture‘s communication in a given platform at time t from the sequences 
belonging to the top 10 percent ventures with highest raised capital. We assume that top 
performing ventures follow a desirable sequence; therefore, further distance from such desirable 




The distance between two sequences is computed as the least effort needed to transform one 
sequence to another, through insertion, deletion and substitution of events. In our sequence, each 
narrator type (e.g., venture alias, link) selected for delivering a message is treated as an ―event.‖ 
Before computing the minimum transformation cost, the cost of one insertion, deletion, and 
substitution needs to be identified. For any one process of transforming one sequence into 
another, the numbers of insertion, deletion, and substitution operations that are needed for the 
transformation, and the costs associated with one operation of each type, are then used to 
compute the cost associated with that transformation process. For a given pair of sequences, 
numerous alternative transformation process can be identified, each with an associated 
transformation cost. The lowest of these transformation costs is then considered as the distance 
between the two sequences. Since the number of alternative transformation processes increases 
as each of the sequences becomes longer in terms of number of events, and numerous pairs of 
sequences may be involved in a project, automating the computation of the lowest transformation 
cost is important
27
. The optimal matching algorithm (Abbott 1995) has led to such automation 
through optimal matching packages in statistical software, including STATA. 
In order to ensure that the cost of transforming sequence A into sequence B is the same as 
the cost of transforming B into A, insertion and deletion costs need to be kept equal. We set 
deletion and insertion costs to 0.5. We assigned cost of 0.6 for substitution of narrators, because 
the cost for substitution of events should be smaller than the sum of insertion and deletion (here, 
0.5+0.5 =1). Optimal matching through STATA‘s SQ package was then used to compute inter-
sequence distances. For each venture at time t, the average distance from the sequences of top 10 
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To make the inter-sequence distances less sensitive to the size of the two sequence, the inter-




percent ventures in Twitter and AngelList is calculated, and the inverse ratio of the average 
distances is used as the quality of non-verbal symbolic action in the social media platforms. 
WoM 
Volume of WoM in Twitter for each BDV is calculated by counting the tweets mentioning 
the BDV, posted by non-affiliated individuals. The valence of these tweets are evaluated 
following Mudambi and Schuff (2010), and the degree of positivity is used as the measure of the 
WoM valence. Volume of WoM in AngelList is calculated by counting comments made by non-
affiliated followers in the activity page. The valence of these comments are calculated similar to 
the calculations in the case of Tweeter tweets. 
Innovation strategy 
In order to determine the innovation strategy (radical vs. incremental), we conducted a text 
analysis of the product description section of the BDV‘s profile in the AngelList website, 
supplemented with blog and news reports about the BDV‘s innovation, obtained from Lexis-
Nexis. We believe a BDV‘s innovation type can be understood by reviewing the product 
description section of the BDV‘s webpage because that section is the medium through which the 
product is introduced and its potential superiorities to competing products are explained. Further, 
news pieces and blog posts provide outsiders‘ view of the BDV‘s innovation. The text-mining 
module of R (tm) was used to analyze the product description section of each BDV‘s profile, as 
well as related news pieces and blog posts. In order to do so, first, a set of words associated with 
radical and incremental innovations was compiled using the existing literature on organizational 
innovations. We searched Google Scholar for articles that contained the terms: incremental 
innovation, and radical innovation. Over 12,100 articles were identified, and the HTML versions 




sentences that did not include any of the keywords ―radical innovation‖ or ―incremental 
innovation‖ with the exception of sentences that were adjacent to the sentences containing these 
words (i.e., one sentence before and one sentence after the sentence containing the keyword). 
Then, the sentences containing the mentioned keywords and their adjacent sentences were 
analyzed to form a network of words that are closely associated with them. For example, the 
words ―original,‖ ―breakthrough,‖ ―pioneering,‖ and ―groundbreaking‖ had the highest 
frequency of occurring when the word ―radical innovation‖ was discussed in the corpus of 
articles. Also, the words ―revise,‖ ―extend,‖ ―amend,‖ ―combine,‖ ―re-configure,‖ and ―modify‖ 
were adjacent to the word ―incremental innovation.‖ The adjacent words were then processed to 
eliminate the ones that are irrelevant to the concepts of incremental and radical innovations. 
Then, a library of refined word for each type of innovation was used to analyze the product 
description section of each BDV in the sample. The frequencies of words associated with radical 
and incremental innovations in the product description corpus of each BDV are calculated. The 
ratio of associated words to the total number of words in the text is calculated to measure 
emphasis on a radical vs incremental approach. The two ratios are then compared with a z-test to 
determine the category of innovation; the significantly larger ratio determines the category of 
radical or incremental innovation. Observations with insignificant z-test are dropped from further 
analysis. 
Raised capital 
The information about the raised capital in each round was collected from AngelList.com‘s 
profile of the BDVs20F
28
. From the conception to business planning, product development, 
commercialization, operationalization, expansion, and eventually public offering, new ventures 
                                                          




raise funds from different resources (e.g., Cumming 2007). Depending on the stage of the 
venture‘s development, the fundraising round is labeled as seeding (i.e., no stage, often at the 
conception and research stage), Stage A, Stage B, Stage C, etc. It is possible that a BDV raises 
external funding at multiple rounds in the same stage of development. Therefore, a new venture 
might have two or three rounds of seeding. In our operationalization of a fundraising period, we 
focus on each round of fundraising and use the raised capital in that round as the dependent 
variable. Then, we control for the stage at which the capital is raised. 
Controls 
Although our focus is on non-verbal symbolic actions, we believe that the content of a 
message communicated by the BDV to its audience influences the raised capital. Specifically, 
Fischer and Reuber (2014) show that the valence of messages communicated can reduce the 
uncertainty for investors. Therefore, a similar algorithm used in evaluating the valence of social 
media WoM is used to estimate the valence of messages communicated by a BDV at time t.  
As mentioned above, we control for the stage of development where the funding is raised. 
We do so because early and late stages of fundraising are different in terms of the funding 
providers,21F
29
 as well as the amount of the capital needed.22F
30
 To best capture the effect of the 
fundraising stage, for each stage of development (e.g., seeding, stage A, etc.), we specify a 
variable, the value of which indicates the number of fundraising rounds a new venture has 
completed in that stage, prior to the current round. Therefore, for BDVs with their first round of 
fundraising, the value of seeding, stage A, stage B, and stage B variables is all set at 0. If a 
venture has had two rounds of fundraising at the seeding stage, and the current round is its 
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For example, angels contribute more in the early stages of the development, whereas venture 
capitalists do so in the later stages close to the initial public offering (IPO). 
30
Usually, the financial capital needed in the early stages of development are smaller than the 




second round at stage A, the value of seeding variable is set at 2, the value of stage A variable is 
set at 1, and the value of stage B and stage C variables are set at 0. 
Also, we control for the number of years since a BDV has been established as the time 
elapsed since establishment can have an effect on accessible resources, financially and 
intellectually. We control for the location dummy, measured at the city level, whether or not the 
venture identifies itself as a business-to-business or business-to-customer (identified by tags 
reported in AngelList.com), and the technological scope dummies, which represent the area of 
focus in the Big Data context (identified by tags reported in AngelList.com; can be analytics, 
security, or infrastructural). Moreover, the number of employees (including co-founders) in the 
fundraising period of interest, and average of employees‘ (including co-founders) value of 
education are controlled for.          
Analysis 
We start our inductive approach with understanding the narrator sequences employed in 
Twitter and AngelList
31
. We start our inquiry by striving to find out if more successful BDVs 
adopt a certain sequence of narrators when communicating with their audience. In order to so, 
we rank the BDVs in our sample based on their raised capital at each round. Given our focus on 
radical and incremental innovations, we first divide our sample based on the innovation strategy 
and carry out the analysis in each sub-sample. We treat the top 10% BDVs as successful BDVs 
and investigate the similarity of their sequences. If top-performing BDVs follow similar 
sequences, it can be an indicator for the existence of an ideal sequence. On the other hand, if the 
sequences followed by top-performing BDVs are diverging, it can imply that narrator sequences 
might not be understood within a singular underlying ideal theme.  
                                                          





To assess the presence of an underlying ideal sequence, we compare the average distance 
that a top-performing BDV‘s sequence has from the other top-performing BDVs‘ sequences to 
the distance it has with sequences of BDVs in the rest of the sample. For each BDV-period 
observation ranked in top 10% (with regards to its raised capital), the sum of inter-sequence 
distances from all other BDV-periods in top 10%, as well as the sum of inter-sequence distances 
from the BDVs in the rest of the sample, is estimate. Then, and from the two estimates, the 
average distance from the top 10% BDVs and the average distance from the BDVs in the rest of 
the sample are calculated. If this calculated statistics is significantly different from zero, a 
meaningful difference between sequences of top 10% observations and the rest of the sample is 
implied. We conduct a series of Z-tests to investigate this hypothesis. Results of the z-test show 
(for radical Twitter (z-value: 3.52), for incremental Twitter (z-value: 3.22), for radical 
AnagelList (z-value: 3.46), for incremental AngelList (z-value: 3.43)) that we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the sequences of top-performing BDVs are similar to the rest of the sample. This 
implies that a converging underlying sequence exists for the top-performing BDVs. We call this 
sequence an ideal sequence. In order to identify this underlying sequence, we focus on the 
centroid sequence of the top-performing BDVs. A centroid sequence in a set of sequences is the 
one that has the lowest distance from all of the other sequences in the set (Abbott 1995).  
Below, we discuss the four centroid sequences in the set of top-performing BDVs, for both 
Twitter and AngelList with radical and incremental innovations. The following is the centroid 
sequence in Twitter for BDVs pursuing a radical innovation: 
personal alias  news  venture alias  follower  news  personal alias 




For simplicity, we have merged narrators of the same type in cases that the same type of narrator 
is chosen for two consecutive messages23F
32
. The following is the centroid sequence in Twitter for 
BDVs pursing an incremental innovation: 
venture alias  news  personal alias  follower  news  venture alias 
 news  venture alias 
The following is the centroid sequence in AngelList for BDVs pursuing a radical innovation: 
personal alias  news  personal alias  news 
And finally, the following is the centroid sequence in AngelList for BDVs pursuing an 
incremental innovation: 
news  venture alias  news 
The centroids from top-performing BDVs reveal few important patterns. First, in all four 
centroids a degree of alternating between internal (i.e., those messages cast by the venture or 
founders/employees) and external narration (i.e., those messages cast by a news link or re-tweets 
of external followers). This preferred alternation between the external and internal narrators is 
consistent with the previous research findings that suggest too much emphasis on self-promotion 
can prove harmful (Parhankargas and Ehrlich 2014).  
Second, and for radical innovations, with their greater degree of uncertainty, more emphasis, 
especially in beginning and concluding phases of promotion where effects of promotion are 
shown to be more influential (e.g., Lu et al. 2014), on establishing legitimacy through passion 
(personal legitimacy) is observed; whereas, for incremental innovations, more emphasis on 
structural legitimacy is observed when self-promotion is concerned. This is consistent with our 
prior discussion about the salience of newness and smallness liabilities for radical and 
incremental innovations, respectively. In the critical phases of communication, and when 
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establishing legitimacy through internal narrators is concerned, personal narration and a focus on 
the narrator‘s passion is followed by the top-performing BDVs. This can help a BDV reduce the 
uncertainties about liability of newness as the more salient liability when a radical innovation is 
pursued. On the contrary, BDVs pursuing an incremental innovation focus on structural 
legitimacy (through venture alias communications) in order to reduce uncertainties regarding the 
smallness liabilities.  
Third, an observed difference between the non-verbal symbolic actions carried in platforms 
focused on micro- and macro-investors is the internal or external agency of the narrators. For 
platforms focusing on micro-investors (e.g., Twitter), internal narrators (venture or personal 
alias) are chosen, whereas for platforms focusing on macro-investors (e.g., AngelList), external 
narrators are selected. The concluding phases of fundraising campaigns are important because 
more activities with regards to the investments happen in these phases (Lu et al. 2014). Our 
findings reveal that for macro-investors, with their explicit processes to evaluate new ventures 
(e.g., MacMillan et al. 1986), external affirmation becomes more important. It is likely to assume 
that personal legitimacy, and vetting the structural soundness of a new venture is evaluated 
earlier in the process of making a judgment about an investment. Therefore, external affirmation 
about the potential of a new venture can fortify the already-gathered information about the new 
venture and its founders. To the contrary, micro-investors follow less-elaborate processes to land 
a decision about making an investment in a new venture (Gerber and Hui 2013). Therefore, it is 
logical to assume that micro-investors make more instant decisions putting more weight on the 
more recent activities by the new venture. A direct communication between the venture and an 
investor (instead of making it by the proxy of news links or blog posts) can be a more direct and 




In the next step, we evaluate the effect that the quality of sequence of narrators have on the 
raised capital by BDVs. Since our calculation of the sequence quality involved reviewing the top 
10% performing BDVs, we drop the top 10% and bottom 10% observation from further analysis. 
In order to investigate the research propositions, we construct a panel where each BDV is 
observed in each round of fundraising (i.e., the BDVs are paneled over the rounds of 
fundraising). This resulted in 4,113 venture-round observations. We split the sample to BDVs 
pursuing radical and incremental innovations, and the statistical models are run within each sub-
sample. For all the models, and due to the panel structure of the data, the models are processed 
using a generalized least squares (GLS) estimation with panel-specific corrections for first-order 
auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity. Specifically, we run three models, one with WoM at the 
Twitter as the dependent variable, while considering the noted controls in addition to the quality 
of narrator sequence at both Twitter and AngelList, their interactions, and controlling for the 
effect of WoM in AngelList. The second utilizes WoM at AngelList as the dependent variable, 
while considering the noted controls in addition to the quality of narrator sequence at both 
Twitter and AngelList, their interactions, and controlling for the effect of WoM in Twitter. The 
third model utilizes raised capital as the dependent variable, while considering the noted controls 
in addition to the quality of narrator sequence at both Twitter and AngelList, their interactions, 
WoM in Twitter and AngelList, as well as their interactions. The interaction terms are analyzed 
in a hierarchical fashion, after the direct effect models are examined. Table 1 presents the results, 
with WoM in Twitter and AngelList as the dependent variables.  
The direct effect models for BDVs pursuing incremental and radical innovations show that 
the quality of narrator sequence in one platform is positively and significantly associated with 




quality in AngelListAngelList WoM). Fruther, the positivity of WoM sentiment in one 
platform is also positively and significantly influenced by the quality of sequence in the other 
platform (sequence quality in AngelListTwitter WoM; sequence quality in TwitterAngelList 
WoM). This provides evidence that the legitimacy-building actions in one platform spill over in 
other social media platforms. To best of our knowledge, this study is the first to document such 
cross-platform effects. Finally, the results of the direct-effect models indicate that in BDVs 
pursuing radical and incremental innovations, positive sentiment of WoM in one platform 
enhances the positivity of another platform‘s WoM (Twitter WoMAngelList WoM; AngelList 
WoMTwitter WoM).  
The interactions model shows differences between BDVs pursuing radical and incremental 
innovations. Specifically, the quality of sequence in the two platforms become complementary 
only when a radical innovation is pursued. Our results show a significant and positive interaction 
between quality of sequence in the two platforms when effects on the platform WoM are 
concerned (sequence quality in Twitter* sequence quality in AngelListTwitter WoM; 
sequence quality in Twitter* sequence quality in AngelListAngelList WoM). These results 
may imply that investors considering an investment in radical innovations expand their search 
for legitimacy cues beyond one platform, and therefore the quality of non-verbal cues in one 
platform enhances the effect of the quality of sequence in the other platform. If investors limit 
their search for legitimacy cues to only one platform, then the joint effect of quality should not 
significantly affect the WoM. This is the case for BDVs pursuing an incremental innovation. The 
findings may imply that investors considering investment in ventures pursuing incremental 




might not be considered. Since the investors are more likely to consider cues from one platform, 
cues from the other do not make any additional value. 
---Insert Table 1 here--- 
Table 2 presents the result when the raised capital is the dependent variable. Results of the 
direct effects model show that the quality of sequence in both platforms remain significantly and 
positively associated with the raised capital, in spite of the significant and positive association 
between the positivity of the sentiment of WoM in both platforms and the raised capital. Taken 
together, these results imply a partial mediation. Also, the results from the interaction model 
show that the positivity of sentiments from WoM in Twitter and AngelList are complementary in 
the case of radical innovations but not for the incremental innovations
33
. 
---Insert Table 2 here--- 
Robustness Tests 
Alternative Ideal Sequences 
Our estimation of sequence quality relied on calculating distance from top 10% performing 
BDVs for radical and incremental innovations, and the extent of the sequence convergence in 
these top performing BDVs plays a key role in the validity of our quality measures. Although our 
z-tests indicate that the top performing BDVs follow sequences that are distinguished from the 
rest of the BDVs, we further investigate to see if there are different archetypes of sequences 
within the top performing BDVs. Following Sabherwal and Robey (1993), we conducted a 
cluster analysis based on the inter-sequence distance of top 10% performing BDVs, using 
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presents the results of analysis when only frequencies of narrators in each platform is 
considered. These results provide evidence that higher frequencies posts made by personal 
alias help BDVs with radical innovations whereas higher frequencies of venture alias help 




Ward‘s (1963) technique. The resulting cluster analysis for incremental and radical innovations 
in Twitter and AngelList indicatesthe presence of a dominating cluster with higher performance 
mean compared to other emerging clusters
34
. When only top 8% BDVs are considered, only one 
cluster emerges, indicating a high-converging selection of BDVs. To further examine the 
robustness of our findings, we calculated the quality of sequence for the middle 84% of BDVs 
(we dropped the top and bottom 8% BDVs based on their raised capital) when the quality is 
estimated similar to our main measure, but only average distance from the top 8% BDVs is 
considered. Models 9 and 10 in Table 2 present these results. The findings remain qualitatively 
unchanged to this variation.  
Endogneity 
It can be argued that a BDV that is more successful in raising capital will attract more 
positive discussions among its audience and hence experience a more positive WoM. This can 
suggest that the raised capital affects the positivity of sentiments in both Twitter and AngelList. 
The reverse causality between the capital raised and the positivity of sentiment of WoM in 
Twitter and AngelList can be a potential cause for endogeneity in our specification (Greene 
2003). Given the panel structure of our data, we utilize the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond 
system of generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano 
and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998). Therefore, following prior literature, we treat the 
positivity of sentiment of WoM in the two platforms and their interactions as endogenous 
covariates (Aral et al. 2012; Bardhan et al. 2013). Then, we conduct a two-step system GMM 
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with incremental innovations in AngelList. In all four sub-groups, two other clusters were 




model to obtain estimates that are robust to both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and 
provide robust standard errors to correct for the possible bias in estimating standard errors.  
This method utilizes the second and longer lagged first differences of the endogenous 
variables as instruments. The results of AR(2) tests indicate there is no serial correlation in the 
second-differences of residuals. Further, the Hansen‘s test of over-identification fails to reject the 
null hypothesis that the instruments are orthogonal to the error terms, and the difference-in-
difference Hansen‘s test of exogeneity fails to reject the null hypothesis that the subsets of 
instruments used in the level equations are exogenous. The results in Table 2 (models 11 and 12) 
show that findings remain qualitatively unchanged after accounting for the threat of endogneiety. 
Volume of WoM 
In order to further evaluate the robustness of the findings, we run the estimation models 
while considering the volume of WoM instead of its sentiment positivity. The results are 
presented in Tables 3 and 4. The findings remain similar, although in the model with the raised 
capital as the dependent variable the coefficient of sequence quality in either platform becomes 
insignificant in the presence of the volume of WoM measures. This can further imply a full 
mediation in the model with the volume of WoM. 
---Insert Tables 3 and 4 here--- 
In order to gain further insights about the cross-effects of non-verbal actions in macro-
investor and micro-investor platforms, we conduct our analyses in three sub-samples. In the 
context of BDVs, we define the technological scope as the main big data area that the BDV‘s 
product/service is focused on. Big data technologies cover diverse technological areas, most 
distinctively, big data security (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2012), analytics applications (LaValle 




Brynjolfsson 2012). A review of the existing literature on big data suggests that big data 
technologies are also diverse in their architectural scope. While some big data technologies (e.g., 
cloud-based computing structures (Grossman and Siegel 2014)) are at the infrastructural level of 
the IT architecture (see Weill and Vitale 2002 for a discussion of IT enterprise architecture) 
some technologies target the analytics application layer (e.g., data modeling applications 
(Grossman and Siegel 2014)). In addition to these more pronounced technological scopes, a third 
category exists for big data innovations that are concerned with the security applications that 
protect large operations of the big data innovations belonging to the two other technological 
scopes.  
We discuss that these three scopes can be different with regards to the type of uncertainty 
they create for investors; therefore, certain platforms may become more important to deliver non-
verbal cues of legitimacy. Tables 5 through 10 present the results for our sub-sample analysis. 
---Insert Tables 5 through 10 here--- 
Although our results for the analytics and infrastructure sub-sample are qualitatively similar 
to the full sample analysis, the findings of these sub-sample analyses suggest that for the security 
sub-sample, only the quality of narrator sequence in the micro-investor platform plays a role in 
increasing the positive sentiment of WoM in both Twitter and AngelList. Moreover, the results 
suggest that only WoM in the micor-investor platform is positively and significantly associated 
with the raised capital, although the results of the interaction models indicate that quality of 
narrator sequence in macro-investor platform adds to the value of the quality of sequence in the 
micro-investor platform, in both affecting the WoM positivity and raised capital for BDVs 
pursuing a radical innovation. Further, increasing the positivity of WoM in macro-investor 




capital. Taken together, the results suggest that considered alone, non-verbal cues for investors in 
the security innovations focus on micro-investor platforms, although in case of radical 
innovations, the evidence suggest that non-verbal cues from the macro-investment platform can 
aid the cues of legitimacy from the micro-investor platform. The reason for such findings can be 
explained by the nature of security innovations and their relevance to public reactions. Existing 
studies in the context of security breaches suggest that firms endure negative market reactions in 
the case of such breaches (Gordon et al. 2011; Yayla and Hu 2011) while the adoption of 
security solutions can be greeted by public support (e.g., Chai et al. 2011). Micro-investor 
platforms draw on a broader audience, often similar to the future public audience of a firm; 
therefore, investors might decide to focus their attention on cues received from the 
communications with this broad audience. 
Discussion 
Social media plays an important role in helping new ventures access the potential investors 
and deliver cues that signal legitimacy. Focusing on the non-verbal symbolic actions in a new 
venture‘s communication with its audience, this essay draws on the literature on signaling theory 
and organizational innovation to theorize about the legitimacy signals sent when different 
narrators are selected to promote the venture. Moreover, and considering the prevalence of multi-
platform fundraising, we focus on the cross-effects of non-verbal symbolic actions in one micro-
investor (Twitter) and one macro-investor (AngelList) platform. Conceptualizing the non-verbal 
symbolic actions as a sequence of narrators delivering promoting messages to the audience in the 
context of BDVs, the findings reveal that ventures that are more successful in raising financial 
capital follow a similar sequence of narrators when communicating with their audience, 




Specifically, we found that successful BDVs alternate between the messages send by agents 
internal to the venture (e.g., personal or venture aliases) and those sent by external agents (such 
as news agencies or individual followers). Therefore, successful BDVs sequentially change the 
mode of promotion from self- to others‘-promotion, or vice versa.  
Moreover, our findings suggest that compared to organizational and formal aliases, personal 
aliases are more emphasized in the critical phases of raising capital (i.e., the beginning and the 
ending of the fundraising period) when a BDV pursues radical innovations. The results suggest 
that more personal communications are more effective to reduce the salient threats of newness 
that radical innovations face. Personal communications reflect on the passion of the individual 
sending a message. It suggests that the individual sees enough value in promoting the venture to 
spend his/her own time crafting a message and personally deliver it. On the contrary, with 
incremental innovations facing a larger threat of smallness, maintaining structural and procedural 
legitimacy through the utilization of a formal alias becomes more effective. Our findings support 
our theory that when new ventures follow the norms of communication by delivering messages 
in social media through an official account instead of a personal one, potential investors become 
more inclined to invest since following the norms may suggest that the new venture has the 
required resources and managerial maturity to compete with established firms. Utilizing a formal 
alias may indicate the presence of social-media management functions in the venture, and that 
may signal the presence of other important functions in the venture. Moreover, utilizing formal 
aliases when communicating reflects on the managerial understanding of what are the established 
norms of communication, thereby, suggesting managerial legitimacy of the venture‘s founders 





Figure 4a.  Ideal Sequence of Narrators in Twitter 
 
Figure 4b. Ideal Sequence of Narrators in AL 
Moreover, the findings of the study suggest that following sequences of narrators similar to 
those followed by top-performing BDVs increases the positive WoM, as well as the raised 
capital. More importantly, our findings reveal that the quality of the sequence of narrators in one 
platform can have effects in the positivity of WoM in the other. These results suggest that macro- 
and micro-investors may follow legitimacy signals in a platform other than the one in which they 
have an active presence. Specifically, when investing in radical innovations is considered, the 




platforms are high. This suggests that the signals in both platforms are conjointly evaluated by 
investors when radical innovations are considered.    
Finally, our sub-sample analysis in the different scopes of the Big Data industry reveals that 
in the scopes where the innovation is of high sensitivity to the public (i.e., Big Data Security) 
legitimacy signals are mainly received from a micro-investor platform, with its higher 
presentation of public opinion. Unlike the case of infrastructural and analytics innovations, the 
eventual success of a venture active in the scope of security may be more dependent on the 
public audience as the key stakeholder. Taken together, the results of sub-sample analysis 
suggest that sub-sections of an industry can be heterogeneous with regards to the type of 
uncertainty that investors face, and non-verbal symbolic communications pursued by new 
ventures should match such nuances. 
Contributions 
The theoretical implications of this study are threefold. First, this study extends the existing 
literature about symbolic communication in social media platforms (Fischer and Reuber 2014) 
by showing that in addition to verbal cues, non-verbal signals can also help a new venture 
promote its innovation.  Specifically, drawing on the literature about organizational legitimacy 
and signaling theory, we provide empirical evidence that selecting narrator of messages sent to 
the audience operates as a non-verbal cue embedded in organizational communications the social 
media. These findings also contribute to the existing literature about non-verbal symbolic actions 
which has evidenced presence of non-verbal cues in mostly physical behaviors but has 
overlooked non-verbal cues in communication. 
Second, the findings of the study extend the existing literature on social media and WoM in 




outcomes such as sales (e.g., Dewan and Ramaprasad 2012; Dellarocas et al. 2007; Forman et al. 
2008), less attention is paid to organizational actions to manage WoM. Focusing on the context 
of new ventures, this study suggest that promotional messages sent by an organization to its 
audience influence WoM in the social media platforms. More importantly, in spite of the 
prevalence of multi-platforming, no research to date has investigated the cross-effect that WoM 
in one platform has in another. Our study provides evidence that the audience of a specific 
platform may follow the cues generated in other platforms, and that WoM in one platform can 
affect the WoM in the other. Therefore, we provide evidence suggesting that benefits from 
managerial tactics followed in one platform can spillover to another. 
Third, this study contributes to the existing literature on organizational legitimacy by 
theorizing about the contingent role that innovation strategies play. The existing literature on 
organizational legitimacy (e.g. Suchman 1995) rarely differentiates legitimacy tactics and their 
suitability for different firms. However, the literature on strategic management suggests that the 
best course of action for one firm might not be as effective for another (Venkatraman 1989). 
Especially for new ventures, with innovation as the core driver of the value, we discuss how 
different legitimacy tactics suit the type of innovation (radical vs. incremental) a firm pursues. 
In addition to its theoretical contributions, this study has two methodological contributions. 
First, this study provides an alternative method to evaluate the radicalness of innovation in an 
entrepreneurial firm. The existing literature has mostly utilized self-reported measures (e.g., 
Ettlie et al. 1984), however, these measures may be limited by common-method biases and social 
desirability threats (e.g., Podsakoff et al. 2003). We suggest that the text-analysis of reports 
related to an innovation can provide a more objective alternative measure to evaluate its 




actions that are carried out over time. Although the existing studies describe symbolic actions as 
those that do not happen at a single point of time (e.g., Fischer and Reuber 2014), these actions 
are rarely examined over time in an empirical study. Our utilization of sequence analysis enables 
researchers to evaluate other types of symbolic actions. Further, our approach in utilizing the 
inter-sequence distance to evaluate the quality of the symbolic actions can be extended to similar 
contexts.  
Managerial Implications 
This study provides entrepreneurs a set of actions to be pursed when communicating to 
potential investors in the social media. First and foremost, our results suggest paying attention to 
selecting the narrator of a message and alternating between self-promotion and others‘-
promotion is an effect way to increase positive response from social media followers and 
eventually increase the raised financial capital. Second, our findings suggest that depending on 
the type of innovation pursued, entrepreneur should change the mode of self-promotion. 
Specifically, when radical innovations are pursued, communication in beginning and ending of 
the capital-raising period should be made through direct personal messages. To the contrary, a 
formal organizational alias may be utilized in key phases of communication (e.g., beginning and 
ending of a fundraising campaign) when the venture is focusing on development of an 
incremental innovation. Third, entrepreneurs should divide their attention between different 
social media platforms appropriately as investors may look for legitimacy cues in platforms that 
they are not primarily active in. Especially for those venture pursuing a radical innovation, a 
simultaneous pursuit of effective legitimacy tactics is met with higher payoffs. Finally, our 




should direct their focus on micro-investing platforms since likely investors pay more attention 
to reactions in a platform which is more representative of the key stakeholders‘ opinion. 
Limitations 
In spite of its contributions, the findings of the study should be interpreted while considering 
its limitations. First, in our examination of multiple social media platforms, our data is limited to 
two platforms, Twitter and AngelList. We contend that further examination of cross-platform 
effect of non-verbal symbolic communication in different platforms can increase the 
generalizability of these findings. Further, it is possible that BDVs prioritize their use of micro- 
and macro-platforms differently (e.g., using Twitter as the main channel of communication and 
AL as a secondary one). Our data is limited to allow us control for this aspect and accounting for 
such heterogeneity across BDVs‘ use of their social media platform might change the findings. 
Moreover, our data is limited in its evaluation of non-verbal symbolic actions carried out outside 
of social media. Specifically, the existing research suggests that offline face-to-face meetings, 
especially with macro-investors, are key to promote new ventures (e.g., Birley 1986; Wetzel 
1987; Harrison and Mason 1992; Webb et al. 2013; Thai and Turkina 2014). Therefore, 
additional research considering offline symbolic actions can shed more light on interactions of 
online and offline symbolic behavior and extend the current findings. Finally, our selection of 
Big Data industry as the context of the study may limit the generalization of findings. Big Data is 
considered to be an advanced area in IT (e.g., Chen et al. 2012) and communicational norms of 
IT entrepreneurial firms may be different from those in the other industries. An examination of 
similar non-verbal symbolic communications in other industries can shed more light on the 
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Tables of Chapter 4 
Table 1.  Results with WoM as the Dependent Variable 
 
WoM measured by sentiment 
 
Direct effect Interaction effect 
 
Novel Incremental Novel Incremental 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
DV= Twitter WoM AL WoM Twitter WoM AL WoM Twitter WoM AL WoM Twitter WoM AL WoM 
Sequence Quality in Twitter 0.121*** 0.094** 0.099** 0.071* 0.138*** 0.082** 0.111*** 0.065* 

















 Sequence Quality in Twitter * 
Sequence Quality in AL 
    
0.093** 0.158*** 0.018 0.009 
N 2844 2844 1269 1269 2844 2844 1269 1269 



















Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, positive language of promotional text, and dummies 
representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or B2C), location, and BDV’s year of establishment are not reported 
for brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  








Table 2.  Results with Raised Capital as the Dependent Variable 
 
WoM measured by sentiment 
 
GLS Alternative Sequence AB-GMM 
 
Direct effect Interaction effect Interaction effect Interaction effect 
 
Novel Incremental Novel Incremental Novel Incremental Novel Incremental 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model10 Model 11 Model 12 
DV= Raised capital Raised capital Raised Capital Raised capital 
Sequence Quality in 
Twitter 0.043* 0.033* 0.038* 0.042* 
0.031* 0.065** 
0.026* 0.007 
Sequence Quality in AL  0.051* 0.028* 0.017* 0.017* 0.011
# 
0.014* 0.009 0.002 
Twitter WoM 0.205*** 0.211* 0.229*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.182*** 0.098*** 0.089** 
AL WoM 0.082** 0.074* 0.073* 0.044* 0.058* 0.044
# 
0.033# 0.018# 
Sequence Quality in 
Twitter * Sequence 





Twitter WoM * AL WoM 
  
0.127*** 0.011 0.123*** 0.008 0.118*** 0.005 
N 2844 1269 2844 1269 2986 1332 2844 1269 
















Table 3.  Results with WoM as the Dependent Variable (Volume of WoM is Considered) 
Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, positive language of promotional text, and dummies 
representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or B2C), location, and BDV’s year of establishment are not reported for 
brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001; 










WoM measured by volume 
 
Direct effect Interaction effect 
 
Novel Incremental Novel Incremental 
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
DV= 




Sequence Quality in Twitter 0.211*** 0.115*** 0.257*** 0.083** 0.087** 0.119** 0.167*** 0.089* 

















 Sequence Quality in Twitter 
* Sequence Quality in AL 
    
0.115*** 0.272*** 0.003 0.011 
N 2844 2844 1269 1269 2844 2844 1269 1269 






















Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, positive language of promotional text, and dummies 
representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or B2C), location, and BDV’s year of establishment are not reported for 
brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  








Table 4.  Results with Raised Capital as the Dependent Variable (Volume of WoM is Considered) 
 




Direct effect Interaction effect Interaction effect 
 
Novel Incremental Novel Incremental Novel Incremental 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 
DV= Raised capital Raised capital Raised capital 
Sequence Quality in Twitter 0.022# 0.003 0.028# 0.010# 0.002 0.023* 
Sequence Quality in AL  0.019 0.005 0.015 0.012 0.003 0.014* 
Twitter WoM 0.355*** 0.407*** 0.375*** 0.227*** 0.082* 0.171*** 
AL WoM 0.071* 0.098** 0.062* 0.039* 0.025# 0.028* 
Sequence Quality in Twitter * 
Sequence Quality in AL 
  
0.110** 0.025 0.062# 0.005 
Twitter WoM * AL WoM 
  
0.176*** 0.009 0.221* -0.008 
N 2844 1269 2844 1269 2844 1269 




















Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, positive language of promotional text, and 
dummies representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or B2C), location, and BDV’s year of 
establishment are not reported for brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  









Table 5.  Results with WoM as the Dependent Variable- Security Sub-Sample 
 
WoM measured by sentiment 
 
Direct effect Interaction effect 
 
Novel Incremental Novel Incremental 
 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 
DV= 
Twitter WoM AL WoM Twitter WoM AL WoM Twitter WoM AL WoM Twitter 
WoM 
AL WoM 
Sequence Quality in 
Twitter 0.144*** 0.142*** 0.084* 0.062* 0.229*** 0.128*** 0.173*** 0.127*** 

















 Sequence Quality in 
Twitter * Sequence 
Quality in AL 
    
0.063* 0.141*** 0.002 0.004 
N 740 740 342 342 740 740 342 342 


















Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, positive language of promotional text, and dummies 
representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or B2C), location, and BDV’s year of establishment are not reported for 
brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  








Table 6.  Results with Raised Capital as the Dependent Variable- Security Sub-Sample 
 
WoM measured by sentiment 
 
Direct effect Interaction effect 
 
Novel Incremental Novel Incremental 
 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 
DV= Raised capital Raised capital 
Sequence Quality in Twitter 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.003 
Sequence Quality in AL  0.004 0.011 0.008 0.008 
Twitter WoM 0.326*** 0.242*** 0.092*** 0.072*** 
AL WoM 0.007 0.002 0.015 0.004 
Sequence Quality in Twitter * 
Sequence Quality in AL 
  
0.083* 0.002 
Twitter WoM * AL WoM 
  
0.332*** 0.002 
N 740 342 740 342 





















Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, positive language of 
promotional text, and dummies representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or 
B2C), location, and BDV’s year of establishment are not reported for brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  









Table 7.  Results with WoM as the Dependent Variable- Analytics Sub-Sample 
 
WoM measured by sentiment 
 
Direct effect Interaction effect 
 
Novel Incremental Novel Incremental 
 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 
DV= 
Twitter WoM AL WoM Twitter WoM AL WoM Twitter WoM AL WoM Twitter 
WoM 
AL WoM 
Sequence Quality in Twitter 0.221*** 0.031# 0.026* 0.032** 0.118*** 0.086** 0.088** 0.084** 

















 Sequence Quality in Twitter * 
Sequence Quality in AL 
    
0.188*** 0.213*** 0.004 0.011 
N 1248 1248 519 519 1248 1248 519 519 





















Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, positive language of promotional text, and dummies 
representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or B2C), location, and BDV’s year of establishment are not reported for 
brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  








Table 8.  Results with Raised Capital as the Dependent Variable- Analytics Sub-Sample 
 
WoM measured by sentiment 
 
Direct effect Interaction effect 
 
Novel Incremental Novel Incremental 
 Model 35 Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 
DV= Raised capital Raised capital 
Sequence Quality in Twitter 0.013# 0.035** 0.001 0.004 
Sequence Quality in AL  0.018# 0.013# 0.008 0.012 
Twitter WoM 0.081* 0.061* 0.082** 0.060** 
AL WoM 0.248*** 0.189*** 0.312*** 0.253*** 
Sequence Quality in Twitter * 
Sequence Quality in AL 
  
0.041* 0.008 
Twitter WoM * AL WoM 
  
0.182*** -0.005 
N 1248 519 1248 519 





















Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, positive language of 
promotional text, and dummies representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or 
B2C), location, and BDV’s year of establishment are not reported for brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  









Table 9.  Results with WoM as the Dependent Variable- Infrastructure Sub-Sample 
 
WoM measured by sentiment 
 
Direct effect Interaction effect 
 
Novel Incremental Novel Incremental 
 Model 39 Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 
DV= 




Sequence Quality in Twitter 0.314*** 0.061* 0.012# 0.025** 0.102** 0.01 0.082* 0.006 

















 Sequence Quality in Twitter 
* Sequence Quality in AL 
    
0.097*** 0.150*** 0.009 0.015 
N 856 856 408 408 856 856 408 408 





















Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, positive language of promotional text, and dummies 
representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or B2C), location, and BDV’s year of establishment are not reported for 
brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  








Table 10.  Results with Raised Capital as the Dependent Variable- Infrastructure Sub-Sample 
 
WoM measured by sentiment 
 
Direct effect Interaction effect 
 
Novel Incremental Novel Incremental 
 Model 43 Model 44 Model 45 Model 46 
DV= Raised capital Raised capital 
Sequence Quality in Twitter 0.012* 0.026** 0.002 0.003 
Sequence Quality in AL  0.018* 0.013# 0.011# 0.009 
Twitter WoM 0.052* 0.021# 0.062* 0.040* 
AL WoM 0.126** 0.317*** 0.224*** 0.184** 
Sequence Quality in Twitter * 
Sequence Quality in AL 
  
0.038# 0.007 
Twitter WoM * AL WoM 
  
0.192*** 0.002 
N 856 408 856 408 



















Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, positive language of 
promotional text, and dummies representing the scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or 
B2C), location, and BDV’s year of establishment are not reported for brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  









Appendix A. Correlation Matrix 
  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Sequence quality in Twitter 0.19 0.25       
2 Sequence quality in AL 0.23 0.31 0.18**      
3 Twitter WoM Sentiment 0.58 0.29 0.23*** 0.16*     
4 Twitter WoM Volume 118.21 43.16 0.19*** 0.07# 0.12*    
5 AL WoM Sentiment 0.52 0.26 0.14* 0.28*** 0.05 0.07   
6 Al WoM Volume 32.42 18.11 0.08# 0.17* 0.02 0.11# 0.10*  
7 Raised Capital 1.08 0.32 0.27*** 0.32*** 0.48*** 0.33** 0.18** 0.13# 






Appendix B. Illustrative Example of Social Media Promotion 
Personal Alias 
(Twitter) 
Barricade IO Retweeted 
David Coallier ‏@davidcoallier  
And this happened (@barricadeio): https://barricade.io/  
Venture Alias 
(Twitter) 
Barricade IO ‏@barricadeio  







News (Twitter) Barricade IO Retweeted 
eForensics Magazine ‏@eForensics_Mag  





Barricade IO Retweeted 
Charlie Taylor ‏@ChasTaylor  
Hot off the presses: Sophos has acquired Cork-based start-up @barricadeio, 




David Coallier commented on Barricade 
Hey Paul, the round has been opened for a while on Angel List. Would love 





Hey everyone! We've completely redefined our onboarding and would love 





Cork IT security startup to create 35 jobs - Independent.ie 
The company has been set up by serial Irish technology entrepreneur David 
Coallier, who co-founded Dublin-based Orchestra, sold to US multinational 
firm Engineyard in 2011. Barricade's expansion comes shortly after an initial 





Appendix C. The Effect of Narrator Frequencies on Capital Raised 
 
Novel Incremental 
 Model C1 Model C1 
DV= Raised capital 
Frequency of Personal Alias (Twitter) 0.112*** 0.019
# 
Frequency of Venture Alias (Twtter) 0.023 0.076** 
Frequency of News (Twitter) 0.065** 0.054** 
Frequency of Follower (Twitter) 0.083*** 0.079** 
Frequency of Personal Alias (AL) 0.203*** 0.011 
Frequency of Venture Alias (AL) 0.033
# 
0.215*** 
Frequency of News (AL) 0.037* 0.062** 
Twitter WoM 0.029* 0.014
# 
AL WoM 0.110** 0.081* 
N 2844 1269 
Wald‘s Chi 4827.1 6339.3 
 
Coefficients of variables  number of employees, education of  employees, 
positive language of promotional text, and dummies representing the 
scope of the BDV, type of innovation (B2B or B2C), location, and BDV’s 
year of establishment are not reported for brevity;  
#p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001;  
For GLS estimations, corrections for panel specific AR1 and 





Chapter 5: Conclusions 
This dissertation is motivated by contributing to two emerging topics in IS: new IT ventures, 
and the Big Data industry. On the one hand, although IT entrepreneurial firms have been 
pioneers of innovation in the field, making the Silicon Valley the symbol of IT advancements, 
research has been lacking to understand how these small, organic, and sometimes fragile 
organizations grow into giants that define the industry‘s norms and trends. Specifically, the 
field‘s understanding of the strategic factors influencing the economic ―success‖ of new IT 
ventures has been limited. On the other hand, the organizational research on Big Data 
technologies – specifically, how they emerge and grow as IT innovations and how firms benefit 
from investing them – is still in the infancy stage (Goes 2014). With most Big Data innovations 
driven by new ventures, this dissertation seizes the opportunity to understand the strategic factors 
that affect the economic success of new Big Data ventures (i.e., BDVs). 
While understanding the strategies followed by new IT ventures is the core theoretical 
phenomenon of interest in this dissertation, this phenomenon is investigated in the rich context of 
Big Data. This is done in a study of three essays. In developing the essays, we have changed our 
theoretical focus from the phenomenon to the context, and vice versa. Focusing on the Big-Data-
specific value propositions offered by BDVs, Chapter 2 has examined the context of Big Data 
and shed light on the hierarchy of Big Data technologies‘ 4V emphases. By contrast, essays 2 
and 3 have focused on the phenomenon of new IT ventures theoretically, and described this 
phenomenon in the highly relevant context of Big Data. In understanding the entrepreneurial 
success, essay 2 has drawn a distinction between the Big Data and a medical context, whereas, 
essay 3 has pointed to the differences among certain areas within the Big Data context. As a 
whole, this dissertation contributes to the literature on: new IT ventures, and Big Data. Below, 




Chapter 2 (Essay 1) 
Essay 1 is primarily focused on understanding how value is created by Big Data 
technologies. The existing literature on Big Data defines Big Data technologies as those helping 
organizations handle data that has a high volume and fast flow to organizational systems 
(volume), and is gathered from various sources and in various formats (variety), with assuring its 
veracity being a challenging task (Chen et al. 2012). These 4V challenges of Big Data, and the 
Big Data technology‘s roles in handling these challenges is almost undisputed. However, the 
existing literature is unclear about the relative value of tackling each V by different Big Data 
technologies. Specifically, it is interesting to know whether Big Data technologies are 
homogeneous with regards to their intent in tackling the 4V challenges, or there exists some 
heterogeneity.  
In this essay, we discussed that Big Data technologies include a wide architectural range, 
from infrastructural applications that allow distributed storage and retrieval of data, to analytical 
applications that use distributed computing along with advanced statistical algorithms to identify 
and model complex trends and behaviors. Therefore, the role of emphasizing each V was studied 
in each architectural scope. Our results suggested that for infrastructural technologies, only 
emphasizing volume and velocity creates value. However, as the technology moves up the ladder 
of architectural hierarchy, emphasizing the veracity and variety aspects become more relevant. 
These results suggest that the 4Vs are not homogeneous with regards to value that tackling them 
creates. Rather, depending on the scope of the Big Data technology, certain aspects become more 
important. The findings also suggest that handling volume and velocity of today‘s data is the 




In addition to bringing clarity regarding the value of emphasizing each of the 4Vs of Big 
Data, the findings show that the verbal communication of a new venture‘s value propositions 
effectively influences the financial success of the venture itself, as well as the value created for 
its investors. One finding in this essay suggests that verbally communicating value propositions 
by a third party (e.g., a news piece, or blog post about the venture) has an effect similar to when 
the message is delivered by the venture itself. These findings can direct entrepreneurs‘ attention 
towards the third party coverage of their venture as a reliable source to communicate value 
propositions to the investors. 
Chapter 3 (Essay 2) 
While communicating value propositions are important to convince investors, 
embeddedness in social networks is another means through which entrepreneurs can promote 
their product/service, and access valuable resources that are otherwise inaccessible or can only 
be accessed at a higher price (Witt 2004). The existing literature on success of new ventures has 
focused on network ties that allow accessing financial capital. Especially at their later stages of 
development, where new ventures become economically viable and competitive, financial capital 
is essential to maintain a rapid growth. Nonetheless, the role of network embeddedness in the 
development of a new venture‘s innovation in the early stages of development is less understood. 
The existing literature (e.g., Brüderl and Preisendörfer 1996, Jenssen and Greve 2002, Florin et al. 
2003) has focused on new ventures at the later stages of development (e.g., initial public offering, 
IPO) and therefore, the focus has been the access to the much needed financial capital, but 
accessing intellectual capital has remained understudied. Therefore, the relevance of the network 
embeddedness to the intellectual capital necessary for development of innovations is overlooked. 




development of innovations. We discussed that Big Data technologies have the characteristics of 
a technological area where innovations can be socially-constructed. Focusing on the literature on 
IT innovations (e.g., Couger 1973; Kautz et al. 2007), we identified the educational and professional 
networks as networks that can supply the intellectual capital needed to develop Big Data 
innovations.  
Our findings suggest that having educational and professional ties to other ventures improve 
the economic success of a BDV. We find that these results are in sharp contrast to the 
observations from a comparable industry, i.e., medical devices, where we failed to find any 
evidence that suggests inter-venture educational or professional ties help a new venture become 
economically successful. These results involve important implications. Notably, the findings 
suggest that Big Data technologies are developed socially and through associative educational 
and professional ties. The existing networks literature suggests that entrepreneurs should spend 
time to create social ties with individuals and organizations that can provide access to financial 
capital. Our findings suggest that in addition to these networking activities, entrepreneurs, 
especially those in industries that resemble the Big Data industry, should consider their 
embeddedness in networks that can supply access to intellectual capital. New ventures have 
limited resources to recruit a limited number of employees in their early stages of development. 
One implication of our findings is that entrepreneurs can use employee recruitment as a means to 
better embed their venture in the knowledge network of new ventures where technological 
innovations are co-constructed. Screening a prospective employee‘s educational and professional 
background and assessing its relevance, i.e., the degree of similarity or distinctiveness, to the 




Also, another finding in this essay suggests that a separate consideration of networks of 
different ties can resolve some of the equivocal findings of the previous literature. For example, 
the previous literature (Elfting and Hulsink 2003) suggests that a mix of network cohesions, i.e., 
density, and structural holes is required to develop radical innovations. However, network 
cohesion and structural holes can rarely co-exist in the same network. Nonetheless, if two 
networks are structurally different, one can supply a venture with the needed cohesion, while the 
other can supply access to structural holes. Using Kendall‘s rank correlation between the 
structural features, e.g., network density or restrictedness, of two different networks we showed 
how two networks can be compared to assess their structural differences. Moreover, we 
empirically validated the thesis that structurally-different networks can provide a simultaneous 
―mix‖ of seemingly-paradoxical network structures.  The previous research encourages 
superimposing networks of different ties because doing so allows for considering multiplex 
relationships between the network edges. However, as networks start becoming different, the 
likelihood of having multiplex ties in the superimposed network subsides, and instead the 
likelihood of maintaining ambivalence, i.e. access to networks with seemingly paradoxical 
features, for actors of the network increases.  Essay 2, provides an example of where a separate 
consideration of networks of different ties illuminates the importance of network ambivalence 
for ventures pursuing a radical innovation. 
Chapter 4 (Essay 3) 
Essay 1 points to the importance of communicating the worth of a venture to its investors, 
and essay 2 points to the importance of network embeddedness. Social media provides a unique 
platform for a new venture to both communicate its worth, and create ties with macro- and 




pursue in their social media. The current literature (Fischer and Rueber 2014) has examined the 
effect of the verbal content of promotional messages in social media. Similarly, our findings in 
essay 1 indicate the importance of the verbal communication of the venture‘s value propositions 
to the investors. However, promotional strategies can extend beyond verbal communications. 
Specifically, the previous literature suggests that entrepreneurs often involve in symbolic 
communications with investors, signaling certain qualities through executing a sequence of 
actions. This essay strived to understand the means through which symbolic communication is 
carried in social media. We explained that social media allows promotional messages to be 
communicated by different narrators, and that following a sequence of narrators can establish a 
form of symbolic communication by itself. We find that over time, the most successful BDVs 
alternate the narrators of their promotional messages, and avoid a monotonic communication. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that the beneficial sequence of narrators differ for ventures 
pursuing radical and incremental innovations. While the previous literature encourages 
entrepreneurs to manage the content of their messages in social media, our findings suggest that 
selecting the source of delivering the message is also of important. Moreover, our results point to 
the superiority of certain rhythms in narrating, suggesting that not only it matters who narrates 
the message, it also matters when that narrator delivers it. Also, we showed that the beginning 
and the ending periods of a fundraising campaigns are critical points at which the most 
influential narrators, depending on the radicalness of strategy, communicate with the investors. 
A second contribution of this essay is providing evidence regarding the cross-platform 
effects. Specifically, we show that ventures in the today‘s world, broadcasting to micro- and 
macro-investors in different platforms, should coordinate their promotional efforts. Our findings 




another platform, especially in the case of the more disruptive and radical innovations. Investors 
face more uncertainty when considering investment in radical innovations. Our results show that 
in the presence of such uncertainty, the search for competency signals can extend to the symbolic 
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